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Desires are usually presented as simple states whose contribution to action, choice, and 
deliberation are understood simply in terms of motivational strength and object. The challenge 
of temptation is to give an account of desires that explains why temptations should not be 
treated on a par with other desires in rational deliberation. Desires qua simple states fail this 
challenge as ex hypothesi what it is to be tempted to do some thing is for doing that thing to 
be your strongest motivation. I examine the nature of desire through the lens of temptation, 
and create a more complex picture of desires identifying and defending various properties of 
desires. These properties are: an account of how desires may be more or less stable with 
respect to reflection and new information; the emotional component of desires (desire 
responses), in variously forming and undermining our reflectively stable desires (considered 
preferences); how it is that we are psychologically disposed to value goods over time 
(hyperbolically), and the way in which it is rational to value goods over time (exponentially); 
finally an account of the difference between warranted and unwarranted changes in the 
strength of desires. Temptation is a consequence of a pervasive natural tendency to discount 
the future hyperbolically. If you discount the future hyperbolically, then the proximity of the 
good causes the comparative strength of your desire responses to reverse. Desire responses are 
produced by a perception-like system within the agent, the conative system. This reversal 
occurs because proximity constitutes abnormal operating conditions for the conative system, 
thus producing unreliable desire responses. As the visual system produces misleading visual 








responses under abnormal conditions—temptations. We can identify and compensate for these 
misleading desire responses by paying attention to the relative stability of our desires. Thus 
desires are not simple states which contribute to deliberation solely in terms of object and 
strength, but rather more complex states that contribute to deliberation in terms of their 
stability and emotional components, as well as their object and motivational strength.  
 
C H A P T E R  1  
INTRO DUCTION 
 
Desires are the most neglected element of rational deliberation. In discussions of 
deliberation, rational choice, and action theory they are generally mentioned and dismissed as 
merely a brute source of motivation or guide to the agent’s pleasures. What is intriguing is 
that such a blunt dismissal of desires is not in line with folk discussions of desire. We are 
temporally extended creatures, and in the course of living and acting, our desires change. We 
acquire new desires, we dispense with old desires, and the desires that we have change. Desire 
understood solely in terms of object and strength give a picture of rational deliberation which 
reduces it to a simple weighing of the relative strength of desires. But intuitively desires have 
many more attributes than simply strength and object. Desires can be enduring or fleeting, 
serious or frivolous, passing fancies or lifetime aims. I can desire objects, people, personal 
experiences, conceptual truths or abstract ideals. My desire may motivate actions, or be 
frustrated by my acting so as to bring them about. My desire may lie in the pleasurable 
contemplation of a state of affairs that I would be positively displeased if it occurred. A theory 
which treats all desires as given, and pays no attention to the circumstances of their inception 
or change, cannot adequately distinguish between one’s most dearly held life aim, and an 
intense but fleeting temptation to act in ways that will undermine that aim. It is these 
considerations which generate what I will call the ‘challenge of temptation’.  
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The idea that temptations should (at least some of the time), be resisted in order to 
satisfy longer term desires whose motivation is weaker at the moment of choice just seems 
obvious. To be tempted to do x is, ex hypothesi, for it to be the case that at that moment your 
strongest motivation is to do x. If all there is to desires is object and motivational strength, 
then there should be no question of resisting temptation being a desirable thing to do. After 
all, if what I am doing in giving in to temptation is simply acting on my strongest desire, and 
desires are considered only in terms of strength and object, then we have no resources left for 
explaining why I should resist temptation in order to satisfy my longer term desire. Thus the 
view that it is rational to resist temptation (in at least some cases) is at odds with the view that 
desires are simple entities which can be wholly understood in terms of their object and 
strength. The challenge of temptation is to explain why we do not consider temptations to be 
on a par with other desires, and any plausible theory of desire should be able to give an 
account of what is wrong with temptations. 
I propose that what we need to do in order to solve the problem of temptation is to pay 
attention to the emotional component of desires, as temptations occur when our motivations 
are suborned by intense experiences of desiring. Ultimately I will argue that such intense 
experiences of desiring should not be treated on a par with other desires because they are the 
product of certain pervasive mistakes, mistakes that are identifiable in deliberation through 
the stability properties of desires.   
The Challenge of Temptation 
We are no strangers to temptation. Most of us have, on a daily basis, the opportunity 
to satisfy a short term desire which, if acted upon, will undermine the fulfillment of some 
more important, longer term, desire. A simple case of this would be someone, let us call her 
Kim, who wants to lose weight in order to fit into a particular dress for her sister’s wedding. 
Generally, Kim’s desire to maintain her diet is stronger than her desire for forbidden 
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foodstuffs, but she has a weakness for chocolate. When the opportunity to eat chocolate cake is 
to hand, she is overwhelmed by her desire for the cake. Consider a particular instance: Kim is 
passing her favorite bakery at 4pm on Tuesday. At that time, she wants to eat cake more than 
to maintain her diet. But when she is temporally separated from the opportunity to eat cake, 
she wants to maintain her diet more than eat cake. Over the day, the interaction between her 
desires for cake and dieting look like this: 
 
Figure 1: Kim’s temptation 
This reversal in the strength of Kim’s desires raises the question of what she should do 
in this case. Should she give in to temptation and eat the cake, or resist temptation and 
maintain her diet? Common sense tells us that she should resist the temptation to eat the cake. 
Indeed, in the act of calling this a ‘temptation’ we are implicitly marking it as different from 
her other desires. And the difference so marked designates the temptation as, in some robust 
sense, less important than the currently weaker competing desire. However, if we understand 
the contribution of desires to choice only in terms of their motivational strength, then she 
should eat the cake. 
The aim of this dissertation is to defend a theory of desire that can make sense of our 
intuitions about temptations, and give an account of why temptations are identifiably different 
from other desires. My view is that the problem of temptation will only be solved by giving an 
account of desires that builds in an account of why it is that temptations are flawed desires, 








Before I can consider how various views of desire cope with the challenge of 
temptation, I need some more resources for talking about the properties of desires. In the next 
section I will suggest a characteristic of desires that will both add to our understanding of 
desires, and be helpful in considering the challenge of temptation. This is the property of 
stability.  
The Stability of Beliefs and Desires 
Now, one identifiable feature of temptations is that they tend to be unstable, that is, 
the power that they exert over the agent is not constant. For instance, the sight or scent of the 
chocolate cake makes it more tempting. These changes in the strength of desires are, I will 
argue, expressions of a distinct property of desires, their ‘stability’.  
The view that beliefs may be more or less stable is common in the literature on 
epistemology,1 and I contend that desires may be more or less stable in analogous ways. 
Stability for beliefs is a function of the propensity of beliefs to change in the face of new 
information. The lower the propensity for change the more stable the belief; the higher the 
propensity for change the less stable the belief.  
Stability is a property of beliefs with respect to bodies of information. This property, 
with respect to a particular set of information, is called resilience. Thus, ‘A’s belief in a 
proposition x is resilient with respect to some piece of evidence e just in case learning e will 
not greatly change the credence that A has in x’. The rough, overall level of stability of a 
particular belief can be expressed in terms of the bodies of evidence that the belief is resilient 
with respect to. By considering the relevant sets of evidence, we can have some sense of the 
                                                 
1 Stability concerns in the epistemology literature also appear as discussions of ‘diachronic coherence’. 
See, for instance, (Polanyi, 1952; Rott, 2004; Skyrms, 1984; Sobel, 1990; Sorell, 1981). Loeb 




degree to which that belief is stable. The stability of a belief is a measure of its resilience 
compared to the resilience of another belief, making stability an essentially relative notion.  
The fundamental notion of stability is the stability of a belief with respect to a body of 
evidence. However, there are other ways in which we can talk about stability. It is possible to 
compare the stability of different beliefs with respect to the same body of evidence, in order to 
get a sense of their comparative stability with respect to that piece of evidence. We can talk 
about a belief being stable with respect to a wide range of bodies of evidence, and use this to 
compare the general stability of beliefs. These two latter senses of stability are both derivative 
of the fundamental relative notion of stability, and it is the final sense that I employ in talking 
about the unqualified stability of a belief (or any other state).  
The cases of stability which I am interested in are ones in which the instability of a 
belief gives us information about something that is going wrong with that belief. I want to 
emphasize the point that not all cases of instability are problematic. That my belief that it is 
going to rain has a high propensity to change with respect to information directly relevant to 
the weather is a sign of my belief working well. Compare this with an unstable belief which 
has a high propensity to change with respect to information that is evidentially irrelevant to 
the subject of the belief, such as cases of wishful thinking. Here the changes in my beliefs look 
like a sign that my beliefs are not functioning well. It is these latter cases that I will focus on.  
A case of wishful thinking can be found in the familiar tale of Charlie Brown and the 
football. At the beginning of every football season, Charlie Brown tries to kick the football 
that Lucy was holding, and every time, Lucy pulls it away.2 Let me take a little liberty in 
filling in Charlie Brown’s psychological states here. Each time Charlie Brown is standing in 
front of Lucy, he has to choose whether to try and kick the football, or whether to walk away. 
                                                 
2 This example was suggested by Elizabeth Anderson. The football gag appeared 40 times in Schulz’s 
Charlie Brown comic strips between 1952 and 1999. 
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Before he is standing in front of Lucy, Charlie Brown swears to himself that he won’t try to 
kick the football this time, because he knows that Lucy will pull it away. After each attempt, 
Charlie Brown swears never to try and kick it again. But when Charlie Brown is standing right 
in front of Lucy, he believes that this time he will be able to kick the football. In believing this 
Charlie Brown is engaging in wishful thinking. If we look at Charlie Brown’s belief that he 
will be able to kick the football over time, it fluctuates—when he is not standing in front of 
Lucy he places little credence in the belief ‘I will be able to kick the football when Lucy is 
holding it’, while he is in front of her places a lot of credence in that belief. His belief that he 
will not be able to kick the football behaves in the opposite manner. The relative strength of 




t0  t1  t2  t4  t5 (Lucy) t3 
 
Figure 2: The case of Wishful Thinking 
The credence that Charlie Brown places in the belief that he can kick the football when Lucy is 
holding it changes when a certain state of affairs is true of him, the state of affairs in question 
being standing in front of Lucy. There is something fishy about what is going with Charlie 
Brown’s beliefs here. The change in his beliefs is caused by an event that has nothing to do 
with the truth of his beliefs. Intuitively, whether or not he is standing in front of Lucy at this 
particular point in time will not by itself cause it to be more or less likely that Lucy will pull 
the football away when he is standing in front of her. And it seems that the credence that he 
places in the proposition ‘I will kick the football when Lucy is holding it’ should only be 
responsive to information about the likelihood of him kicking the ball when Lucy is holding it, 
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which is in turn dependant on the likelihood of Lucy pulling the football away. Because the 
information that he is presently in front of Lucy is evidentially irrelevant to Charlie Brown’s 
belief that he can kick the football when she is holding it, it should have no effect on the 
credence that he places in this belief, yet it clearly does. I will call such a belief change 
‘unwarranted’. When changes in beliefs are warranted, then, they will be caused by some 
change in the world which is evidentially relevant to the truth of the proposition.  
I propose that we can generalize the type of stability story that I have given for beliefs 
to all propositional attitudes that have similar attributes, including desires. Schematically, the 
stability of a propositional attitude will be a function of the propensity of that attitude to 
change under conditions conducive to change in that attitude. So, we have some propositional 
attitude such as a belief, desire, intention, or hope. To be susceptible to a stability story the 
propositional attitude must have some measure of strength, and some identifiable class of 
events that are capable of changing the attitude, a ‘change event’. The measure of strength, 
and particular change events, will vary with the attitude in question. Strength for beliefs is the 
credence which the agent has for the truth of a proposition, while strength for desires is the 
desire’s measure of motivational force. 3 For beliefs, the primary change event is learning new 
evidence. Learning new evidence will also be a change event for other propositional attitudes 
insofar as they depend on beliefs. Reflection is another type of change event for propositional 
attitudes. Now, for each distinct type change event for a kind of propositional attitude, we can 
construct a measure of stability for that propositional attitude. That measure of stability 
captures the resilience of any particular state with respect to a particular change event. So, ‘A’s 
propositional attitude toward x is resilient with respect to change event e just in case e’s 
occurrence does not change A’s propositional attitude toward x. We can then talk about such 
                                                 
3 This is a view proposed by (Davidson, 1980; Schroeder, 2004; Smith, 1998) among others. 
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stability comparatively, with respect to either single change events or various sets of change 
events. 
I propose that there are two types of change events for desires, and thus two types of 
stability. The first is stability with respect to new information, which is a property of desires 
that depend upon other propositional attitudes (such as beliefs). The second is stability with 
respect to reflection, which is a property of all desires. I will discuss these in turn.  
We can get some sense of how many desires are dependent upon other propositions 
(and thus capable of being more or less stable with respect to new information), by considering 
the decision theoretic distinction between epistemically basic and non-basic desires. A basic 
desire is a desire for which there is no proposition such that were the agent to learn it to be 
true, her desire would change. A desire for p is epistemically basic just in case the agent’s 
desire for p does not depend on any of her beliefs. We can understand the dependence of a 
desire p on the truth of some proposition q in terms of how the truth of q affects the 
desirability of p. If you have an epistemically basic desire for p, then (p & q) will be just as 
desirable to you as (p & ~q), both of which will be just as desirable to you as p.4 In contrast, if 
you have an epistemically non‐basic desire for p (which is dependent on q), then (p & q) 
will be more (or less) desirable to you than (p & ~q).5  
Only highly specific propositions (such as propositions which describe whole possible 
worlds) will count as basic desires using this definition. The main property of basic desires that 
                                                 
4 This account of the basic-ness of desires is drawn from standard decision theoretic accounts such as 
those given by James M. Joyce. (Joyce, 1999) 
5 A larger class of desires than basic desires is the class of practically basic desires.  Practically basic 
desires are not actually basic because there are in principle certain things that you could learn which 
would cause you to change your desire.  But such desires for p are practically basic because for any q 
that you have a realistic probability of learning, you are indifferent among the desirability of p, (p & q), 
and (p & ~q).   
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is of interest to us here is that basic desires so defined will be stable no matter what you learn.6 
New information will not be a change event for such basic desires, although it will be for all 
other desires. Given that it is likely that no or few such basic desires exist, it is the case that 
most desires will be dependent upon other propositions. These desires will then be responsive 
to evidence regarding the truth of those propositions on which they depend. Thus new 
information will be a change event for the vast majority of desires.  
Common instances of epistemically non-basic desired are desires for a means to some 
end. For instance, I desire a hammer as a means to drive in a nail. If I learn that rubber duckies 
are the best tool for the job, then my desire for a hammer (given that it depends on my 
believing it to be the case that ‘hammers are the best tools for driving in nails’), will change.7  
Now, considering new information as a change event for desires we can construct a 
measure of resilience (and thus a measure of stability) for desires. Resilience, as in the belief 
case, will not be a property of individual desires; rather it will be a two-place relation between 
particular desires, and specific pieces of new information (evidence). As the stability of a belief 
is a function of its resilience with respect to new information, the stability of a desire will also 
                                                 
6 If I have a basic desire, and I learn something, the fact of my learning that thing will not change my 
desire. It will have no evidential impact on my desire. However, there is another way in which learning 
some thing may change my desires, even if they are basic. This is the case in which learning some thing 
has a causal impact on my desire. For instance, I have a basic desire for chocolate cake, and learning that 
my nana has died causes me not to desire chocolate cake any more. But learning this information 
changes my desire through brute causal force, as it were, not through any process of reasoning. So the 
claim is not that learning new information can never change a basic desire, but rather that learning new 
information cannot change a basic desire in virtue of its evidential impact.  
7 There are several common types of information that epistemically non-basic are often responsive to. 
Another type of information on which desires commonly depend is information about what the world 
would be like if the desire were fulfilled. Desires for certain experiences will be responsive to 
information about what the experience will be like. If I learn that the chocolate cake that looks so 
delicious has been baked with salt rather than sugar, then I will no longer desire that cake, as I 
(correctly) infer that the experience of eating the cake will not be that experience in virtue of which I 
generally desire to eat chocolate cake. The second is information about particular experiences. One of 
the reasons I desire to engage in certain activities is because I have certain expectations about what that 
experience will be like. Information that I learn now about what that experience will be like for me is 
relevant to my desire in that in (at least) some cases, it seems that my desire should change if I learn 
that my expectations about the experience are mistaken.  
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be a function of its resilience with respect to new information. The level of stability of a 
particular desire can be expressed in terms of the sets of evidence that the desire is resilient 
with respect to. So, ‘A’s desire for a state of affairs x is resilient with respect to some set of 
evidence e just in case learning e will not change the desire that A has for x.’ Thus the stability 
of a desire is a function of how likely that desire is to change with respect to learning new 
information. Stability for desires, like stability for beliefs, is essentially a relative notion.8  
As desires differ in the extent to which they depend on the truth of other propositions, 
so they will differ in how susceptible they are to change as a response to new evidence. Using 
these differences, we can construct a hierarchy of desires.  At the most stable end of this 
hierarchy will be basic desires.  At the least stable end of this hierarchy are those desires which 
depend on beliefs which can be undermined by learning any new information at all, where 
that new information is likely to be learned by the agent. The majority of desires, however, 
will fall somewhere between these two extremes. Thus epistemically non-basic desires have 
the structure that, like beliefs, they may be compared in terms of how resilient they are with 
respect to new information.  
The second type of stability that I will propose is the stability of desires with respect to 
reflection. Reflection is a change event for desires because we are agents with multiple 
concerns and aims, and our various desires do not exist in isolation from one another. In order 
to act in any principled way at all, we must seek to balance this plurality of ends. An agent 
                                                 
8 As desires differ in the extent to which they depend on the truth of other propositions, so they will 
differ in how susceptible they are to change as a response to evidence. Using these differences, we can 
construct a hierarchy of desires. At the most stable end of this hierarchy is what we might call 
practically basic desires. Practically basic desires are not actually basic as there are in principle certain 
things that you could learn which would cause you to change your desire. However such desires for p 
are practically basic in that for any q that you have a realistic probability of learning, you are indifferent 
among the desirability of p, (p & q), and (p & ~q). At the least stable end of this hierarchy are those 
desires which depend on beliefs which can be undermined by learning a wide range of new information, 
where that new information is likely to be learned by the agent. Most desires will fall somewhere 
between these two extremes. 
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who frequently acts on the impulses of the moment, rather than reflecting upon her corpus of 
beliefs and desires and determining which of her desires are most important, will, by her own 
lights, do badly at satisfying those desires. An agent requires a certain amount of consistency 
amongst her desires if she is ever to be successful in achieving her ends at a time, let alone in 
achieving her ends over time. When such consistency is achieved by an agent, it is done so 
through reflection. The experience of desiring two contradictory things, reflecting upon them 
and establishing which should be pursued and which foregone is far too common an 
experience to deny. I may have a certain desire right now, but if I were to reflect upon the 
corpus of my beliefs and desires, this desire may strengthen or weaken as a result of my 
reflection.9 
As with the case of the resilience of desires with respect to new information, we can 
construct a measure of resilience (and thus a measure of stability) for desires with respect to 
reflection. Each act of reflection can be defined in terms of the information which is considered 
in that act. The set of possible information for each act of reflection is the full corpus of the 
agent’s beliefs and desires, and each possible combination of this information constitutes a 
distinct act of reflection. The level of stability of a particular desire can be expressed in terms 
of the acts of reflection that the desire is resilient with respect to.  So, ‘A’s desire for a state of 
affairs x is resilient with respect to some act of reflection r just in case performing r will not 
change the strength of the desire that A has for x.’ Thus the stability of a desire with respect 
to reflection is a function of how likely it is to change under reflection.  
The type of reflection that I am considering is rational reflection. I take it that 
reflection is capable of producing change in desires in two ways. One of these is purely causal. 
If I reflect on some horrible experience, and the trauma of this reflection causes me to abandon 
                                                 
9 Note that this is a distinct change event from new information, as the agent does not require any 
external input to change her desires through this method.  Reflection may change desires even in the 
absence of any newly learnt or discovered evidence. 
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all my desires through some sort of psychological schism, then the mechanism of this change 
is not the content of the reflection—my reasons—but rather it is the causal power of the fact 
of the reflection that causes my desire to change. In contrast, the type of reflection that I am 
concerned with here is rational reflection, which causes desires to change in virtue of the 
conclusion reached in that act of reflection.  
Achieving consistency among desires through reflection is a matter of retaining those 
desires that are consistent with one another, and discarding those that are not. However, given 
that there is no fact of the matter about which desire should be discarded in such a conflict and 
which desire retained, each agent must establish a rough hierarchy of importance amongst her 
desires in order to solve this question.10 The view that such hierarchies exist stems from the 
idea that there is no ‘view from nowhere’ from which we can reflect on our desires. In the 
process of reflection we treat certain desires as fundamental, those which are the starting 
points for our deliberation. In cases of conflict amongst desires, fundamental desires are those 
that cause changes in competing desires, rather than being changed themselves. Using the 
propensity of different desires to change under reflection, we can create a hierarchy of 
reflective basic-ness for desires. The more susceptible a desire is to change through reflection, 
the less reflectively basic it is. Reflection is not a change event for a fundamental or 
reflectively basic desire in such a hierarchy. Thus an agent’s corpus of desires at any given 
time can be organized into a hierarchy of reflective basic-ness. Just as in the belief case, where 
desires lie in this hierarchy of importance has implications for their stability.  Desires at the 
                                                 
10 In saying this I do not want to commit myself to the view that all desires are comparable.  I take it 
that an agent who has pluralistic concerns that cannot be reduced to a dimension of comparison will 
construct multiple such hierarchies, and achieve consistency in this way. Nor do I want to imply that is 
seeking such consistency an agent only succeeds when she establishes a complete ordering of her 
desires, I take it that in many cases of reflection very rough hierarchies are sufficient. 
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lower end of this hierarchy will be unstable with respect to reflection, while desires at the 
higher end will be stable with respect to reflection.11 
Now, paying attention to the stability features of desires not only gives us another 
way of talking about them, but one which can begin to make some sense of why temptations 
are different to other desires. Both instrumental and intrinsic desires can be more or less 
stable. The instability if instrumental desires can be understood in terms of changes in the 
cognitive structure which supports such desires. If my desire for P, depends upon my belief 
that Q, and my belief in Q is unstable, it will follow that my desire for P is unstable with 
respect to new information. Suppose that my belief in Q is actually an instance of wishful 
thinking, where the change in Q is triggered by the proximity of some particular thing. In this 
case my desire for P will demonstrate the same shift in intensity as Kim’s desire for cake in 
fig. 1. But this cannot be the whole story of temptation, as mere instability with respect to new 
information does not make a desire a temptation (although it may be a clue that there is 
something fishy about that desire). Temptation usually takes place in the absence of new 
information about the about the object of one’s desires. For instance, the mechanism of Kim’s 
temptation seems to be a shift in the strength of her intrinsic, rather than instrumental 
desires.  
In the case of Kim, the fluctuation of the felt intensity of her desire to eat the cake (her 
emotional experience of desiring) is not a response to changes in the properties in virtue of 
which she finds the cake desirable. The strength of Kim’s desire for the cake is changing in 
                                                 
11 Stability with respect to reflection, like stability with respect to new information, is essentially a 
relative notion.  The stability of a desire under reflection is a measure of its resilience compared to the 
resilience of another desire.  It tells us which of the desires presently to hand is more likely to change if 
the agent were to examine them in light of her full corpus of beliefs and desires. Desires with no 
resilience under reflection at all will be changed by the most cursory act of reflection. This is in contrast 
to desires with maximal resilience with respect to reflection, which will not change under reflection no 
matter how rigorous the reflection that the agent subjects them to.  However the stability of desires 
comes in degrees.  The vast majority of desires will lie somewhere between these two extremes. 
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response to the mere proximity of the cake, rather than any change in either her certainty 
about receiving the cake, or the relevant properties of the cake. Like the case of wishful 
thinking, this instability in her desire for the cake is not moving Kim toward a better grasp of 
the underlying goodness of the outcome for her. Instead it appears to be a shift in her intrinsic 
desire for the cake, a shift that is not motivated by any changes in the properties of the cake in 
virtue of which she finds it desirable. By taking these stability properties seriously we can 
treat desires as being more complex than is allowed by the standard, simplistic view of desires. 
Moreover this additional property gives us an analysis of what is going on in the case of 
temptation, which is a first step to answering the challenge of temptation.  
The Structure of the Dissertation 
The challenge of temptation is problematic for current theories of desire, especially 
those views of desire which treat desires as simply having an object and a measure of 
motivational strength. The tricky case, and the subject of this dissertation, is the case of 
temptation which is generated by the experience of feeling an urge for some thing. I propose 
that this is a case which can only be understood if we first understand how the emotional 
components of desires work. Thus a view of desire capable of answering the challenge of 
temptation needs to address not only how these emotional components of desire generate 
temptations, but why they should not be treated on a par with other desires in deliberation. 
The bulk of the dissertation is an attempt to establish an account of what these emotional 
components of desire are.  
In the next two chapters I consider various views of desire, and how they 
accommodate both stability and temptation. In the second chapter, I consider two views of 
desire that treat desires as various species of cognitive, rather than conative, attitudes. The 
first is the view that desires are a species of judgment, which is the view of ‘Judgmentalism’ 
about desire. The second is Scanlon’s argument that desires should be understood as a type of 
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reason. I argue that both of these views fail the challenge of temptation in the same way—
they ultimately hold both that desires which the agent does not endorse (i.e. conflict with 
longer term, weaker although plausibly more important aims, for instance, temptations) are 
simply not desires. Judgmentalism cannot answer the challenge of temptation because only 
internally coherent desires turn out to count as desires, so they deny the existence of the 
phenomena. Scanlon’s reasons view similarly reduces to the claim that we can only desire that 
which is, in a relatively robust sense, consistent with our other views. Thus these approaches 
only solve the challenge of temptation in an uninformative way, by eliminating temptations, 
and thus the challenge of temptation, by fiat. This does not respect the robustness of 
experiences of temptation. 
In the third chapter I consider three conative views of desire; two of them familiar, and 
one less so. In historical and contemporary philosophical, psychological, and neuro-
physiological discussions of desire, desires qua conative states have been presented in three 
distinct ways. These are the three faces of desire: motivation, pleasure, and reward. The first 
two of these inform various skeletal and widely used concepts of desire such as: ‘mental states 
capable of motivating action’; or ‘positive affect toward some end’, which capture the 
Motivational Theory of Desire, and the Hedonic Theory of Desire respectively. The third 
view, that of desire qua reward, is championed by Timothy Schroeder in “The Three Faces of 
Desire”. This is the Reward Theory of Desire.  
Neither the Motivational nor Hedonic theories of desire can answer the challenge of 
temptation because temptations, in terms of the relevant characteristics of motivation and 
pleasure, look just like other desires. The reward view is plausible in many ways, but it still 
cannot answer the challenge of temptation. Representations of tempting things produce 
reward signals in the same way as other desires, so this view alone cannot distinguish 
temptations from other desires.  
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I propose that what is missing from the views of desire canvassed in chapters two and 
three is an explicit recognition of the fact that our desires are intimately connected to certain 
kinds of emotional responses. It is the nature and origin of these emotional responses of 
desiring, that both cause temptations, and explain why it is that they should not be treated on 
a par with other desires in rational deliberation. Proving this point is the aim of the fourth and 
fifth chapters.  
In the fourth chapter I argue that not only do these emotional components of desire 
exist, but that they affect our desires, and can be manipulated in certain ways. I give a basic 
outline of what this felt emotional component of desires looks like, and defend its 
psychological plausibility. These emotional components of desires are the characteristic 
phenomenological corollaries of desires which are a type of automatic affective responses, 
‘desire responses’. I contrast these desire responses with what I call the ‘considered 
preferences’ of the agent. A considered preference is a full-fledged desire that is stable with 
respect to minimal reflection, over time, and across circumstances.12 These requirements of 
minimal stability are meant to exclude desires which are degenerate in a variety of ways. As a 
species of automatic affective responses, desire responses are produced by some system in the 
agent which processes such representational and affective responses, which I call the conative 
system.  
I then give an account of how such emotional responses work, and what constraints we 
can place on them by employing a loose analogy with D’Arms and Jacobson’s response-
dependent theory of emotion. The constraint that I will propose for the emotional response of 
desiring is that such responses can more or less ‘fitting’ in the same way that emotions can be 
more or less fitting according to D’Arms and Jacobson. What it is for an emotion to be fitting, 
                                                 




then, is that it is the appropriate response to the relevant property. That is, the response gets 
the property right. What it is for the response to get the property right is that the response 
tracks the norm established by the responses of normal subject under normal conditions. A 
desire response that does not ‘fit’ in this sense is mistaken in some identifiable way—it fails to 
reflect that which it is supposed to reflect.  
Thus I argue that what it is for such a response to be mistaken is that it fails to track 
the ‘normal’ response for that agent, a norm which is established by appealing to both the 
‘normal’ desire responses of the agent—those responses that she has in the absence of any 
interference—and the vanishing point desires of that agent. Considering the connection 
between our desires and these emotional components of desire I argue yields an account of 
what causes temptations, and why they should not be treated on a par with other desires in 
deliberation. The hypothesis that I propose about the abnormal conditions for operation for 
the conative system is that proximity undermines the fit of our desire responses in the same 
way that distance undermines our visual perceptions of relative size. The desire response that 
results from such a manipulation is flawed, and should be discounted in deliberation, which 
explains why temptations should not be treated the same as other desires in rational 
deliberation. 
Now, the real challenge of temptation is not that we sometimes have an intense 
emotional experience of desiring some thing when it is proximal, even if that thing is contrary 
to our longer term aims. But rather that it is not obvious to us at the moment of desiring that 
satisfy this urge is contrary to our considered preferences. Temptation is not merely an 
emotional overlay of preferences that can easily be dismissed when it leads us astray, it also 
misleads us about our considered preferences are by undermining our ability to effectively 
reflect on what they actually are. All temptations have in common the effect of distorting the 
agent’s reflections on her considered preferences. What we need is an explanation of how it is 
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that such proximal desires interfere with an agent’s ability to reflect on what her considered 
preferences actually are, as well as an account of why it is that the proximate desires which 
count as temptations should be discounted in deliberation. This is the subject of chapter five.  
In the fifth chapter I fill out the argument proposed in the fourth chapter by 
identifying why it is that the conative system reliably produces mistaken desire responses 
under the conditions of proximity, and how it is that proximity interferes with our desire 
responses. Temptation, I argue, is best understood as a consequence of a pervasive natural 
tendency to discount the future hyperbolically. I rely on George Ainslie’s seminal work in 
establishing that the default rate at which we discount the future is hyperbolic. If you discount 
the future hyperbolically, then the mere proximity of the good causes the comparative 
strength of your desire responses to reverse. This reversal occurs, I argue, because proximity 
constitutes abnormal operating conditions for the conative system, thus producing unreliable 
desire responses. These responses are unreliable because they are the result of the 
inappropriate intensity of the emotional response of desiring.  
Our desires are (partially) caused by the properties in virtue of which we take the 
objects of our desire to be desirable. These properties not only cause in us ‘full-fledged’ desires 
that we reflect upon and endorse (considered preferences), but also automatic affective 
responses that constitute the emotional experience of desiring that thing (desire responses). 
Both of these states have a measure of motivational strength, and we tend to assume that they 
track one another. Thus our motivations can be supplied either by our considered preferences 
or our desire responses. However when these two measure of motivational strength come 
apart, we must reconcile them. Hyperbolic discounting is just such a case when these two 
measures of motivational strength come apart, and it is through this mechanism that 
hyperbolic discounting creates temptations.  
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I argue that, in the case where these two measures of motivational strength come 
apart, we aim to achieve a loose reflective equilibrium between the strength of considered 
preferences and the strength of desire responses. So, there is a range of conditions under 
which I desire the cake, and I desire it in virtue of its desirable features. The automatic 
affective response that is the desire response also occurs over a range of conditions. Both 
considered preferences and desire responses are in part produced by a common cause—the 
properties in virtue of which the thing is desirable to you. However, we tend to encounter 
difficulties when these two conditions come apart. If one of these measures of motivation is 
mistaken, then it should be discounted in achieving this equilibrium. I propose that the 
mistaken desire responses should be discounted in achieving reflective equilibrium between 
the motivational strength of desire responses and the motivational strength of considered 
preferences, on the grounds that it results from the conative system operating under abnormal 
circumstances.  
The final element of my argument is to propose that the stability of desires gives the 
agent indirect but reliable access to the strength of her considered preferences even when she 
is in the grip of temptation. We can appeal to the comparative stability of our motivations in 
order to identify flawed desire responses and discount them in deliberation, thus giving an 
indirect way for the agent to identify, and therefore resist, temptations. I propose that 
appealing to the stability of desires will give us an account of what precisely it is that is wrong 
with Gauthier’s proximal preferences (desire responses), which in turn will generate an 
account of why they should not be treated the same as other desires in rational deliberation. 
Gauthier, however, leaves it a mystery why we have these proximal shifts in our preferences, 
and does not address the question of precisely what it is that is wrong with them.  
Hyperbolic discounting shows why it is that the conative system yields felt emotional 




this, it shows how pervasive mistakes in intensity occur in the conative system in the 
formation of proximal desires that count as temptations. Isolating the mechanism of 
hyperbolic discounting thus explains what causes these proximal shifts in our desires in 
temptation cases, and why they are mistaken. 
However, the underlying aim of the dissertation is not simply to argue for the 
particular answer to the challenge of temptation that I defend, but rather to demonstrate that 
the challenge of temptation requires us to treat desires as far more complex states than we 
generally do. Indeed, I take the main contribution of this dissertation to be the characteristics 
of desires that I identify, analyze, and defend in the course of giving this response to the 
challenge of temptation. Specifically: the account of how desires may be more or less stable 
with respect to reflection and new information; the role of the emotional component of 
desires, desire responses, in variously forming and undermining our reflectively stable desires 
(our considered preferences); the uneasy relationship between how it is that we are 
psychologically disposed to value goods over time (hyperbolically), and the way in which it is 
rational to value goods over time (exponentially); and the account of the difference between 
warranted and unwarranted changes in the strength of desires. 
 
 
C H A P T E R  2  
THE META PHYSI CS  OF  DESIRE 
 
This chapter is a preliminary investigation what kinds of theories of desire can both 
answer the challenge of temptation, and accommodate the stability properties of desires. Its 
aim is to disprove a tempting general thesis about desires, the view that desires can be reduced 
to some other mental phenomena. In this chapter I will consider two such reductive theses. 
The first is what I will term ‘Judgmentalism’ about desire, which is the view that desires are a 
type of judgment. The second is the view that Scanlon proposes in ‘What We Owe to Each 
Other’, which identifies desires with a type of reason. Both of these views are in the 
cognitivist tradition, in that they are aiming to explain desires in terms of a cognitive, rather 
than conative, attitude. Considering such views is necessary for my overall project because if a 
view of this cognitivist sort is correct, then how it is that desires may be more or less stable is 
not an independently interesting question, rather the stability properties of desires will be a 
matter of the stability properties of these other states. There are various possible views about 
desire which explain desires in terms of other mental states such as beliefs, judgments, or 
reasons. In this chapter I will argue against two of the most prominent examples of such 
views. Ultimately I will argue that neither is a satisfactory alternative to a broadly Humean 
(conative) conception of desires, in part because these views cannot address the problem of 
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temptation. Indeed, I will argue that such views eliminate the challenge of temptation through 
the somewhat implausible mechanism of excluding temptations from the class of desires.13   
Judgmentalism 
The first possibility that I will address is the view that desires are judgments, which I 
will call Judgmentalism. To be a judgmentalist about desire is to hold that all desires are 
judgments, rather than some simpler state. There is more than one way of understanding 
judgments about desires, and thus more than one version of Judgmentalism. I will consider 
two types of Judgmentalism, each of which depends upon a different way of understanding 
judgments about desires. To begin with I need to explicate the nature of judgments, as this is 
necessary to fully grasp what it means to say that desires just are judgments.  
Within the generic category of ‘judgments’, there are two much discussed subsidiary 
forms, theoretical judgments and practical judgments.  Broadly speaking theoretical judgments 
are taken to be judgments about matters of fact, while practical judgments are taken to be 
judgments of an agent regarding how they ought/will/should act.  For those who hold that 
practical judgments are a distinct type of judgment, the mark of a practical, as opposed to 
theoretical, judgment, is that it should somehow cause (or at least be capable of causing), 
actions.  Theoretical judgments, on the other hand, are taken to be motivationally inert by 
those whose accept the existence of practical judgments.14 The relationship between these two 
                                                 
13 Note that a more traditional cognitivist view of desires, like the rationalist view attributed to Kant, is 
not contrary to my project as it still requires an account of intrinsic desire that can make sense of 
temptation. This view “…sees reason as, in addition to its instrumental function, capable of in some 
sense determining the agent's ends independently of desire and in some cases of motivating the agent to 
act independently of, and potentially contrary to, the ends given by the "lower faculty" of desire.” 
(Hurley, 1989) There are, then, two different sources of or grounds for practical reason on this account, 
one in desire and the other in reason itself.” Temptations are ends that arise in the ‘lower faculty’ which 
produces intrinsic desires, and the Kantian does not want to treat all intrinsic desires as they do 
temptations. Thus the Kantian still requires an account of how it is that temptations differ from other 
intrinsic desires.  
14 “Practical reasoning in this more or less technical sense leads to (or modifies) intentions, plans, and 
decisions.  Theoretical reasoning in the corresponding technical sense leads to (or modifies) beliefs and 
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forms of judgment is controversial. What is readily agreed by all is that there is such a thing 
as epistemological or theoretical judgment, so I shall take epistemological judgment as the 
model for judgments.  
Svavarsdottir gives an account of the standard epistemological usage of the term 
‘judgment’ that I will use as a framework for discussion: 
“[The term] ‘Judgment’ is standardly used to designate a mental event (a cognitive act) 
closely related to the cognitive state of believing something: the belief that such and such 
is a state that grounds the disposition to judge such and such.  When judging such and 
such, an agent is affirming, in thought or language, that such and such is the case.”15 
This standard conception of judgment is composed of two elements. One is a belief, while the 
other is a commitment to, or endorsement of, the good epistemological standing of that belief. 
In the interests of simplicity I will analyze judgments by postulating the fewest possible 
elements. Given the general understanding of mental states that we are working with—
propositional attitudes— I will in the first instance treat all of the elements of judgments as 
propositional attitudes. For notational purposes, I will express attitudes in all capital letters 
(ATTITUDE), and indicate the propositional content of the attitude with angular brackets 
(<that p>). Now, it is clear that one of the elements of an epistemological judgment is a belief. 
What sets epistemic judgments apart from other beliefs is an explicit element of endorsement 
of the epistemic status of that belief. The question is how we should understand this second 
endorsement element of the judgment.  
The candidates for this element of endorsement are those mental states which are 
taken to be elements of reasoning broadly construed, beliefs and desires. The distinction 
between beliefs and desires is standardly considered to be one between cognitive and conative 
attitudes. Cognitive attitudes are those whose epistemic status depends on such and such being 
                                                                                                                                                 
expectations.”  Here Harman differentiates between the two types of reasoning (and hence the two 
types of judgment), on the basis of the content and function of that reasoning.  (Harman, 2004, p. 45.) 
15 Svavarsdóttir, 2006. 
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the case. Conative attitudes are those desires, hopes, wishes etc. that express the way that the 
agent wants the world to be. The endorsement element of a judgment is something in the 
territory of an affirmation of the content of the judgment. The question is whether this 
affirmation takes a cognitive or conative form. Conative states reflect the way that the agent 
wants the world to be, rather than the way that they take the world, or their beliefs, to be. 
Cognitive states reflect the way that the agent takes the world, and her beliefs, to be. If we 
take endorsements to be conative, then the endorsement element of the epistemological 
judgment will look something like: WANT/HOPE/WISH/DESIRE <to BELIEVE <that p>>. 
This clearly does not capture the endorsement element of epistemic judgments, as it expresses 
something about the way that the agent wants the world to be, rather than the way that she 
takes the world to be. And a prerequisite for endorsing some thing the way that it is, is that 
you take the way that it is to be a part of the way that the world is. Thus conative states are 
not plausible candidates for the endorsement role. This leaves cognitive states to fulfill the role 
of endorsement in judgments.  
I propose that we can capture this endorsement element through a second belief, thus 
modeling epistemic judgments as a pair of beliefs. This second belief is a belief about the 
question of whether or not your evidence is sufficient to support your belief. Specifically, it is 
a belief that the credence that you place in p fits your evidence that p. Note that the picture of 
judgment that I am proposing here is an explicitly internalist one. The agent judges only in 
those cases where she has access to the evidence for her belief that p, and believes that her 
credence in p fits this evidence. What makes this an internalist picture is that I am proposing 
that the agent must have access to the evidence for her belief in p in order to judge that p. This 
picture satisfies the ideal of ontological minimalism in that it does not posit any entities other 
than those widely accepted.  
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There are a variety of mental phenomena in the immediate locale of judgments that 
must be kept separate. These are: the act of judging; the mental state of judgment; and the 
process of reasoning that leads to judging. The mental state of judgment is what we get after 
an act of judgment. The act of judgment bridges the gap between reasoning, and having a 
(mental state of) judgment. Reasoning leads to judgment, although it is not the same as 
judgment. In the clearest cases, all three of these elements work together, while remaining 
conceptually separate. I will focus on the relationship between reasoning and judging as it 
highlights an important characteristic of judgment. 
So, you have an epistemological judgment that p when you believe that p, and you 
believe that the credence that you place in p fits your evidence that p. One thing that you do 
in judging that p is that you make and an implicit connection, between believing that p and 
endorsing the BELIEF <that p>, explicit. This explicit endorsement is generated by reasoning 
your way to a judgment. Now, as a rational believer, in believing that p to degree .7, I 
implicitly commit myself to believing that this is the degree of belief which is supported by 
my evidence as if I believed that a .7 credence in p was not supported by my evidence, then I 
would not believe p to degree .7. In the case of garden variety beliefs such an endorsement is 
part and parcel of having a belief.  
In the case of mere belief, it is possible (if incoherent) for an agent to hold a belief 
without an endorsement, however an endorsement is necessary for a judgment. So what 
distinguishes judgment from mere belief is that the existence of this endorsing belief is 
guaranteed. Note that I am not claiming that this sort of endorsement is only present in cases 
of judgment, rather that this endorsement is explicit in cases of judgment.  
Thus we have a model of judgment where what it is to judge that p, is to: BELIEVE 
<that p>, and BELIEVE <that the credence that you place in p fits your evidence that p.> Less 
formally we can understand this endorsement element of a judgment as an evaluative 
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proposition of the form: this is the right belief to hold in light of the evidence. Now that we 
have some sense of the nature of judgments in the clearest case of epistemic judgments, we 
can consider what judgments capable of explaining desires might look like.  
Desires as Judgments 
The aim of this part of the discussion is to show that a theory of desire which takes 
desires to be a species of judgment cannot answer the challenge of temptation. I will argue that 
such a view must hold that temptations are not desires at all, as they are not the kind of states 
that tend to be endorsed by the agent. This, I propose, is more a case of ignoring a problem 
than a plausible explanation of why it is not a problem at all. A plausible view of desires must 
encompass an account of temptations as a type of flawed desires, rather than merely deeming 
them not to be desires by fiat. So my agenda is to argue against all forms of Judgmentalism.  
There is two ways of understanding judgments about desires, and thus two types of 
Judgmentalism. One form of Judgmentalism is phenomena driven, in that it moves from a 
natural way to understand judgments about desires, to the claim that desires just are this type 
of judgment. The second form of Judgmentalism is theory driven in that it begins with the 
aim of giving a certain type of account of desires, which entails that judgments about desires 
be understood in a certain way. I will consider these in turn. 
Humean Judgmentalism 
Here is a picture about judgments about desires that I think is correct. This is the 
picture there are desires broadly understood as conative states that have the ability to 
motivate, whose object can also be the object of beliefs such as the belief that this thing is 
desirable. Call desires construed as propositional attitudes capable of motivation Humean 
desires to distinguish them from various other models of desire. Given the presence of such 
states, it is pretty straightforward to give an account of how judgment works in the case of 
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such desires that is similar to the way in which judgment works in the case of belief. In the 
belief case, we move from a belief to an epistemic judgment by adding a further belief which is 
an affirmation of the good epistemic standing of the initial belief. In the case of Humean 
desires is it easy to begin with such a desire, and move to an analogous state of conative 
judgment by adding a belief which is an affirmation of the desire. An endorsement of a desire 
of the kind required by judging cannot merely be the affirmation that you possess the desire. 
Rather, it needs to say something about the ‘good standing’ of this desire. I take it that what it 
is for a desire to be in good standing is for its object to be desirable in light of your reasons, or 
some similar formulation. 
Let us call judgments whose contents are such attitudes ‘conative judgments’. The 
content of the conative judgment would be the object of the associated desire. The 
endorsement element will be an affirmation of the ‘correctness’ of this desire in the form of a 
belief about the desirability of that thing: BELIEF <p is desirable>. What it is for something to 
be desirable in this sense is something like it being the right thing for you to want in light of 
your reasons. It is, in a sense, natural to understand judgments about desires as conative 
judgments, as conative judgments have a natural source of motivation. This is, in a nutshell, 
the advantage of the Humean approach.  
I propose that Humeans, very broadly construed, can and should accept conative 
judgments as a model of how judgments about desires work. The view that we can (and clearly 
do), make judgments about our desires in very basic cases such as deciding that a particular 
desires is the right one to act on, is a natural extension of any view of desire. A nice feature of 
such conative judgments for my view is that the endorsement element of the desires makes 
explicit the agent’s reasons for favoring that desire over other unendorsed desires. This 
awareness of the grounds of a desire is going to tend to make desires that are the objects of 
conative judgments more stable than simple desires.  
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Now, insofar as this is simply an account of how judgments about desires work I have 
no objections to it. What is contentious is the further, judgmentalist, claim that desires just 
are in some necessary sense, such conative judgments. Having admitted the existence of 
standard desires, the only way that this could function as a theory of all desires is if it makes 
the further claim that the basic propositional attitude of desire is always accompanied by the 
endorsement. Now, for the rational agent, although beliefs and epistemic endorsements are 
not the same thing they tend to go together. Even in the case of garden variety beliefs, 
epistemic endorsements are implicit. However there is no such natural tendency for desires 
that p to be so closely identified with beliefs that p is actually desirable.   
The claim that desiring and beliefs about what it is correct to desire always go together 
is plausible only if we hold that you should only desire that which you believe to be desirable. 
It seems plausible to say that this is true of some of our desires. I, for instance, take it to be 
true that I desire not to torture kittens because given my reasons torturing kittens is 
undesirable. But in many other cases of desire, there is no such harmony between my desires, 
and my beliefs about what the right thing to desire given my reasons is. I desire to drink red 
wine, but given my plans for tomorrow morning, my beliefs about disrupted sleep, and my 
prediction of the wine causing a headache I do not think that this is the right thing to desire in 
light of my reasons. My desire for wine is incontinent in the sense that it contradicts my 
reasons, but it seems to be a desire nonetheless. The one proposing that all desires are conative 
judgments must hold that all desires are of this former type – because in making a conative 
judgment, the agent must believe that the object of her desire is that which is the right thing 
to desire in light of her reasons. The implication of this view is that it is impossible for an 
agent to desire that which she does not take to be fully rational. This claim of constant 
companionship between desiring and endorsing is not necessary if we simply hold that 
conative judgments are one of the places that desires figure in our mental economy, which is 
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an eminently plausible position. Thus although the view that conative judgments are desires is 
at best a psychologically implausible view of all desires, it is a plausible view of the subset of 
rational desires.     
Cognitive Judgmentalism 
The second version of Judgmentalism can informatively be called cognitivist 
Judgmentalism. As in the case of Humean Judgmentalism, this second version depends on a 
particular account of judgments about desires, in this case, a cognitivist account of such 
judgments. Call such judgments desire-judgments. The motivation for this view is the project 
of giving a cognitive account of desires. A thought that could motivate such an account is that 
judgments, in that they have a reflective element, are a more likely candidate for a cognitive 
account of desire that beliefs, as beliefs have very little chance of accounting for the 
motivational capacity of desires’.  
Now, as this is a cognitive account of desires, the desire-judgments cannot include 
conative elements, so the judgments in question are not conative judgments. To satisfy the 
cognitive constraint both elements of the judgment—the content and the endorsement—must 
be cognitive states. An intuitive place to start is with beliefs about the good. After all, it is not 
completely counter-intuitive to say that a way of understanding what it is to desire some 
outcome is to believe it to be good. If we use this as the content of a judgment, then we end up 
with a species of epistemic judgment, judgments about the good. The content of such a 
judgment would look like: BELIEF <p is good>. In the case of epistemic judgment, the 
endorsement element follows the form: BELIEF <that the credence that you place in p fits 
your evidence that p.> If we take desire-judgments to be a straightforward species of epistemic 
judgment then the endorsement element would be essentially the same. Thus we can 
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understand desire-judgments as: BELIEF <p is good> and BELIEF <that the credence that you 
place in the goodness of p fits your evidence for p being good.> 
The problem with such a formulation is that it does not capture one of the two 
important characteristics of desires. It is generally assumed that desires fulfill the functional 
role of motivating and justifying action in our conception of practical reason. Thus a belief 
that plausibly fulfills the desire role would need to have some pretension to motivational 
efficacy. It would also need to be able to explain or justify action. To fail to fulfill either of 
these desiderata would make it a very implausible theory of desire. Beliefs about the good 
satisfy this second criterion, as beliefs about the good could justify action in the following 
way: If I am going to a movie and you ask me why I am going to that particular movie, if I 
respond that I believe it to be good, I have in some plausible sense given a sufficient 
explanation of my action. However beliefs about the good have difficulty with the criterion of 
motivational efficacy. That I believe something to be good simply does not speak to my 
motivation to do that thing, as my motivation to act in accordance with such belief is arguably 
external to the belief. I believe that peonies, yogis and chocolate are good, but none of these 
beliefs necessarily motivate me to act in any way. That I believe that p is good tells me 
nothing about what role this information will play in my deliberative processes. In the case of 
justification, a belief about the good can play the appropriate role because its connection to 
action has already been established because the action that needs justifying has already been 
performed. Justification comes after action, and is linked to that particular action by the 
professed or imputed states of the agent. Motivation, however, comes before action, and so the 
connection between a given belief and motivation needs to be internal to that belief. If it is the 
case that beliefs about the good always carry motivational force, then such a connection is 
plausible, but this is simply not the case. Thus beliefs about the good alone are not persuasive 
 30
 
candidates for the role of the content of desire-judgments because they do not have a clear 
connection to motivational force. 
What else is there in the cognitivist’s armory that might be capable of capturing this 
missing element of motivation? I take it that the most plausible candidate amongst beliefs is 
going to be beliefs about reasons. In contrast to the belief that swimming is good, the belief 
that I have reason to swim has a much closer connection to how I should act in light of this 
information. Thus the most plausible view of the content of desire-judgments will include 
some recognition of reasons. This recognition could occur in either the content or the 
endorsement element of the judgment. The content of the desire-judgment could then look 
something like: BELIEF <I have reason to p>.16 The endorsement element of a desire-
judgment would be an analogue of the evaluative proposition that constitutes the endorsement 
element of the epistemic judgment. In the case of epistemic judgment this is the belief that: 
and BELIEF <that the credence that you place in p fits your evidence that p>. The claim that a 
belief ‘fits’ evidence is an appeal to the idea that given your evidence, you are justified in 
placing that level of credence in that belief. There are two parts to your belief, its content, and 
the credence that you place in it. Such a belief ‘fits’ the evidence only if it gets both of these 
elements correct. In the case of desire-judgment, the content is also a belief, so, the 
endorsement element should be pretty similar. In the case of epistemic judgments, the content 
of the belief which fits this evidence will be the belief that, given the evidence that you have, is 
most likely to be true. Thus the endorsement element of a desire-judgment will have the 
form: BELIEF < that the credence that you place in having reason to p fits your evidence for 
having reason to p.>  
                                                 
16 At this point I am putting aside concerns about just where these reasons will come from if we 
eliminate the conative view of desires.  
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Putting these two elements together, we get the picture that a desire-judgment is: 
BELIEF <I have reason to p> and BELIEF < that the credence that I place in having reason to p 
fits my evidence for having reason to p.>. So, a desire-judgment is a belief that I have reason 
to p, combined with a belief that this reason to take p is correct. The view of cognitivist 
Judgmentalism is that all desires are desire-judgments so understood.17   
Objections 
One immediate disadvantage of the cognitivist judgmentalist view of desires is that, as 
a cognitive view of desire, it is going to have difficulty satisfying our conative intuitions about 
desires. Specifically, such a view is going to have difficulty accounting for the motivational 
aspect of desires. My recognition, however sincere, that I have a reason (even an objectively 
good reason) to do some thing does not necessitate that I am motivated to do that thing. In 
proposing an account of desire that appeals only to beliefs about reasons, the view faces the 
problem that the recognition of reasons does not entail that an agent accepts, or is motivated 
to comply with, those reasons. Thus a significant cost of understanding desires in terms of 
beliefs about reasons is that it is not compatible with the view that having a desire to p means 
being motivated to p. Of course, a proponent of the view may be willing to bite this bullet; 
however, such a move is only attractive if there are other benefits to the theory. I propose that 
these benefits are too elusive to justify this move. 
Another problematic aspect of this view is the reliance of the endorsement element of 
the desire-judgment on beliefs about what it is correct to do given your reasons. I, like many 
others of my acquaintance, desire things that I firmly believe are not the right thing to desire 
given my reasons. The list of my desires that are contrary to reason is quite extensive, and I 
don’t think that I am alone in this. The apparent existence of such desires creates a dilemma 
                                                 
17 The outline of a view such as this is proposed, although not defended, in Hurley, (1989). 
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for the judgmentalist: On one hand she can deny that any ‘desire’ for an object that the agent 
does not take herself to have good reason to do is a desire, thus excluding a large group of 
apparent desires from her view. On the other hand, she can accept these as desires, which 
requires us to believe such things to be the right thing to do in light of the reasons. This can 
only be the case if we do not have access to our beliefs about what it is that we have reason to 
do, despite holding an internalist view of judgment. In either case the cognitivist judgmentalist 
picture of desire falters. 
So we have a step from desires to conative judgments, which seems quite plausible. 
What the cognitivist anti-Humean tries to do is take these conative judgments and turn them 
into some species of epistemic judgment. It is this second step which is not possible. You 
cannot take this last step without making the motivational ability of these judgments very 
mysterious. Thus the view that judgments about desires are epistemic judgments can only be 
had at the price of making the motivational properties of desires deeply mysterious. 
The Plausibility of the Judgmentalist Program 
There are several objections that can be made to the judgmentalist program, in 
addition to those objections which apply to each form of Judgmentalism. If Judgmentalism is 
correct, then any desire-like state which is not endorsed by the agent will turn out not to 
count as a desire. This result is analogous to what happens when it is proposed that what it is 
to act, is to act rationally. On such an account irrational ‘actions’ don’t turn out to be actions 
at all—they are relegated to the realm of mere behavior.18 Thus Judgmentalism about desires 
gives us too pristine an account of agency. It simply denies that irrational desires (in the sense 
of internally incoherent desires – those that the agent herself does not endorse), are desires at 
all. If we want to preserve space in our moral psychology for desires that are fleeting, 
                                                 
18 This is the view of action that is generated by a literal reading of Kant’s account of agency. 
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ungrounded, knee-jerk, or generally unsatisfactory in a wide variety of ways, then we must 
reject judgmentalist views of desire.  
I also have a concern with the general approach of Judgmentalism. The strategy is to 
argue that an entire class of mental states should be understood in terms of judgments about 
that state. Judgments have two elements, endorsement and content. In the sense that the 
endorsement is an endorsement of the content, it is clear that the endorsement is always one 
step beyond the content of the state. Specifically, it is the result of the agent reflecting on the 
content of the state. Such an act of reflection requires the agent to entertain the proposition 
that she is reflecting on. But what it means to be able to reflect upon the content of a judgment 
is for the agent to entertain that proposition without endorsing it. Thus, it seems as if the 
content of the state can, and must, exist in the absence of the endorsement element. 
Judgmentalism, particularly Humean Judgmentalism, presupposes the existence of desires 
which are not accompanied by an endorsement. So, the worry is, why can the content itself 
not count as the state, given that it exists independently of the state? If the desire exists as the 
content of the judgment, then positing the necessity of the endorsement element is a step too 
far. All versions of Judgmentalism are vulnerable to this objection.  
In conclusion, the judgmentalist view of desire, which takes all desires to be species of 
judgment, is unsatisfactory because it requires a major conceptual adjustment. In accepting the 
view of cognitivist Judgmentalism that all desires are in fact desire-judgments we must give up 
on the idea that desires are necessarily motivational, which is a radical revision of the concept 
of desire. Even if we are willing to bite this bullet, there is a further toll extracted by 
Judgmentalism instantiated through both desire-judgments and conative judgments. Both 
views of judgment require that it is a prerequisite of desiring that a desire meets some 
standard of ‘correctness’ for desires. That is, both views hold that we desire things only if we 
take them to be the ‘right’ thing to desire in light of the reasons. Thus it is a price of 
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Judgmentalism that ‘irrational’ desires cannot count as desires. I propose that this is too high a 
price to pay, making Judgmentalism about desires an implausible view.  
Desires and Reasons 
In this section the aim is to consider the second of the two cognitivist theories of 
desire, the view proposed by Scanlon in ‘What We Owe to Each Other’19 that desires are best 
understood as reasons. A central claim of Scanlon’s argument is that we should reverse the 
normal order of explanation between desires and reasons, and explain the most distinctively 
action related aspects of desires in terms of reasons. In proposing this reversal Scanlon is in 
part motivated by the same view as I, the view that the term ‘desire’ requires greater 
explanation. However, the conclusion that Scanlon draws from this observation is radically 
different from mine. What Scanlon does is to take a standard normative understanding of 
reasons—justificatory reasons—to be primitive, and explains two functions that philosophers 
commonly attribute to desires, motivation and justification, in terms of such reasons. Thus 
instead of explicating the nature of desires qua motivational states, he eliminates them as 
distinct philosophical entities. The sense of desire that is left standing—the directed-attention 
theory of desire that Scanlon takes to capture the folk meaning of desire—motivates and 
justifies only by appealing to reasons external to the desire. In short, Scanlon holds that 
desires, as we understand them in talk of action and deliberation, just are reasons. 
Scanlon presents the view that desires are reasons as an alternative to a certain 
Humean conception of desires. Both Scanlon and the Humean view he objects to hold that 
there must be some state which fulfills the functional role of motivating and justifying action 
in our conception of practical reason. The difference between the two views is what is taken to 
realize this functional role description. Standardly, the realizer of this role is taken to be 
                                                 
19  Scanlon, 1998. 
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Humean desires, which is the essence of the Humean view. Scanlon, in contrast, argues that 
only reasons are capable of filling this role. His strategy is to argue that in order for desires to 
fulfill this functional role the Humean requires a state that satisfies: (1) the constraints 
generated by this functional role description (in order to fit accounts of practical reasons); and 
(2) the constraints generated by the folk conception of desire (in order to count as desires). He 
concludes that there is no desire-like state that fulfills all these constraints. Rather, he argues 
that the folk sense of desire is captured by the ‘directed-attention’ theory of desires. This is the 
view that what it is to have an occurrent desire for some thing is for your attention to be 
repeatedly directed toward that thing. However, desires in the directed-attention sense are not 
independently capable of either motivating or justifying action. It is reasons that play these 
motivational and justificatory roles in the directed-attention theory of desire. Thus, Scanlon 
argues, it is reasons that realize the desire role in practical reason. Scanlon’s ultimate claim is 
that because the desire role is fulfilled by reasons, what philosophers are really referring to 
when they engage in desire talk (particularly in the context of practical reason) is reasons. As 
he puts it: “…the notion of a desire…needs to be understood in terms of the idea of taking 
something to be a reason.”20 Thus desires as conceived by philosophers, he proposes, just are 
reasons.  
The Argument 
The argument that Scanlon gives is very complex, so I will begin with a schematic of 
his argument, and then focus on the key points. In broad terms, Scanlon’s argument is as 
follows: 
Philosophers claim that when they talk of desires (the philosopher’s sense of desire, 
desireΦ), they are talking about the same psychological states that are picked out by 
ordinary usage of the term ‘desire’, the folk theory of desire, desireF. 
                                                 
20  Scanlon, 1998, p. 7-8. 
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The fundamental characteristics of desiresΦ are that they motivate and justify action.21 
DesiresΦ are generally assumed to be instantiated by states such as pro-attitudes. 
Pro-attitudes cannot be desiresΦ because they do not satisfy the Humean’s own 
constraints on the desire-role of practical reason. 
The only remaining possibility for desiresΦ is basic urges.  
Basic urges cannot be desiresF because they do not satisfy the folk view that to desire 
something is to perceive that thing in the guise of the good. 
So, desireF and desireΦ are not the same phenomena. 
DesiresF are desires in the directed-attention sense. 
DesiresF possess the characteristics of motivation and justification only derivatively 
through the cognitive process of ‘taking something to be a reason’. 
The roles of motivation and justification that are central to desiresΦ are played by reasons 
in desiresF. 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Therefore, talk of desire in the philosophical sense should be replaced with reasons talk. 
 
Indeed, Scanlon’s conclusion could be expressed in stronger terms. As he puts it “…the 
philosophical use of ‘desire’ is not a harmless choice of technical terminology but a seriously 
misleading one.”22 So, Scanlon seeks to reconcile the apparently motivational aspects of action 
with its rational aspects through replacing the concept of desireΦ with reasons.  
One of the keys to Scanlon’s argument is a distinction between the philosophical sense 
of ‘desire’, and the way that the folk understand ‘desire’. Scanlon proposes that we can 
distinguish between the folk sense of desire, and the philosophical sense of desire, in the 
                                                 
21 “Desires are commonly understood in philosophical discussion to be psychological states which play 
two fundamental roles. One the one hand, they are supposed to be motivationally efficacious: desires 
are usually, or perhaps always, what moves us to act. One the other hand, they are supposed to be 
normatively significant: when someone has a reason (in the standard normative sense) to do something 
this is generally, perhaps even always, true because doing this would promote the fulfillment of some 
desire which the agent has”(Scanlon, 1998, p. 37). 
22  Scanlon, 1998, p. 55. 
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following way: The folk sense of desire is just what people mean when they invoke desires in 
non-technical conversation. The philosophical sense of desire is ‘whatever fills the desire-role 
that is stipulated in practical reason’. We can call the ‘folk’ or ordinary view of desire 
(desireF),23 and the philosophical view of desire (desireΦ). A part of the subtext of Scanlon’s 
distinction between the two senses of desire is that he doesn’t want it to be the case that 
desiresΦ just are desiresF, as it seems that he cannot easily deny the existence of desires in the 
folk sense, which is his intention with respect to desiresΦ.  
The Constraints on DesiresΦ 
Four of the five constraints on desiresΦ that Scanlon appeals to are furnished by what 
he calls the ‘standard Humean’ view of desire. This is presented as an uncontroversial, if 
simplistic, Humean view of desire. Scanlon does not present the view at a single point, but 
rather refers to it in a variety of ways in a variety of places. The basic outline of Scanlon’s 
standard Humean view of desire is: 
Desires are commonly understood in philosophical discussion to be psychological states 
which play two fundamental roles. On the one hand, they are supposed to be 
motivationally efficacious: desires are usually, or perhaps always, what move us to act. On 
the other hand, they are supposed to be normatively significant: when someone has a 
reason (in the standard normative sense) to do something this is generally, perhaps even 
always, true because doing this would promote the fulfillment of some desire which the 
agent has.24 
There are two distinct roles that desires must fulfill: (1) desires must be motivationally 
efficacious; and (2) it is the fulfillment of desires which grounds our reasons. Scanlon presents 
the standard Humean position as capturing the extreme version of both of these claims, by 
adding a universal rider. So, the first claim of Scanlon’s standard Humeanism is: (1) desires 
are the sole source of motivation for action, and thus always occur in a correct explanation of 
                                                 
23 Scanlon refers to this variously as the ordinary or common view of desire. 
24  Scanlon, 1998, p. 37. 
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action. Call this thesis ‘motivational Humeanism’. The second claim is: (2) all of our justifying 
reasons depend on our desires. Call this thesis ‘justificatory Humeanism’.25  
In addition to these two relatively uncontroversial theses about Humean desires, 
Scanlon also attributes I will call ‘independence requirements’ to the standard view. These 
references are scattered throughout his discussion, so I will gather them here to suggest the 
tone of these independence requirements. Scanlon says that a substantial thesis of the 
standard Humean view is that it is “…claiming a special role for desires in moving us to 
act…”26 At a later point, he adds: 
According to this familiar model, desires are not conclusions of practical reasoning but 
starting points for it. They are states which simply occur or not, and when they do occur 
they provide the agent with reason to do what will promote their fulfillment.27  
He variously describes desires in his standard Humean sense as being “sources of motivation”, 
“…original sources of reason…”28, as well as “…independent sources of reasons…”29. These 
various glosses on the ‘special role’ of desires in practical reason amount to Scanlon placing 
two more constraints on the desire-role in practical reason. Both of these are ‘independence 
requirements’ in that they are claims about desires being original and independent sources of 
motivation and justification. Thus, Scanlon’s standard Humean view has two more theses: (3) 
all desiresΦ (non-instrumental) desires are reason-independent sources of motivation for 
action; and (4) all basic desiresΦ are reason-independent sources of justification. The third 
thesis can be called the “motivational independence requirement”, and the fourth the 
“justificatory independence requirement”. 30 31 These theses are grounded in Scanlon’s 
                                                 
25 These first two constraints, and the position names are drawn from Arkonovich, (2001, p. 499). 
26  Scanlon, 1998, p. 37. 
27  Scanlon, 1998, p. 43. Emphasis original. 
28  Scanlon, 1998, p. 45. 
29  Scanlon, 1998, p. 46. 
30 Constraints one and three, and the position names are drawn from Arkonovich, (2001, p. 499). 
31 “I have argued in this section that when we consider the various states that might be identified as 
desires we find none that can play the role in justification [that is] commonly assigned to desires—that 
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presentation of the functional role description of desiresΦ in practical reason. The source for 
all of these constraints is ostensibly the claim of pure Humeanism that desires are the sole 
source of motivation and justification in practical reason.   
So, in Scanlon’s terms the standard Humean view is meant to capture the 
philosophical sense of ‘desire’, and it will do this by satisfying these four theses about desires:  
(1) desires are the sole source of motivation for action, and thus always occur in a correct 
explanation of action; (2) all of our justifying reasons depend on our desires; (3) all desires are 
independent sources of motivation for action; and (4) all desires are independent sources of 
justification. What is necessary for a state to count as a desire on Scanlon’s standard Humean 
view is that it possesses all four of these properties. 
Scanlon proposes a fifth and final property of desiresΦ which is generated by the claim 
that desires in the philosophical sense are the same as desires as conceived by the folk. Scanlon 
appeals to the case of Warren Quinn’s radio man to pump the intuition that, barring external 
theoretical agendas, we have a robust intuition that a part of what it is to desire some thing is 
to perceive it in the guise of the good. The case is of a man who experiences an urge to turn on 
every radio he sees. Ex hypothesi, Quinn claims that the radio man does not see the turning 
on of radios as good. The radio man does not want to hear the music, he does not appreciate 
the tactile qualities of the knob, rather he just has an urge to turn the radio on.32 Such an urge, 
                                                                                                                                                 
of states which are independent of our practical reasoning and which, when they occur, provide reason 
for doing what will promote their fulfillment.” (Scanlon, 1998, p. 49.) 
32 Quinn, in his presentation of the case simply stipulates this example, whilst acknowledging that it is 
bizarre. He says: “Suppose I am in a strange functional state that disposes me to turn on radios that I 
see to be turned off. Given the perception that a radio in my vicinity is off, I try, all other things being 
equal, to get it turned on. Does this state rationalize my choices? Told nothing more than this, one may 
certainly doubt that it does. But in the case I am imagining, this is all there is to the state. I do not turn 
the radios on in order to hear music or get news. It is not that I have an inordinate appetite for 
entertainment or information. Indeed, I do not turn them on in order to hear anything.” His target in 
this example is what we might call the functionalist interpretation of Humean desires, where desire is 
presented as bare dispositions to act. The conclusion that Quinn draws from this case is that it is deeply 
mysterious how such functional states could possibly rationalize action. He goes on to say: “I cannot see 
 40
 
Scanlon argues, is a purely functional state that “…lacks the power to rationalize actions”.33 
Because it lacks this power it cannot, according to Quinn and Scanlon, count as a desireΦ. 
Thus Scanlon uses the Quinn example to propose that desiresΦ include an ‘evaluate element’. 
The evaluative element of desire that Scanlon derives from the radio man case is that desiring 
involves “…the judgment that there is something good—pleasant, advantageous, or otherwise 
worthwhile—about performing the action.”34 Ultimately, this evaluative requirement comes 
from Scanlon’ account of the folk view of desire, desireF, as ‘desire in the directed-attention’ 
sense. I will come back to this part of Scanlon’s argument. This, then, yields the fifth 
constraint on desiresΦ, the ‘evaluative requirement’ that a necessary condition of desiring 
something is perceiving that thing sub specii boni, in ‘the guise of the good’.  
So, Scanlon’s view is that a state must possess all five of these properties to count as 
desires in the philosophical sense.35  Of these five constraints, only two of them play crucial 
roles in Scanlon’s argument, these are the motivational independence requirement and the 
evaluative requirement. He uses the motivational independence requirement to reject the 
wider class pro-attitudes as candidates for Humean desires. The evaluative requirement plays 
double duty: in the first instance he uses it to reject basic urges as Humean desires, then he 
uses it to argue that the folk theory of desire—desire as directed-attention—locates motivation 
in takings to be reasons. It is this latter use of the evaluative requirement which is the most 
implausible element of Scanlon’s view, so it is this part of the view that I will focus on.36    
                                                                                                                                                 
how this bizarre functional state in itself gives me even a prima facie reason to turn on radios, even 
those I can see to be available for cost-free on-turning.” (Quinn, 1995, pp. 189-90.) 
33  Scanlon, 1998, p. 38. 
34  Scanlon, 1998, p. 43. 
35 “According to Scanlon, this model attributes to desires the following three features: 1) "desires are 
not conclusions of practical reasoning but starting points for it" (p. 43; 2) "desires are states which 
simply occur or not" (p. 43; 3) "when they do occur they provide the agent with reason to do what will 
promote their fulfillment" (Arkonovich, 2001, p. 43). 
36 One of the puzzles about how Scanlon manufactures these constraints on desire is that it by focusing 
so tightly on the requirements of motivation it does not clearly capture other types of desires. There are 
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The Directed-Attention Theory of Desire and Motivation as Reasons 
Scanlon’s aim in proposing the directed-attention theory of desire is to show that the 
necessary attributes of desireΦ, justification and motivation, can only be provided by reasons, 
and from this conclude that desiresΦ are not desires in the folk sense, but are in fact reasons. 
This is, in a nutshell, Scanlon’s position. So we can conceive of the debate that Scanlon is 
having as between two extreme positions: At one end is the Humean position that desires are 
those psychological states that are uniquely capable of the subjective motivation and 
justification required by rational action. At the other end is Scanlon’s view, which is that 
reasons are the states that are uniquely capable of the subjective motivation and justification 
required by rational action, and desiresF have these attributes only derivatively. The aim of 
this section is to examine his argument for the latter proposition.  
Scanlon derives the directed-attention theory of desire from two sources: the 
phenomenology of occurrent desiring, and the evaluative requirement generated by Quinn’s 
case of the radio man. The ‘directed-attention’ theory of desire is the view that what it is to 
desire something is for your attention to be repeatedly favorably directed toward that thing.  
A person has a desire in the directed-attention sense that P if the thought of P keeps 
occurring to him or her in a favorable light, that is to say, if the person's attention is 
                                                                                                                                                 
various types of desire that do not seem to entail motivation at all. I desire that my husband surprises 
me with flowers, but my doing anything to bring this end about (such as mentioning it), robs the 
gesture of the element of spontaneity which is part of what I desire in it. My desire requires no 
motivation, although it clearly seeks satisfaction. Other examples of such desires are desires for 
outcomes that you have no control over, or desires such as Freudian wishes, that find their satisfaction 
in fantasy. The satisfaction of a desire only requires motivation in the case of desires for one’s own 
future actions. But, as is highlighted by these examples, desires for action do not exhaust the category 
of all desires. The claim that desires should motivate cannot be understood as the claim that motivating 
is a necessary attribute of desires. The strongest claim about motivation that is compatible with the 
existence of such desires is that a necessary attribution of a desire is that it has the ability to motivate.  
As Arkonovich puts it, “…while all desires might necessarily seek satisfaction, we need not think that 
all satisfaction involves motivation. Here I am thinking of the Freudian account of the wish. The wish is 
clearly a desire-like state as such states are usually defined in contemporary philosophical psychology. 
Yet a Freudian wish is precisely a state which finds satisfaction in fantasy as opposed to action, and 
consequently does not motivate the agent to do anything.” (Arkonovich, 2001, p. 43). 
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directed insistently toward considerations that present themselves as counting in favor of 
P.37  
Scanlon attributes this view of desire to reflecting on the following two cases. The first case is 
of having a positive evaluation of some action such as “…seeing something good about 
drinking a glass of foul-tasting medicine…”38, but failing to desire to drink the medicine. The 
second case is seeing some action as pleasant, but having no desire to do it. What stops the 
first case from being a case of desire is that you lack the directed-attention element of desire. 
Your attention is not directed toward the prospect of drinking the medicine in the right way. 
What stops the second case from being a case of desire is that although you take the action to 
be pleasant, you fail to count this as a consideration in favor of performing that action.  
Scanlon claims that the idea of ‘desire in the directed-attention sense’ thus 
…capture[s] an essential element in the intuitive notion of (occurrent) desire. Desires for 
food…and sexual desires are marked by just this character of directed-attention. And this 
character is generally missing in cases in which we say that a person who does something 
for a reason nonetheless “has no desire to do it…”39 
There are three factors here which Scanlon takes to be particularly apposite to the folk notion 
of desire. The first is that desires in the directed-attention sense are occurrent psychological 
states with identifiable and typical qualia. The second is that such desires “…capture…the 
familiar idea that desires are unreflective elements in our practical thinking—that they “assail 
us” unbidden and that they can conflict with our considered judgment of what we have reason 
to do.”40 The last is that it satisfies the evaluative requirement, as a central part of desiring 
something in the directed-attention sense is perceiving it in the guise of the good (or at least 
the guise of the pleasant). 
                                                 
37  Scanlon, 1998, p. 39. 
38  Scanlon, 1998, p. 39. 
39  Scanlon, 1998, p. 39. 
40  Scanlon, 1998, p. 39. 
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This view of desires is not particularly complex as Scanlon is explicit that it does not 
and cannot capture the motivational and justificatory properties of the desire-role in practical 
reason. How it is that desires in the directed-attention sense are connected to motivation and 
justification is embedded in Scanlon’s understanding of the evaluative requirement.  
Central to the idea that what it is to desire something is to have your attention 
directed toward it, is that the thought of P repeatedly occurs to you in a favorable light. 
Scanlon further glosses this element of ‘directed-attention’ as “…the person’s attention 
[being] directed insistently toward considerations that present themselves as counting in favor 
of P.41 Scanlon proposes that what it is to count certain considerations as being in favor of P, is 
to take these considerations to be reasons for P. It is this characteristic of the directed-
attention theory of desire that makes it clear why it is that Scanlon holds that desires should 
be ultimately understood in terms of normative reasons.  
So, Scanlon’s account of how motivation operates in the case of desires in the directed-
attention sense contains a shift from “having your attention directed toward considerations 
that appear to count in favor of”, to “taking these considerations to be reasons”. When the 
shift occurs in his presentation of the view, Scanlon treats the change as merely 
terminological.42 But this is not at all clear to me. It seems that taking something to be a 
reason is a much more committed state than simply having your attention repeatedly directed 
toward considerations that count in favor of something. I think that Scanlon equates these two 
things because he has a particularly strong interpretation of the evaluative requirement in 
mind.  
Insofar as desiring something is to be attracted to it, then it is at least plausible (if not 
universally accepted) to say that when you desire some thing you perceive it, in some very 
                                                 
41  Scanlon, 1998, p. 39. 
42 Copp and Sobel make this point extremely clear. (Copp & Sobel, 2002, p. 256-7). 
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minimal sense, to be good. Call this weak intentionalism. But Scanlon is not interested in such 
a weak sense of evaluation. If he was satisfied by this interpretation, then he would not make 
the crucial move in his formulation of the directed-attention theory from ‘seeing some thing 
in a favorable light’ to ‘takings to be reasons’, as surely weak intentionalism is satisfied by 
seeing some thing in a favorable light. The only justification for this shift is if he is implicitly 
interpreting the evaluative requirement as stronger requirement, such as ‘judging yourself to 
have a reason’. Call this strong intentionalism. I think that there is evidence for Scanlon’s 
being a strong intentionalist in how his notion of ‘taking’ something to be a reason turns out 
to be motivationally efficacious.  
Scanlon argues that the element of desires in the directed-attention sense that does all 
the work to make them look like desiresΦ is in taking considerations in favor of P to be 
reasons for P. It is then these reasons that fulfill both the motivational and justificatory roles 
that are central to desireΦ. As he puts it: “…when a person does have a desire in the directed-
attention sense and acts accordingly, what supplies the motive for this action is the agent’s 
perception of some consideration as a reason, not some additional element of “desire”.”43 Thus 
desires in the directed-attention sense motivate only in virtue of distinct reasons. The notion 
of ‘taking’ or ‘perceiving’ something to be a reason that he uses is a complex one. He does not 
appear to mean that in every case the agent must ‘judge’ or ‘believe’ there to be a reason. At 
one point, Scanlon states that having a desire for P in the directed-attention sense “…involves 
a tendency to judge that [you] have [a] reason…”44 to get P. At another he presents the idea as 
it at least being the case that it ‘seems to’ the agent that there is a reason. However in still 
other places he treats the idea of seeming to be a reason as equivalent to believing that there is 
                                                 
43  Scanlon, 1998, p. 40-1. 
44  Scanlon, 1998, p. 43. 
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a reason. In the latter case, Scanlon explicitly commits himself to giving some account of how 
beliefs can motivate. It is in this account that we see his commitment to strong intentionalism. 
Scanlon’s argument for the view that beliefs can motivate is a form of a ‘one thought 
too many’ argument. In the case of beliefs, he argues that: 
A rational person who judges that there to be sufficient grounds for believing that P 
normally has that belief, and this judgment is normally sufficient explanation for so 
believing. There is no need to appeal to some further source of motivation such as 
“wanting to believe.”45  
The same, he proposes, is true of intentions. There is no reason to suppose some specifically 
motivational entity like desireΦ in addition to a judgment of how to act and the reasons that 
such a judgment recognizes in order to account for how motivation works in the practical case.  
When a rational person judges that she has ‘compelling’ reason to P, under normal 
circumstances she will form the intention to P. When you have a desire in the directed-
attention sense, you have a tendency to make such judgments. According to Scanlon, “…this 
judgment is sufficient explanation of that intention and of the agents acting on it.”46 So, what 
is capable of motivating an agent to act are intentions of the form: ‘I judge that I have reason 
to P’. Thus it is something that looks like a judgment about reasons that does the motivational 
work for desires in the directed-attention sense. This is just a retelling of the thesis of strong 
intentionalism. It is the claim that what it is to be motivated when you have a desire in the 
directed-attention sense is for you to form an intention by judging yourself to have a reason 
to act in accordance with your desire. So it is strong intentionalism about desires that yields 
Scanlon’s final conclusion that what it is to be motivated by having a desire for P in the 
directed-attention sense is in essence to be motivated by judging yourself to have a reason for 
P.  
                                                 
45  Scanlon, 1998, p. 33. 
46  Scanlon, 1998, p. 33-4. 
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So, how plausible is strong intentionalism? The first issue is that this is a cognitively 
demanding interpretation of both desires and action. In order to desire, you have to have the 
concept of a reason. Scanlon does not make this constraint as explicit as I have, but he clearly 
takes having reasons to be necessary for being motivated when you have a desire in the 
directed-attention sense. He makes this clear in his discussion of the possibility of akratic 
actions. He states: 
Even when desire in the directed-attention sense runs contrary to our reason (that is to 
say, our judgment) in [the sense of seeing something as a reason that I judge not to be 
one], however, it remains true that the motivational force of these states lies in a tendency 
to see some consideration as a reason.47  
Insofar as desire in the directed-attention sense involves this tendency to see something as a 
reason, then he makes possessing the concept of a reason central to desiring in the folk sense. 
One case of desire that this excludes is the desires of creatures who lack the concept of a 
reason, such as babies or toddlers seeking their parents for comfort, eating, drinking, or 
dancing to music. Desires in the directed-attention sense clearly motivate in these cases, but 
their motivation must, according to Scanlon, proceed via conceptualization as a reason. I would 
hesitate to say that babies and infants take themselves to have reasons, but take it that 
denying that they have desires that motivate them to be very far from the folk understanding. 
Another case is that of what can be called spontaneous action, such as scratching an itch 
without really thinking about it, or hugging your spouse in passing just because he is there. In 
these cases, where a desire pops out of nowhere, and you act on it without thinking about it, to 
posit that you judge yourself to have a reason seems to be one thought too many. Maybe in 
some cases you do, but in those where you don’t, I presume that the folk theory would still 
want to count them as desires, and fairly central cases of desire at that. Given that what 
Scanlon claims of the directed-attention theory of desire is that it captures the folk meaning of 
                                                 
47  Scanlon, 1998, p. 40. Emphasis added. 
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desire, rather than being a stipulative view of what desires are, this is a serious objection. If he 
goes beyond the folk view in a way that excludes various intuitively clear cases of desire from 
counting as desires, then it is so much the worse for his theory.   
A further objection to strong intentionalism is that in order for your behavior to count 
as action you must in essence judge yourself to have reason to so act (rather than it merely 
seeming to you that you have a reason to so act). This suffers from the same objections 
regarding the possibility of imperfect action as the view of Judgmentalism about desires 
discussed in the first half of this chapter.   
So, what could lead Scanlon to having such an implausibly strong interpretation of the 
evaluation requirement? One possibility is if he is assuming that desiring some thing involves 
seeing that thing as desirable, where what it is to see some thing as desirable is to make a 
judgment about its desirability. This is only going to be plausible if we equate ‘desiring P’ with 
‘judging P to be desirable’. This is a very specific reading of the evaluative requirement, which 
is not really supported by why we might turn to the evaluative requirement in the first 
instance. One of the attractions of the evaluative requirement is that it gives an intentional 
gloss to desiring that is absent from an unnaturally bare functional state such as that of 
Quinn’s radio man. As Copp and Sobel put it: “We do not merely act under the force of desire, 
but in typical cases we intend to act in light of our desires.”48 But it is really plausible to say 
that desiring something involves judging that thing to be desirable? I think not, and for the 
same reasons that it is implausible to say that all desires are conative judgments. Interestingly, 
it seems as if Scanlon’s view that desires just are reasons actually ends up relying on the claim 
of Humean Judgmentalism, that all desires are conative judgments, and is the worse for it.  
                                                 
48  Copp & Sobel, 2002, p. 276. 
 48
 
Thus Scanlon’s argument is that the proper understanding of desiresF is the ‘directed-
attention sense of desire. However desires in the directed-attention sense only motivate 
tangentially, by causing the agent to judge that she has a reason to so act. Thus what 
distinguishes desiresF from desiresΦ, and prevents them from fulfilling the desire role in 
practical reason, is that desiresF are only capable of justifying or motivating action 
derivatively, through appealing to independently existing reasons. However, as we have seen 
Scanlon’s reliance on an implausibly strong interpretation of the evaluative requirement 
undermines his claim that desires in the directed-attention sense capture the folk theory of 
desire.  
Conclusion 
Scanlon’s argument is between two extremes: At one end is the Humean position that 
desires are those psychological states that are uniquely capable of the subjective motivation 
and justification required by rational action. At the other end is Scanlon’s view which is that 
reasons are the states that are uniquely capable of the subjective motivation and justification 
required by rational action, and desiresF have these attributes only derivatively. The structure 
of the argument that he gives is to reject the possibility of Humeanism, thus leaving his 
reasons view as the sole explanation. However, there are many moderate Humean positions 
which do not subscribe to both motivational and justificatory Humeanism, let alone the 
independence requirements. Smith, for instance, defends a version of Humeanism that 
endorses a version of motivational Humeanism, but denies the justificatory Humean view that 
desires are uniquely capable of justifying action.49 Another version of moderate Humeanism 
which is perfectly plausible endorses both motivational and justificatory Humeanism, but is 
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moderate in that eliminates the claims that desires are the unique sources of justification and 
motivation. Thus the dichotomy that underpins Scanlon’s argument is false.  
The larger difficulty with Scanlon’s view is the implausibility of his interpretation of 
the folk theory of desire, the directed-attention theory of desire. Scanlon’s argument that we 
should understand desires in the philosophical sense as (1) distinct from desires in the folk 
sense; and (2) in terms of reasons, fails in a number of ways. Not only is his take on the 
standard Humean account of desire implausible, his account of the folk theory of desire also 
fails. But there is value in the views that are driving Scanlon’s arguments. The final reason 
that Scanlon gives for preferring reason talk to desire talk is because he takes the standard 
Humean view of desire to commit us to a specific, and problematic, picture of practical 
reasoning:  
A desire is naturally understood as have a two-part structure: it has an object and a 
weight. It is a desire for something, typically taken to be some state of affairs, and it 
counts in favor of that thing with a certain degree of strength, on this view, when our 
desires come into conflict, rational decision is a matter of balancing the strengths of 
competing desires. If we take desires, along with beliefs, as basic elements of practical 
thinking, then this idea of balancing competing desires will seem to be the general form of 
rational decision-making.50 
I agree with Scanlon that insofar as we treat Humean desires a having only two contributions 
to make to rational deliberation, its object and its strength, we get a troubling picture of 
rational deliberation. In fact it is this precise view of desires and rational deliberation that I 
described in the first chapter as so comprehensively failing the challenge of temptation. 
However I propose that we can avoid this picture of deliberation, while retaining the benefits 
of the Humean view of desires, by considering the relative stability of desires in deliberation. 
It is this view that I will be defending in later chapters. So, I take Scanlon’s motivations in 
proposing the reasons view of desires to be sound, but think that his arguments do not deliver 
the required conclusions.  
                                                 




I take it that a reasonable conclusion to draw from this discussion is that these 
cognitivist theories of desire bring us no closer to solving the challenge of temptation, except 
through eliminating generally cognitivist views of desire on the grounds that they implausibly 
attempt to eliminate the problem by fiat, rather than explaining what it is that is flawed about 
temptations. Having narrowed the field to broadly Humean views of desire, in the next 
chapter I will consider the various permutations of the Humean view to explore in greater 
detail how it is that we should conceive of desires, in order to reach a view that is capable of 
answering the challenge of temptation.  
 
C H A P T E R  3  
THE NATU RE O F DESIRE 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine precisely what type of conative state desires 
might be, and take one step closer to an understanding of desire that can answer the challenge 
of temptation. In the previous chapter I considered the broad question of whether desires 
should be understood in terms of other mental states, such as reasons or judgments, and 
rejected this possibility. In this chapter, the aim is to explore what resources I can appeal to in 
order to discover some limits on what can be said about desires qua conative entities.  
Timothy Schroeder, in “The Three Faces of Desire”51, points out that in both historical 
and contemporary philosophical, psychological, and neuro-physiological discussions of desire, 
desires have been presented in three distinct ways. These are the eponymous three faces of 
desire: motivation, pleasure, and reward. The first two of these inform various skeletal and 
widely used concepts of desire such as: ‘mental states capable of motivating action’; or ‘positive 
affect toward some end’. The third view, that of desire qua, reward is championed by 
Schroeder. Schroeder’s aim is somewhat different to mine in that he is defending a thesis 
within the philosophy of mind about how desires are physiologically instantiated, while I am 
defending a view about how desires should be conceived (and thus treated) in rational 
deliberation and practical reason. The instructiveness of Schroeder’s view lies in its 
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engagement with what recent neuroscience tells us about how desires are physiologically 
instantiated, and I take a desideratum of any concept of desire to be that it is consistent with 
neuroscience. The bulk of the chapter will be spent on Schroeder’s argument that the most 
fundamental face of desire in creatures like us is reward. I will be arguing that Schroeder 
succeeds in demonstrating that reward is the neglected face of desire. What Schroeder fails to 
do is to prove that desires just are rewards, although I think his failure is instructive, and 
suggests the account of the emotional component of desire offered in chapter four.   
Each of Schroeder’s three faces of desire can be represented by a distinct and 
independent theory of desire, all of which could count as ‘the’ theory of desire. The strongest 
candidate, and currently prevalent understanding of desire, is captured in the Motivational 
Theory of Desire (MTD), which takes the motivational face of desire to be central.52  The 
weakest candidate is the Hedonic Theory of Desire (HTD), which is grounded in a long 
tradition which identifies desires with pleasure and displeasure. The final and least familiar 
candidate, the Reward Theory of Desire (RTD), is the view of desire championed by 
Schroeder. All of these views are amenable to being understood in terms of propositional 
attitudes, so I will treat them as such in discussing their differences.  
Motivational Theory of Desire 
The Motivational Theory of Desire roughly satisfies the functionalist intuition that 
mental items are defined by what they characteristically do, and what desires characteristically 
do is motivate us to act.53 One source of this view is a version of an Aristotelian ‘ergon’ 
argument. According to the ergon argument, ‘the’ characteristic function of a thing is that 
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which distinguishes it from other things. The Motivational Theory of Desire takes motivation 
to be the characteristic function of desire because it is this action-guidingness which 
distinguishes desires from beliefs and other mental entities.54 Thus what it is to desire some 
thing is to be motivated to get that thing.  
For some mental state (such as a desire) to have motivational capacity is, in its most 
basic form, for it to be capable of moving the agent to act.  But such a simplistic account is not 
sufficient in the face of deviant causal chains. Donald Davidson influentially concluded that for 
a mental state to be counted as motivational in the sense required for action as opposed to 
mere behavior, we not only care that mental states have the capacity to move an agent to act, 
but that they cause action in the right way. A part of what it is to cause action in the right way 
is that the mental state in question moves the agent to act in virtue of its content. Another 
concern is that having the capacity to motivate for a mental state cannot be the same as 
actually causing action. Rather, it is the dispositional claim that the mental state in question 
would cause the agent to act in the absence of some stronger, motivational state. Thus the 
motivational face of desire must be framed (roughly), as the principle that: 
Motivational Theory of Desire (MTD): To desire that P just is to be motivated so as to 
bring it about that P, under normal conditions.  
On this view, what it is that distinguishes desires from other pro-attitudes is that they 
have the capacity to motivate.55 Indeed, by definition, in the MTD it is the case that mental 
states which motivate are just are desires. This seems to accord nicely with our intuitions that 
                                                 
54 This is then allied with a propositional conception of desire.  On this view we do not have desires 
simpliciter.  It is never the case that I desire watermelon, rather, my desire is ‘that I eat watermelon 
right now’.  In this view desires can always be, and are properly, expressed in terms of a ‘that’ clause.  
The motivational view presents desires in terms of a lean model of two central characteristics – 
propositional content and motivational force.  
55 This cannot plausibly be the stronger claim that desires are motivationally efficacious—that is, that 
they will always result in action—as it is clear that there are cases where we have competing desires and 
only the stronger one will in fact produce action.  This does not mean that the weaker desire in this 
struggle was incapable of producing action; it had the capacity to do so, it just, as a matter of contingent 
fact, did not do so in this instance.  Thus it is the capacity to produce action which is important here. 
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to want something (to desire it) is intimately connected with trying to get that thing. 
Arguably any theory of desire which said that desiring had nothing to do with trying to get, 
would be such a perversion of the common usage as to constitute a theory of desire*, rather 
than desire. Of course, it does not follow from this simple point that motivation is necessarily 
all there is to desire. 
Hedonic Theory of Desire 
The Hedonic Theory of Desire, in contrast, is grounded in the intuition that desires 
are all about affective states such as pleasure and pain. On this view, all desires are, at base, 
conative attitudes directed toward propositions about the state of the world which dispose the 
agent to experience pleasure when fulfilled and pain when denied.   
Hedonic Theory of Desire (HTD): To desire that P is to be disposed to feel pleasure if P, 
and displeasure if not P. 56  
The HTD and its close cousins was the dominant view of desire in eighteenth and 
nineteenth century British psychology, as exemplified in the writings of Bentham and Hume. 
Although it has fallen out of favor, it is not without substantial influence. Our hedonic 
                                                 
56 There is a point that needs to be made here about what the object of the desire is, and how this differs 
from the conditions that must hold for the agent to be aware that her desire has been satisfied. 
Schroeder conflates these two points by arguing that the only plausible way of understanding this view 
is in terms of what it seems to the agent, as the agent’s pleasure and pain does not track the way that 
the world is, but rather the way that the world seems to the agent. In Schroeder’s view the ‘seems that’ 
locution is included here to account for cases in which the agent has mistaken perceptions about the 
world.  If someone falsely believes that a deeply held desire of theirs has been fulfilled, intuitively they 
will experience just as much pleasure as someone who truly believes that some similar desire has been 
fulfilled.(Schroeder, 2004, p. 27.) However, it cannot be the case that the object of my desire that P is 
really ‘that it seems to me that P’. If this were true, then I would be indifferent between my desire that 
my husband is happy being satisfied by my husband being happy, or it seeming to me that he is happy 
in the experience machine. It is clear that the object of my desire is the former, not the latter, thus the 
‘seems to’ locution is out of place in talking about the content of such a desire. Thus there are two ways 
that we could understand the Hedonic Theory of Desire. One is that the object of my desire that P is 
directed toward the pleasure that I will be disposed to feel if P. The other is that I desire that P as a 
means to the pleasure that I am disposed to feel if it is the case that P. In this latter case the object of my 
desire is P, whereas in the former case the object of my desire is the pleasure that will result from P 
obtaining. I take the former to be the most plausible view. 
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experiences are at least important markers of the existence of certain desires. Pleasure and pain 
provide us, in many cases, with important information about whether that which we desire is 
what we want. Also, it seems that for at least certain desires that P, their strength should track 
the amount of pleasure (or pain) that results from P obtaining.57 Thus hedonic tone is 
importantly connected to our understanding of desire, although the theory that desires just 
are such hedonic states is not, in itself, taken to be that plausible.  
Reward Theory of Desire 
There is a third player in this debate which has not had the exposure of the 
motivational view or the hedonic view. This is the Reward Theory of Desire proposed by 
Schroeder.58 I will be discussing this in much greater detail because of its novelty and interest.  
Before outlining Schroeder’s Reward Theory of Desire I should make it clear that 
Schroeder’s project is in the scientific tradition of discovering what instantiates natural kinds, 
in this case the natural psychological kind of desire. What Schroeder identifies as this natural 
psychological kind is the subset of intrinsic pro-attitudes that are called ‘desires’, ‘wants’, and 
‘wishes’ in the common parlance. His aim is not to eliminate desire talk, rather to understand 
the nature of desire by discovering the source of its surface features—motivation and pleasure. 
In the way that discovering that H20 is water teaches us something about the essential nature 
of water, Schroeder proposes that discovering the underlying nature of desire will allow us to 
                                                 
57 This claim is meant to be understood in light of the caveats expressed in the previous footnote. 
58An early version of this theory was first expressed in the philosophical literature by Fred Dretske: 
“The third face of desire, stressed by Fred Dretske in his Explaining Behavior (Dretske, 1996) but 
largely neglected by both popular thinking and philosophical research, is that there is a link between 
desire and reward: desires determine what counts as a reward and what counts as a punishment for an 
organism.  A rat, according to this view, can only be rewarded with food when it wants food; when it 
does not want food, food is no reward, and indeed force-feeding associated rat would be constitute a 
punishment.  In the motivational theory, this can be accommodated as another accidental, but 
evolutionary sensible, feature of desires.  Just as it makes sense for pleasure and displeasure to be linked 
to desire, so it makes sense for desires to determine what will serve to operantly condition an 
organism.” (Schroeder, 2004, p. 15.) 
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go beyond these surface features in our understanding of intrinsic desires. Now, there are two 
distinct claims that we can see Schroeder as defending. The first is the ‘physical’ view that he 
is simply identifying the fundamental source of desire-like phenomena in creatures like us as 
being instantiated is the area of the brain which is the seat of reward. The second is the 
‘conceptual’ view that he is arguing that our concept of desire should be understood in terms 
of reward, which entails that the other two surface features of desire, motivation and pleasure, 
should be understood as being caused by desires, rather than as elements of desires.  
I will begin with a quick outline of the view. Schroeder’s Reward Theory of Desire is 
the view that an intrinsic desire is a mental representation which has been constituted by the 
agent as a reward. A reward, on Schroeder’s view, is a neuroscientific conception of a certain 
type of learning signal released in a particular subsystem of the hypothalamus.59 This 
subsystem is, according to Schroeder, the mechanism by which rewards are realized in the 
brain. When I get the desired object/experience, this triggers a certain type of learning signal 
in this system, which reinforces the representation of that thing as a reward. What it is for an 
agent to constitute some representation as a reward is for that representation to drive the 
production of the appropriate kind of learning signal in the agent’s reward system.   
The biggest challenge that Schroeder faces in defending a theory of desire as reward is 
to present and motivate a view of reward that will make sense of the claim that what it is to 
desire some thing is to constitute that thing as a reward. So, in order to understand what is 
going on in Schroeder’s view, we need understand in detail what he means by ‘reward’, and 
how it is that our representations can be ‘constituted as’ rewards.  
                                                 
59 “There are two output structures of the biological reward system in organisms like us, twin structures 
immediately adjacent to one another deep in the brain: the ventral tegmental area, or VTA, and the 
pars compacta of the substantia nigra, or SNpc.”  (Schroeder, 2004, p. 49.) 
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Schroeder’s theory of reward 
 There are two central and not completely coincident concepts of what constitutes a 
reward in the way that the term ‘reward’ is commonly used: (1) The agent-relative view that 
what is a reward for an individual is giving them what they want, whether or not the giver 
intends the thing as a reward; and (2) the view that whether or not something counts as a 
reward is related not only to the agent’s response to that thing (as in (1)), but also to the 
intention that was expressed by the conferring party in so conferring that thing. It is 
important to note that these common sense understandings of reward are not what Schroeder 
is linking to intrinsic desires. His use of the term ‘reward’ is a technical one, where reward is 
taken to be a specific type of learning. The formal statement of Schroeder’s theory of reward 
is:   
Contingency-based Learning Theory of Reward (CLTR): For an event to be a reward for 
an organism is for representations of that event to tend to contribute to the production of 
a reinforcement signal in the organism in the sense made clear by computational theories 
of what is called ‘reinforcement learning’. 
Note that Schroeder’s aim here is not to give an account of what constitutes a reward in terms 
of necessary and sufficient conditions. Thus the fact that CLTR does not easily incorporate 
several elements of the folk theory of reward such as the intentions of the conferrer (if there is 
an agent involved in this role) or the efforts of the receiver, does not, Schroeder claims, 
undermine his view. Rather, his aim is to “…give a theory of the psychological aspect of 
reward: what must be the case inside an organism in order for it to make things into 
rewards.”60 61 
                                                 
60 Schroeder, 2004, p. 67. 
61 “When an organism like us is rewarded by, say, being given a bicycle, the first thing that happens in 
its brain is that it represents being given a bicycle.  This representation causes activity elsewhere in the 
brain, which categorizes the represented event as a reward.  Meanwhile, other brain structures have 
been attempting to predict the rewards and punishments the organism was going to receive at this 
moment.  The combination of current reward information and predicted reward information is used by 
the brain to calculate the difference between the rewards that had previously been predicted and the 
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According to CLTR there are three main elements of reward: representation, 
reinforcement and learning. The most straightforward, and least contentious, of these 
elements is the claim that rewards are representational states. The representations in question 
are those of propositional content, as well as the less cognitive representations of things such 
as thirst found in the hypothalamus. 62,63 The idea that we have such representational states is 
uncontroversial, as is the view that such states can participate in our various psychological 
processes. That rewards have representational content in this wide sense puts Schroeder’s view 
on a par with many other views of reward, as it is essentially the claim that such states have 
objects. It is the latter two elements—reinforcement and learning—that require explanation 
and defense. Both of these elements appear in the CLTR because Schroeder’s theory of reward 
understands the learning element in terms of Sutton and Barto’s theory of Reinforcement 
Learning.  
Reinforcement Learning 
The theory of Reinforcement Learning builds on a long discourse about 
‘reinforcement’ as understood in terms of operant conditioning within psychology.64 
                                                                                                                                                 
rewards that have actually materialized.  The result is released to the rest of the brain in the form of a 
very specific signal, one causing a very specific form of learning.  This signal has effects upon the short-
term operation of the brain and upon its long-term dispositions, effects that, in organisms like us, affect 
our feelings and modify dispositions to act, think, and experience, all in ways that tend to increase the 
acquisition of rewards and the avoidance of punishment.” (Schroeder, 2004, p. 49.) 
62 “All that is required for something to be counted as a perceptual or cognitive representation, so far as 
RTD is concerned, is that it be a content-bearing thing, making up some perceptual or cognitive 
attitude, localized in or distributed through some perceptual or cognitive center of the brain, capable of 
passing output to the reward system.”  (Schroeder, 2004, p. 134.) 
63 “A desire that justice be served is an entity that involves, as a part, the capacity to perceptually or 
cognitively represent that justice is being served, and it is from the content of this representation that 
the desire acquires its content.”  (Schroeder, 2004, p. 133.) 
64 The seminal definition of reinforcement is expressed in Thorndike’s Law of Effect, 1911: “Of several 
responses made to the same situation, those which are accompanied or closely followed by satisfaction 
to the animal will, other things being equal, be more firmly connected with the situation, so that, when 
it recurs, they will be more likely to recur; those which are accompanied or closely followed by 
discomfort to the animal will, other things being equal, have their connections with that situation 
weakened, so that, when it recurs, they will be less likely to occur The greater the satisfaction or 
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Reinforcement Learning is a computational approach to explaining how it is that we learn by 
interacting with our environment.65 The main focus of the theory is “goal-directed learning 
from interaction”66. The general idea motivating this view is that we learn many things 
through interacting with our environment. A child discovers the pleasures of sweet, the 
aversiveness of hot things, and the attraction of bright colors by touching, tasting, and seeing 
the world around her. Not only does interacting with the environment teach us things about 
the environment and our reaction to it, it also poses certain types of learning problems such 
as: ‘How do I get the chocolate?’; ‘Where should I go in the maze to get the cheese?’; and other 
more complex questions. The focus of this theory is learning problems where the agent has a 
specified goal, and the problem is to achieve the goal through interacting with the 
environment. What the agent is aiming for in achieving this goal, according to the theory, is 
to maximize a measurable reward signal which is released by the achievement of the goal. 
Such a reward signal is generally taken to be quantifiable, and thus able to be expressed 
numerically. 
The two main elements of Reinforcement Learning are the processes of search and 
memory. The ‘search’ element is captured by allowing the agent to try many responses to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
discomfort, the greater the strengthening or weakening of the bond.” (Thorndike, 1911, p. 244) The 
Law of Effect is somewhat controversial, but is generally taken to capture in broad strokes, a general 
intuition in psychology about how certain behaviors may become more or less likely. This general 
intuition is at the root of the procedural understanding of ‘reinforcement’ in psychology.  It “…refers to 
the presentation of a rewarding event following a response, which results in the phenomenon of an 
increased probability of that action re-occurring.”(Evans, 2001) In turn, that which reinforces behavior 
in this way is taken to be a reward. The relevance of the Law of Effect for Sutton and Barto is that it 
captures two central elements of reinforcement learning: search and memory. 
65 “The idea that we learn by interacting with our environment is probably the first to occur to us when 
we think about the nature of learning. When an infant plays, waves its arms, or looks about, it has no 
explicit teacher, but it does have a direct sensorimotor connection to its environment. Exercising this 
connection produces a wealth of information about cause and effect, about the consequences of actions, 
and about what to do in order to achieve goals. Throughout our lives, such interactions are undoubtedly 
a major source of knowledge about our environment and us. Whether we are learning to drive a car or 
to hold a conversation, we are acutely aware of how our environment responds to what we do, and we 
seek to influence what happens through our behavior. Learning from interaction is a foundational idea 
underlying nearly all theories of learning and intelligence.” (Sutton & Barto, 1998, p. 3.) 
66  Sutton & Barto, 1998, p. 3. 
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situation, which will be selectively reinforced or undermined.  The ‘memory’ element is where 
an association is formed (or strengthened) between a response to the situation and an 
experience of satisfaction, allowing the agent to remember which responses were most 
effective.67  
To take a computational approach is to adopt the perspective of someone designing an 
artificial intelligence system, and construct a computational process that is capable of solving 
the problem at hand. There are two parts to such an approach, the framing of the situation, 
and construction of the process. The problem is framed through the specification (or mapping) 
of the environment faced by the agent (the situation). The process is constructed by 
considering various ways that the agent may interact with the environment (actions), each of 
which constitutes a policy action. The aim in every case is for the agent to pursue that policy 
for action that maximizes a numerical reward signal. Thus “[r]einforcement learning is 
learning what to do—how to map situations to actions—so as to maximize a numerical reward 
signal.”68  
There are four main parts to Sutton and Barto’s theory of Reinforcement Learning: a 
policy for action; a reward function; a value function; and an environment.69 The policy 
determines what the agent will do in the face of different states of the environment, which “… 
[corresponds] to what in psychology would be called a set of stimulus-response rules or 
associations.”70 A policy for action can be understood as a disjunctive description of the moves 
that an agent may make in an extensive form game. The reward function determines what the 
goal of the agent is in a given situation, by “…map[ping] each perceived state (or state-action 
pair) of the environment to a single number, a reward, indicating the intrinsic desirability of 
                                                 
67  Sutton & Barto, 1998, p. 18. 
68  Sutton & Barto, 1998, p. 3. 
69  Sutton & Barto, 1998, pp. 7-8. 
70  Sutton & Barto, 1998, pp. 7. 
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that state.”71 The reward function captures the intrinsic desirability of being in a particular 
state at a particular time. In contrast, value function of a state-action pair is the sum of 
rewards that the agent achieves over time if they begin with that state-action pair. So while 
reward measures the immediate positive impact of a state on an agent, value measures the sum 
total of desirable outcomes resulting over time from that starting point. The final element of 
the view, the environment, is the state of the world within which the agent seeks to maximize 
her rewards. 
How it is that this mapping maximizes a numerical reward signal is cashed out in the 
‘Temporal Difference’ (TD) learning algorithm. The TD algorithm is based on the idea that 
through making temporal ‘errors’ in valuation—by estimating the reward of some state 
differently at different times—the agent learns something about the actual value of that state 
to her.72 In the Reinforcement Learning model the quantity estimated is that of value, 
understood as the cumulative reward of the state. The TD algorithm is based on two 
assumptions: the assumption “…that the computational goal of learning is to use the sensory 
cues to predict a discounted sum of all future rewards…within a learning trial…”; and the 
Markovian assumption that future rewards depend only on current perceptions—they have no 
connection with past perceptions.73 The Markovian assumption captures how it is that the 
agent can better predict the actual value of a reward by improving her successive estimations 
of the reward during a trial. This is important because during a trial the agent only has access 
to estimations of the sum of all future rewards, as the sum itself can only be known at the end 
                                                 
71  Sutton & Barto, 1998, pp. 8. 
72  Sutton & Barto, 1998, p. 21. 
73 Let V(t) be the sum of all future rewards; r(t) be the reward at time t; E[⋅] be the expected value of the 
sum of all future rewards in the trial; let the rate at which the agent discounts future be some γ such 
that 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.  Then the future value of all rewards to the end of a particular learning trial can be 
predicted with the equation 
[ ]...)2()1()()( 210 ++=++= trtrtrEtV γγγ  
(Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997,p. 1595) 
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of the trial, yet her aim is to maximize her future rewards.74 The attractiveness of this view is 
that learning about the actual value of states will allow the agent to better maximize her 
reward signal, as she will learn which state-action pair will lead to the most rewards over time, 
thus allowing her to maximize the satisfaction of her intrinsic desires. 
Thus what it is for something to be a reward, according to Schroeder’s Contingency-
based Learning Theory of reward, is for it to drive a learning signal that predicts an error 
between actual and expected rewards. For this to count as a claim about the physiological basis 
for reward Schroeder needs to give an account of how our representations tend to produce a 
physiological reinforcing signal that matches the form required by the Temporal Difference 
algorithm central to Sutton and Barto’s theory of reinforcement learning.75 At the heart of 
Schroeder’s theory of reward is the view that it is demonstrable that such a reinforcing signal 
exists in the reward center of the brain, which is comprised of a pair of neural structures 
immediately adjacent to one another: the ventral tegmental area, or VTA, and the pars 
compacta of the substantia nigra, or SNpc, the VTA/SNpc for short. Schroeder is in good 
company in making this claim. As Dayan et al put it: 
The idea that dopamine cells in the vertebrate midbrain report errors in the prediction of 
reward has been a powerful (although not undisputed) organizing force for a wealth of 
                                                 
74 Let V(t) represent the sum of all future rewards, and V^(t) represent an estimation of that sum. If the 
agent in fact acts on V(t) during the trial, an estimate V^(t) of the sum of all future rewards must exist. 
Sutton and Barto argue that the possibility of such an estimate is present within V(t), because the 
changes of V(t) are consistent through time. Through this consistency in V(t), V^(t) can be estimated at 
successive time steps. Errors in successive estimations V^(t) are the temporal difference errors at the 
center of the reinforcement theory. These temporal differences amongst instances of (V^(t)) act as a 
proxy prediction error for the value of all rewards available to the agent in the trial, which may be 
utilized during the trial in order to improve the estimates V^(t) of V(t). Improving the estimates of V(t) 
during a learning trial is the primary mechanism by which, according to Sutton and Barto, the agent 
aims to maximize her rewards. 
75To construct and use an error signal similar to the TD error above, a neural system would need to 
possess four basic features: “(i) access to a measure of reward value r(t); (ii) a signal measuring the 
temporal derivative of the ongoing prediction of reward 
  )(
ˆ)1(ˆ tVtV &&−+γ
; (iii) a site where these signals could be summed; and (vi) delivery of the error signal to areas 
constructing the prediction in such a way that it can control plasticity.” (Schultz et al., 1997, p. 1595) 
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experimental data.  This theory derives from reinforcement learning [as framed by Sutton 
and Barto], which shows how a particular form of the error (called the temporal difference 
error) can be used to learn predictions of reward delivery and also how the predictions can 
be used to learn to choose an adaptive course of action in terms of maximizing reward and 
minimizing punishment.76   
So, Schroeder’s view of reward is that firings of the VTA/SNpc function as a 
contingency-based learning system (based on the TD algorithm) because they fire in the 
pattern necessary for predicting differences between expected and actual rewards.  As 
Schroeder puts it: 
…VTA/SNpc neurons fire in a pattern that carries information about the difference, at 
time t, between the rewards received and expected at t versus those rewards the organism 
was predicting (at t-1) it would receive or expect at t…Such a signal has been shown to be 
exactly the sort of signal required for reward-based reinforcement learning.  That is, such 
a signal is exactly what is most computationally useful if a system is going to modify itself 
adaptively on the basis of rewards received.77 
Schroeder’s essential claim here is that the firings of the VTA/SNpc function as a 
contingency-based learning system because they fire in the pattern necessary for predicting 
differences between expected and actual rewards. The conclusion that Schroeder draws from 
this is that there is empirical evidence that we have a structure in our brains capable of 
fulfilling the desiderata of reinforcement learning.  Representations of events that produce 
such learning signals make the represented events rewards for Schroeder.  
From this Schroeder concludes that the VTA/SNpc provides the biological basis of 
what it is for something to count as a reward. If it is in fact plausible to conclude that this is 
just what reward is, then this is persuasive evidence in favor of his Contingency-based 
Learning Theory of Reward. And vindicating this theory of reward is an important step for 
Schroeder in proving his Reward Theory of Desire. So, should we be persuaded by Schroeder’s 
theory of reward? 
                                                 
76  Dayan & Balleine, 2002, p. 285. 
77 Schroeder, 2004, p. 50. 
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Schroeder’s argument for the Contingency-based Learning Theory of Reward (CLTR) 
is given against a background of three possible theories of reward—CLTR, the Behavioral 
Theory of Reward, and the Hedonic Theory of Reward. The Behavioral Theory of Reward is 
the view that reward is a stimulus which tends to increase any behavior which it follows. The 
classic example would be ‘rewarding’ a rat with sugar water. If giving the rat sugar water 
every time it presses a lever tends to increase the rat’s lever pressing behavior, then the sugar 
water is a reward. The Hedonic Theory of Reward is the view that a reward is anything which 
gives pleasure. Schroeder argues for CLTR by identifying ”…straightforward theoretical 
benefits to thinking of contingency-based learning as the nature of reward and punishment.”78 
The theoretical benefit that Schroeder has in mind is that of explanatory power.  
Schroeder argues that both the behavioral and hedonic theories of reward are 
vulnerable to the following objection: If behavior (or pleasure), just is reward, then reward 
cannot cause behavior (or pleasure). That reward causes both behavior and pleasure is an 
important element of the common-sense understanding of reward. But if we identify reward 
with behavior (or pleasure), then, he claims, any such causal story we may tell is trivial. 
CLTR, in contrast, allows us to maintain this common-sense causal intuition. Reward, if 
understood in terms of contingency-based learning, can be easily and reasonably understood 
as a cause of both behavior and pleasure. Schroeder argues that any theory of reward which 
does not suffer from this objection gains an advantage due to the robustness of this causal 
intuition, and the CRLT is just such a theory. 79  
A second advantage of CLTR is along the same lines—it captures a variety of other 
common sense intuitions about reward: 
                                                 
78 Schroeder, 2004, p. 62. 
79 Schroeder, 2004, p. 62. 
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…rewards cause emotional changes, they directly motivate via deliberation and inculcate 
unconscious effective behavioral dispositions, they inculcate intrinsic desires, they modify 
intellectual dispositions, and they can, perhaps, modify sensory capabilities.80 
Most of these effects have, to some degree, been demonstrated to be mediated in certain cases 
through VTA/SNpc teaching signals. That is, the effects have been demonstrated as being 
caused by temporal difference errors in reward prediction. Schroeder is very optimistic that 
those effects which have not yet been demonstrated as resulting from this system in certain 
cases (the inculcation of intrinsic desires and the unconscious modification of intellectual 
dispositions)81, will be so when the appropriate experiments are performed. Thus CLTR gives 
an account of how these aspects of reward work. 
The final theoretical benefit of the CLTR identified by Schroeder is that the theory 
captures everything learnt about reward through behaviorism (although not necessarily in 
precisely the same terms.) That is, those things considered to be rewards and punishments in 
the behaviorist tradition continue to count as rewards, and rewards are still capable of 
modifying immediate behavior, behavioral dispositions, and intellectual dispositions.82 
Moreover the theory is better than a purely behaviorist theory of reward as we still get to 
explain how reward causes these things, rather than merely identifying reward with these 
behaviors. The robustness of this argument for the CRLT depends upon the plausibility of the 
claim that we take rewards to cause pleasure and motivation. I am inclined to accept 
Schroeder’s argument for this point as this does seem to be a prima facie plausible 
interpretation of the folk theory of reward. 
So, as an account of reward, Schroeder’s view looks better than the alternatives, the 
hedonic and behavioral views. It is both physiologically and psychologically more plausible, 
and has greater explanatory power in a number of dimensions than its competition. Thus, the 
                                                 
80 Schroeder, 2004, p.63. Emphasis added.  
81 Schroeder, 2004, p. 62. 
82 Schroeder, 2004, p. 64. 
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claim of CRLT that for an event to be a reward for an organism is for representations of that 
event to contribute to the production of a reinforcement signal in the organism in the sense 
made clear by the theory of reinforcement learning is the most persuasive theory of reward. 
Having established his view of reward, we are now in a position to make clear what the reward 
face of desire is, and how it is that this could be the fundamental face of desire.  
The formal statement of Schroeder’s Reward Theory of Desire is: 
Reward Theory of Desire (RTD):  To have an intrinsic (positive) desire that P is to use the 
capacity to perceptually or cognitively represent that P to constitute P as a reward.  To be 
averse to it being the case that P is to use the capacity to perceptually or cognitively 
represent that P to constitute P as a punishment.83 
The first thing to note about this theory is that it is a theory of intrinsic desires, a theory 
about what it is to desire to that your spouse be happy, that you have a good life, that you not 
smell the skunk, that you see Balanchine, etc.. The next point is that it distinguishes between 
desires and aversions, the positive and negative aspects of desire. This distinction is, for 
Schroeder, grounded in intuition and justified by physiology. He claims that the brain 
distinguishes between these two cases in the working of the reward center. This particular 
element of his argument is beyond the scope of this discussion and will have no bearing on the 
outcome, so I will put it to the side.  
The final element of Schroeder’s view that needs to be explicated is what it is to 
’constitute’ something as a reward. The account he gives of this constitution relation is 
functionalist:  “…to constitute something as a reward or punishment is to use a representation 
of it to drive the production of a reward or punishment signal.”84 So a representation which is 
                                                 
83 Schroeder, 2004, p. 131. 
84 “Reward and punishment signals, in turn, are to be understood in terms of learning theory.  A reward 
signal is an event that causes a characteristic, mathematically describable form of learning, and a 
punishment signal is an event that causing as opposing form of learning…[T]his is learning in a very 
specific sense: it is a change in the connectivities of units that are themselves describable at an 
appropriately abstract level…Hence, if something is a causal system that is mathematically describable 
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constitutive of a reward is a representation that produces a learning signal of the kind specified 
by the CLTR. In sum, to have an intrinsic (positive) desire that P is to use the capacity to 
perceptually or cognitively represent that P to produce a reinforcement signal, thus 
constituting P as a reward.85   
I take it that by giving a physiologically plausible account of reward, and 
demonstrating how it is linked to desires, Schroeder has succeeded in showing that reward is a 
neglected face of desire. This leaves his further conclusions to consider. The first is the issue of 
how the reward face of desire stands in relation to the other two faces of desire—pleasure and 
motivation—and which of them is the most fundamental (both physiologically and 
conceptually), and thus the best candidate for instantiating desires. The second is Schroeder’s 
main conclusion, the claim that intrinsic desires just are rewards. 
Desire: Reward, Motivation, or Pleasure? 
Schroeder makes the argument that the reward face of desire is more fundamental 
than the motivational or hedonic faces of desire in two parts, one physical, and one conceptual. 
Schroeder’s central, and persuasive, argument for the physical claim that the reward face of 
desire is more fundamental than the other two faces of desire is a physiological one. His 
                                                                                                                                                 
as instantiating contingency-based learning, then it is the site of such learning.”  (Schroeder, 2004, p. 
134-5.) 
85 An issue that may give one pause about the RTD is its reliance on representations, and question of 
whether or not you have a desire in the absence of the relevant representation. Schroeder carefully 
points out that the RTD does not commit us to an episodic account of desire in the following extract: 
“The fact that desires include perceptual and cognitive representations as proper parts is likely to strike 
many as confusing. Does this mean that every time one perceives a pie one also desires it? Does it mean 
that one cannot desire the well-being of a child without thinking of that child’s well-being? No. 
According to the theory, desires need not involve tokened representations, need not involve actual 
episodes of representing pies or well-being. Rather, to desire is to be so organized that tokened 
representations of pie or well-being, if they occur, will contribute to the production of reward 
signals…This is why RTD requires a link between representational capacities and reward signals, rather 
than a link between occurrent representations and reward signals.” (Schroeder, 2004, p. 134.) 
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conceptual argument is an argument about the relative explanatory power of the three views 
of desire.  
The first, physiological, argument depends upon the claim that the activity that 
Schroeder identifies in the VTA/SNpc (reward center) as the reward signal is plausibly the 
cause of activity in the other centers of desire in many simple cases of intrinsic desiring. He 
begins by identifying the locations in the brain which are primarily responsible for reward, 
pleasure, and motivation. It is uncontroversial that the reward center is connected to those 
structures in the brain most implicated in hedonic tone and the motivation of action.  However 
Schroeder goes one step further in making a claim about the specific nature of this connection. 
He contends that the physiological structures that instantiate motivation and pleasure are less 
fundamental in the brain than the reward structure as identified by Schulz et al. As Schroeder 
puts it: 
Desire’s best-known face, motivation, seems to stem from the brain’s reward system.  
Desire’s other well-known face, pleasure, seems to represent the activity of the reward 
system. And desire’s neglected face, reward, is constituted by the activity of the reward 
system.86 
So, Schroeder argues that the reward is the physical instantiation of desire because it is the 
most fundamental physical cause of desires. This is the physical claim that desires are rewards. 
His evidence for this view is that the reward structure (the VTA/SNpc), is physiologically 
prior to the structures which instantiate motivation and pleasure. In this discussion I will refer 
to the VTA/SNpc as the reward center. The perigenual anterior cingulated cortex (PGAC) is 
identified as the neural home of hedonic experiences; I will call this the pleasure center.87 I 
shall use the term motor center to refer to the motor striatum, which is primarily implicated 
in voluntary action as it is the system that selects among the possible actions that are formed 
                                                 
86 Schroeder, 2004, p. 131. 
87 Schroeder, 2004, pp. 78-83. 
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in the motor cortex, which is the neural seat of what Davidson refers to as ‘primitive acts’.88 
Thus the motor center receives input from the motor cortex, the supplementary motor area 
(SMA), and the motor region of the anterior cingulate cortex (AC), which are generally held 
to be the important seats of motivation.  
Vindication of this claim requires that there is evidence that the activities of the 
reward center cause activities in both the pleasure center and the motor center, and that there 
is no direct causal connection between the pleasure center and the motor center. Thus there 
are three claims about causal relationships amongst these centers that Schroeder must defend: 
(1) <reward center directly causes activity in pleasure center>; and the (2) <reward center 
directly causes activity in motor center>; while (3) <motor center does not directly cause 
activity in pleasure center> and < pleasure center does not directly cause activity in motor 
center>  
The first causal connection, the claim that activity in the reward center causes activity 
in the pleasure center is supported by evidence of the neural pathways between the reward 
center and pleasure center, and the operation of dopamine on these two structures. These 
structures are such that, as Schroeder puts it: “…the activity of the reward system is a normal 
cause of pleasure.”89 However note that these two systems are independent as although the 
operation of the reward center is a sufficient cause of activity in the pleasure center, it is not a 
necessary cause. Berridge et al demonstrated that rats with extensive lesions to the reward 
center were still able to experience pleasure and displeasure, as indicated by facial expression.90  
                                                 
88 Primitive actions are those actions which are performed directly, without performing any other 
actions to bring them about.  Lifting a glass is a primitive action, while eating chocolate is not. 
(Davidson, 1980, ch 3.) 
89  Schroeder, 2004, p. 36; pp. 76-83. 
90 Berridge and Robinson (1998) cited by Schroeder, (p. 81). In addition Schroeder argues: “There are at 
least two tremendously important facts about the PGAC. The first is that it is wholly distinct from the 
VTA/SNpc: that the neural basis of pleasure, therefore, is not identical to the neural basis of reward, 
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The second causal connection, the claim that activity in the reward center causes 
activity in the motor center is supported by studies which demonstrate that destruction of the 
reward center causes the complete absence of voluntary movement91 as evidence that reward is 
causally prior to motivation.  
The lack of the third connections—that pleasure does not cause motivation, and 
motivation does not cause pleasure—is shown by the lack of neuroscientific evidence for a 
direct connection between the motor center and the pleasure center.92 Experiments have 
shown that the connections between these two areas are indirect. Individuals who have 
significant damage to the pleasure center (and thus lose hedonic tone) are still capable of goal-
directed action. However due to the lack of hedonic tone they fail to get distressed or excited 
about the prospects of the success or failure of goal-directed action.93 It is also possible to 
manipulate motivation in organisms without changing their hedonic responses.94  
So both the hedonic and motivational faces of desire seem to be the effects of a 
common cause, this common cause being the reward face of desire. Thus, the reward system is 
the seat of a physiologically more fundamental face of desire than either motivation or 
                                                                                                                                                 
and so pleasure is not identical to a reward signal. The second is that the PGAC is far from the only 
source of excitatory input to the VTA/SNpc: that pleasure, therefore, is not the only thing that is 
rewarding.” (Schroeder, 2004, p. 36.) 
91  Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Langston & Palfreman, 1995. 
92 “Work done in localizing the neural basis of motivation has centered around the motor cortex, the 
main region of the brain sending signal directly to the spinal neurons controlling the voluntary 
muscles. However, the selection of an actual action from the range of plausible actions is not performed 
by the motor cortex, but by another structure deep in the brain, known as the motor center of the basal 
ganglia. The basal ganglia guide both conscious, pre-planned action and spontaneous action. It may 
come as a surprise to learn that the connections between the neural basis of pleasure, in the PGAC, and 
the control of the voluntary muscles appears to be fairly modest. Instead of pleasure dominating 
motivation, motivation appears much more influenced by the neural basis of reward in the VTA/SNpc. 
Reward signals from the VTA/SNpc appear to have a very important influence upon the basal ganglia, 
both in the short term (influencing immediate motivation) and in the long term (guiding the formation 
of behavioral tendencies). (Schroeder, 2004, pp. 36-7.) 
93  Foltz & White, 1962. 
94  Berridge & Robinson, 1998. 
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pleasure. Schroeder’s argument for the physiological primacy of the reward center is well 
supported by current neuroscience, so this claim is plausible. 
Schroeder argues for the conceptual priority of the reward face of desire by appealing 
to the relative explanatory power of the three views. That activity in the reward center cause 
activity in both the pleasure center and motor center allows for appeals to reward in order to 
explain what happens in both the pleasure center and the motor center. It is a part of the folk 
theory of desire that our desire cause our actions, and that having desires satisfied cause 
pleasure. Having a view of desire that allows for these causal connections is thus, he claims, 
doubly satisfactory. In the first place it accords with our common sense intuitions about the 
causal connections amongst these states, which is always a desirable characteristic in an 
otherwise counter-intuitive theory. Maintaining these causal relations is also explanatorily 
beneficial. Separating the essence of desire from its ‘public faces’, as it were, increases the 
explanatory power of the view because such a theory of desire gets to say informative things 
about why desires motivate, and why having our desires satisfied is pleasurable. In these 
respects the RTD is explanatorily more powerful than its rivals. This argument rests on both 
the strength of our intuitions about the precise nature of the causal connections amongst these 
states, and whether or not we are willing to bite a bullet on the loss of this explanatory power. 
It is certainly correct that we take there to be close connections amongst reward, motivation, 
and pleasure. However I dispute Schroeder’s claim that the folk understanding of these 
connections is so clearly causal. The folk theory, but its very nature, is not that specific about 
the types of connections that exist amongst these states, and I think that Schroeder is going 
beyond the available evidence in drawing this conceptual conclusion.   
This then leaves the issue of Schroeder’s final conclusion, the claim that the Reward 
Theory of Desire is the correct theory of intrinsic desire. Even if it is true that the reward face 
of desire is physiologically more fundamental than its two rivals, it is still an open question 
 72
 
whether or not it is a plausible theory of intrinsic desire, or simply a more fundamental 
feature of some deeper account of desire. I will argue that the latter is true, on the grounds 
that Schroeder’s theory of reward, the CRLT that is at the center of his Reward Theory of 
Desire, appeals to an antecedent (and thus more fundamental) notion of intrinsic desire.  
The Reward Theory of Desire as ‘the’ Theory of Desire. 
The aspect of Schroeder’s view that is problematic for his final conclusion is his view 
of what it is for a representation to be constituted as a reward or punishment. The account he 
gives of what it is to constitute some representation as a reward or a punishment is 
functionalist. It is that “…to constitute something as a reward or punishment is to use a 
representation of it to drive the production of a reward or punishment signal.”95 Thus a 
representation which is constitutive of a reward is whatever it is that produces a reward signal.  
Now, there must be space in this view for representations that do, and do not, 
constitute rewards. Throughout the course of any day we all have multiple representations 
that should not turn out to be rewards. So, what is the difference between a representation 
that produces a reward signal, and a representation that does not? However, Schroeder’s 
account does not have an answer to this question. This is a very suggestive gap in his view. I 
think that Schroeder is obscuring a crucial assumption in his view by giving such a bare 
functionalist account of this constitution relation. This assumption is buried in his reliance on 
the reinforcement theory of reward.  
                                                 
95 “Reward and punishment signals, in turn, are to be understood in terms of learning theory.  A reward 
signal is an event that causes a characteristic, mathematically describable form of learning, and a 
punishment signal is an event that causes an opposing form of learning…[T]his is learning in a very 
specific sense: it is a change in the connectivities of units that are themselves describable at an 
appropriately abstract level…Hence, if something is a causal system that is mathematically describable 




Let us take a closer look at the actual cases that Schroeder relies upon in defending his 
Contingency-based Learning Theory of Reward. The question of how it is that psychological 
concepts such as reward, pleasure, and motivation are instantiated in the brain is the territory 
of a group of relatively recent scientific disciplines which operate at the intersection of 
neuroscience and psychology, such as biopsychology, neuropsychology, affective 
neuroscience, behavioral neuroscience, etc. As interdisciplinary enterprises, these endeavors 
take their concepts from both sides of the fence. Neuroscience contributes information about 
the grey squishy bits, while organizing concepts such as pleasure, motivation, and reward 
come from psychology. These psychological concepts organize neurological research by 
identifying the experiences and activities that are characteristic of such concepts, thus 
establishing what it is that is happening in the brain when the agent experiences certain 
things, or behaves in certain ways. However this is not a one way street. If research begins 
with the view that liking something and wanting to get it are identical, yet through brain 
manipulations it discovers that liking and wanting can be disconnected, then we learn that 
these are in fact two distinct concepts. This process of exploration results in a type of reflective 
equilibrium among psychological concepts and neural instantiations. So, in order to judge how 
plausible Schroeder’s position is, we need to be clear about the experiments which he is basing 
his conclusions on, specifically the concepts, and the characteristic experiences and behaviors 
that are taken to fall under them.  
The theory of Schulz et al which is so central to Schroeder’s claim relies on just such a 
process of reflective equilibrium. The idea of reward is taken from psychology. The 
instantiation in the brain is discovered through the neuroscientific technique of monitoring 
the firing of particular neurons during some event which will count as reward for the creature 
in psychological terms. The principle investigations which are taken to support their theory 
entail the tracking of dopamine receptors in the VTA/SNpc of monkeys who are being 
‘rewarded’ by tiny amounts of fruit juice. Schulz’s hypothesis was that understanding reward 
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processing at a neuronal level would help us to understand voluntary, goal-directed behavior. 
There were three trials, each with a red square trigger stimulus. In the first condition the 
monkey would be rewarded for moving (pressing a small lever under where their right hand 
was resting); in the second condition the monkey would be rewarded for not moving its hand; 
in the final condition the monkey was not rewarded for moving its hand. In order to receive 
the reward of 1.5ml of apple juice, the monkey had to perform the required (non)action 3.5 
seconds after the trigger stimulus. The reward was delivered 1.5 seconds after the action was 
performed.96 The structure here is of operant conditioning achieved through association 
between the conditioned stimulus and the unconditioned. The conditioned stimulus was the 
red square, and the unconditioned stimulus was the apple juice.  
The experiment recorded the activation of individual neurons within the target zones 
while the monkeys were performing computer controlled behavioral tasks. The fruit juice 
functions as a reward because it is intuitively an unconditioned stimulus for the monkeys.97 
So, Schroeder’s claim that reward is a certain type of learning signal qua neuroscientific, is in 
its fullest expression the claim that: reward understood as that response which is elicited in 
monkeys by fruit juice is a certain type of learning signal. I think a key question that must be 
asked of this study is why it is that fruit juice elicits the reward signal that Schroeder identifies 
as ‘reward’.98  99 
                                                 
96  Schultz et al., 2000. 
97  Schultz, Tremblay, & Hollerman, 2000. 
98 Schulz et al define reward as “…an operational concept for describing the positive value that a 
creature ascribes to an object, a behavioral act, or an internal physical state. The function of reward can 
be described according to the behavior elicited. For example, appetitive or rewarding stimuli induce 
approach behavior that permits as animal to consume. Rewards may also play the role of positive 
reinforcers where they increase the frequency of behavioral reactions during learning and maintain 
well-established appetitive behaviors after learning.” So, Schroeder is proposing a theory of desire as 
reward, where the notion of reward at issue is operational—essentially, that which is capable of 
conditioning the subject. (Schultz et al., 1997, p. 1593.) 
99 Not unsurprisingly, talk of a ‘reward-based’ analysis of desire in this sense causes the specter of 
behaviorism and Pavlovian conditioning to loom, an association that Schroeder is eager (but perhaps 
cannot) do away with.  He draws a hard distinction between what he calls the ‘doctrinaire’ behaviorist, 
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Recall that Sutton and Barto take their reinforcement theory of learning to capture the 
Rescorla-Wagner model100 of what is going on in classical and operant conditioning—the idea 
that learning is a matter of predicting the unconditioned stimulus by using the conditioned 
stimulus as evidence for its imminent occurrence. In such conditioning the organism has 
certain automatic responses to certain stimuli. Conditioning occurs when a behavior is elicited 
from some subject by repeatedly pairing the conditioned stimulus with some unconditioned 
stimulus which the subject naturally finds attractive. It is the aim of TD algorithm to capture 
what is going on in such a model of conditioning. In such cases it is the unconditioned 
stimulus that drives the subject’s behavior, in that it is the unconditioned stimulus that 
generates the reward function by determining the intrinsic desirability of each state, and thus 
the relative values (the sum of rewards available for the outcomes of a given plan of action) of 
possible policies for action. According to the TD algorithm, the subject learns what the value 
of some state-action pair is through changes in successive estimations of the value of 
implementing particular policies of action. This then gives the agent a way of identifying that 
policy of action which has the greatest value, so she can act so as to maximize her numerical 
                                                                                                                                                 
who holds the unflinchingly bullet-biting position that rewards and punishments just are their effects 
on behavior, and the neuroscientific conception.  Then he points out—correctly, if somewhat 
simplistically—that neuroscientists are engaged in finding the underlying structure through which 
reward is expressed in the brain, and thus they are not behaviorists.  By looking at reward in 
neuroscientific terms, which gives us a way of understanding reward independently from the 
behaviorist’s focus on behavior and pleasure, Schroeder claims to avoid this implication.  If, however, 
we take the in principle objection to behaviorism to be that they fail to take seriously the complex 
interior life which accompanies these phenomena in beings like us, then it is not clear how much better 
current neuroscience is doing.  But given that his neuroscientific understanding is so heavily rooted in 
this tradition, does his disavowal really work?  This is an interesting question, although not one which 
is strictly relevant to the present discussion, so I will leave it to a later time. 
100 There is some question about what happens in both classical and operant conditioning to the 
organism when ‘learns’ some behavior. The Rescorla-Wagner model is an account of how such learning 
proceeds. According to this model, animals learn to predict the imminent advent of the unconditioned 
stimulus by the presence of the conditioned stimulus from repeated pairings of the unconditioned 
stimulus with the conditioned stimulus. This prediction hypothesis can be understood as the 
conditioned stimulus behaving as evidence. If we apply the Rescorla-Wagner model to operant 
conditioning cases, where a conditioned stimulus cues a behavior which is followed by an unconditioned 
stimulus, then the conditioned stimulus will be evidence for the organism of a forthcoming 
unconditioned stimulus, if the organism performs the CR.  
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reward signal. So, if we ask the question of what determines the reward function and thus the 
value of the outcomes to the agent, the answer will be given in terms of the intrinsic 
desirability of the unconditioned stimulus to the subject.   
Thus Schroeder’s reliance on the theory of Reinforcement Learning leaves him 
vulnerable to the following argument: 
What it is for something to be an intrinsic desire is that it is constituted by the agent as a 
reward. (Reward Theory of Desire) 
A representational state is constituted by the agent as a reward if it produces a reward 
signal. (Contingency-based Learning Theory of Reward) 
A reward signal measures the difference between actual and expected value. (Theory of 
Reinforcement Learning) 
The value of a state of affairs is determined by a reward function. (Theory of 
Reinforcement Learning) 
A reward function attaches positive value to a representation if and only if the object of 
the representation is already intrinsically desirable to the agent. (Theory of Reinforcement 
Learning) 
Thus a representation produces a reward signal (is constituted as a reward in Schroeder’s 
terms) iff the representation is of something that the agent antecedently takes to be 
intrinsically desirable. 
Therefore, the essential nature of an intrinsic desire cannot be that it is constituted by the 
agent as a reward.  
In short, representations are not intrinsic desires because they are constituted by the 
agent as rewards, but rather that they are constituted by the agent as rewards because they are 
intrinsic desires. The model of reinforcement learning relied upon so heavily by Schroeder 
presupposes a fully fledged view of intrinsic desires. Thus Schroeder’s reward view of desire is 
not a plausible view of what intrinsic desires are. There is a more fundamental notion of 
intrinsic desire in play that explains why some representations contribute to a reward signal 
while others do not. 
How is it that Schroeder missed such an important step in his explanation of reward in 
terms of contingency-based learning? A part of the clue is to be had in his somewhat abrupt 
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dismissal of, and thus lack of exposition about, the types of computational learning theory that 
do much of the work in his view of reward.  
Reinforcement learning is driven by…information about the difference between actual 
and expected contingencies…But these details are just that: details…So I propose to gloss 
over the particular mathematical details, leaving them to those interested in computational 
theories of learning and neural modeling.101 
Unfortunately for Schroeder, the devil, as is so often the case, is in the detail. On close 
examination it turns out that Schroeder’s view of reward, and thus his view of desire, relies on 
the presupposition of desiring built into the theory of Reinforcement Learning that grounds 
his CLTR. His view yields an account of intrinsic desires because it presupposes them. The 
argument that he gives has the form of a ‘desire in—desire out’ argument, so he cannot, by 
relying on such an argument, discover the fundamental nature of desires. Now, this argument 
does not completely invalidate Schroeder’s view, just his claim that intrinsic desires are 
rewards. What, then, is the import of Schroeder’s Reward Theory of Desire? An in depth 
discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this chapter, but I will give a sketch of a 
response.  
If we take Schroeder’s central claim that reward is best understood as a process of 
cognitive learning seriously, then the reward face of desire can be understood as a theory of 
desire change. There are two points in favor of this interpretation. The first is that this 
interpretation of the RTD goes some distance toward explaining why Schroeder may have 
taken it to be a theory of nature of intrinsic desires. What Schroeder is in essence claiming in 
the Reward Theory of Desire is that desires are a certain type of learning function.102 This is 
suspicious because it seems to be conflating what a desire is at a given time, with a process 
through which desires change. Once we take seriously the idea that desires are dynamic states 
                                                 
101 Schroeder, 2004, p. 66. 
102 I am unsure whether I should be talking about processes, structures, or functions here, but I cannot 
see anything that hangs on the difference between these cases at this point. 
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that persist over time, and assume that they can change in response to certain experiences, 
then it makes more sense to understand Schroeder’s RTD as a theory of desire change. 
Understanding Schroeder’s account of desire as an account of desire change also helps make 
sense of why he would argue for it in the first place. It is relatively common that someone 
who takes himself to be giving a theory of p is in fact giving a theory of change in p, and it is 
this error which I am attributing to Schroeder. He takes himself to be giving an account of 
intrinsic desires, while he is in fact giving an account of how it is that such intrinsic desires 
change. 
I claim that Schroeder's picture is suggestive of, in its most plausible form, this 
process. The RTD, taken as a theory of desire change, captures a mechanism through which 
our desires can change as a response to information about the actual and estimated value of an 
outcome to the agent. If we follow a desire through time, then this describes a process where 
this desire is either reinforced or undermined by experiences. Intrinsic desires enter into the 
reward system, and are altered through the cognitive and conative processes that are 
instantiated in, and driven by, the reward system. Simplistically we can say that the learning 
element of the theory describes a process such that if the rewarding-ness of a state, experience 
or outcome exceeds the way in which it is predicted to be it will be reinforced. If the 
rewarding-ness of the state does not live up to expectations of its value it will be undermined. 
The details of how this learning occurs are the details of reinforcement learning. I consider 
that Schroeder’s view, taken as an account of desire change, is an important contribution to a 
more realistic understanding of desires.  
In sum, Schroeder argues persuasively that reward is a physiologically more 
fundamental face of desire than pleasure or motivation. Although I take Schroeder’s 
Contingency-based Learning Account of Reward to be the correct account of how our desires 




plausible theory of the essential nature of our concept of intrinsic desires. I do not want to take 
a strong stand of which of these three faces of desire is ‘the’ face of desire, in part because I 
take the most plausible view of desire to be a cluster concept which includes all three of these 
elements. Now, none the three theories presented here can answer the challenge of temptation 
as temptations do not differ from other desires in terms of their hedonic aspects, motivational 
structure, or rewarding-ness. However, there is a suggestive gap in Schroeder’s Reward 
Theory of Desire which indicates where we should look next for an answer to the challenge of 
temptation. The gap is the question of why it is that some representations are constituted as 
rewards, while others are not.  
 
C H A P T E R  4  
THE EMOTIONAL COMPONENT OF DESIRES 
 
 I propose that what is missing from the views of desire canvassed in the previous 
chapters is an explicit acceptance that our desires are intimately connected to certain kinds of 
emotional responses that we have to things. I will argue that not only do these emotional 
components of desire exist, but that they affect our desires, and they can be manipulated in 
certain ways. Considering the connection between our desires and these emotional 
components of desire will yield an account of what causes temptations, and why they should 
not be treated on a par with other desires in deliberation.  
The aim of this chapter is to argue that what is needed in our understanding of desires 
is an acknowledgment of the form and influence of the emotional component of desires. My 
aim is to defend the idea that there are characteristic phenomenological corollaries of desires—
what I will call the ‘emotional responses of desiring’—which are intimately connected to our 
desires.  
The view that there is a felt emotional component of desires is driven by two distinct 
concerns. The first, and most influential, is the evidence of the phenomenology of certain 
common cases of desiring. This is the phenomenology of simply wanting some thing, in the 
absence of any robust explanation of why this should be the case. Such emotional experiences 
of desiring behave, in many ways, like a response to that thing on a par with various 
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perceptual responses. Like the scent of a rose, the wanting has distinctive and identifiable 
qualia. The second concern is more theoretical. This is the gap in Schroeder’s Reward Theory 
of Desire. What was lacking in Schroeder’s Reward Theory of Desire was an answer to the 
question of why it is that some representations drive reward signals, while others do not. By 
paying attention to the felt emotional aspect of desires, I propose that this gap can be filled. 
These emotional responses of desiring are the phenomenological states characteristic 
of experiencing an urge, yearning, craving, desire response, attraction, want or desire for some 
thing. Such felt emotional components of desires are not the same as desires, but they are 
intimately connected with them. If I look at a painting and have an emotional response of 
desiring, then this can count as evidence that I have a desire for the painting. It is not usually 
evidence for me that I have a desire, but if I express this kind of emotional response through 
comments, expression, gestures, etc., then from the third personal point of view, this counts as 
evidence that I desire the painting.103 If I desire to pursue some career, and represent it to 
myself in great detail yet have no emotional response of desiring to the prospect, then this 
looks like evidence that I don’t ‘really’ desire that career. However such responses are neither 
necessary nor sufficient conditions for desires, as both of the connections I have described are 
defeasible. For instance, someone who is close to his brother, and looks at his sister-in-law and 
feels such an emotional response of desiring, may well squelch this response rather than 
forming the attendant desire for his brother’s wife. Conversely, someone who desires to grade 
papers, and represents to herself the prospect of grading those papers may well lack the 
emotional response of desiring to this representation, but this is not likely to call into question 
                                                 
103 In most cases, the agent herself will not use this as evidence that she has the desire, as she has access 
to the desire and is thus in no need of evidence one way or the other. However, if her access to her 
desire is being disturbed in some way, then she can take a third personal perspective in order to 




her desire to grade the papers. Thus the felt emotional component often goes along with 
desires, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for having a desire.  
In the normal case, when we have such a felt emotional component of desire, we have 
the desire too. So the felt emotional component of desires is an emotional correlate of certain 
desires. Although there is a close connection between full fledged desires and the felt 
emotional component of desires, I am not taking a stand on what this relationship is, as the 
precise relationship between such felt emotional components of desire and desires proper is 
not clear. However these emotional responses of desiring are important as they are often 
natural accompaniments to full-fledged desires, and their existence provides certain types of 
evidence about the accompanying desires.   
My presentation of how this felt emotional component of desires works will be broken 
up into several sections. In the first instance, I will be concerned with motivating the existence 
of responses of the type required for the felt emotional component of desires. The second 
section will explore how such a response would behave by drawing an analogy to the types of 
responses relied upon in various theories of response dependence. The third section will again 
rely on an analogy to a response-dependence theory. This time I will use a looser analogy to 
the response-dependent theory of emotion proposed by D’Arms and Jacobson, in order to 
argue that the felt emotional component of desires can be more or less fitting. Such an account 
of fitness requires explicit constraints on responses in order to generate an account of when 
such a response is appropriate in the sense that it ‘fits’ the stimulus. This then leads to the 
next and final chapter, where I will identify various instances of failure in the conative system, 
failures that produce characteristic cases of temptation through manipulation of the felt 
emotional component of desires. It is this account of fitness that will ultimately show how 




Automatic Affective Responses 
The felt emotional component of desire is meant to capture the experience of 
considering something and wanting it. Although note that by ‘wanting’ I do not mean to 
include the idea that such wanting is necessarily motivational. I desire that my husband 
surprises me with flowers, but my doing anything to bring this end about (such as mentioning 
it), robs the gesture of the element of spontaneity which is part of what I desire in it. My 
desire requires no motivation, although it clearly favors satisfaction. What I am interested in 
here is the experience of having a particular emotional response to some outcome, a response 
which is characteristic of the felt experience of desiring. 
I propose that the felt emotional component of desires is a type of automatic affective 
response to some object, call this the ‘desire response’. Such responses occur when an agent 
has a particular characteristic response to external stimuli. A response is automatic if it is 
outside of the conscious control of the agent, and it is affective if it encodes an attitude (affect) 
of the agent. Such a response encodes several pieces of information. It has a valence, which 
determines whether the object of the response should be approached or avoided. It also has a 
felt intensity, which acts as a proxy (although not a necessarily reliable one), for a variety of 
information about the agent’s attitude toward the thing. The fact of such responses can 
provide evidence for how much the agent is motivated to get that thing (in cases where the 
desire is a desire for some thing), or evidence for how strong the agent’s desire for that thing 
is, or how appealing that thing is to the agent, etc.  
The view that our representations can have a valence and felt intensity which is 
supplied by some automatic affective response is not a novel one. Baumeister et al argue that 
emotions cause behavior through a feedback mechanism which relies on a dual process view of 
emotions. According to the dual process view, emotions are sorted into two distinct processes, 
automatic and consciously controlled, both of which participate in the feedback mechanism. 
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Such dual process views are becoming widely accepted in talk of cognition.104 In emotions, the 
controlled process yields those things that count as what we tend to take as ‘full-blown’ 
emotions, such as fully worked out desires for specific careers, or particular activities. These 
are consciously experienced complex states. In contrast, the automatic process yields far 
simpler states that may not even be consciously detected by the agent. These are something 
like the ‘unconscious emotions’ proposed by Wienkelman and Berridge,105 although I have no 
commitment to the idea that these states be unconscious.  
Automatic affective responses are composed of a representation, and at least one 
association.106 The association is with other mental items such as patterns or memories. The 
mechanism through which such responses are formed is similar to the way in which 
representations and associations comprise the recognition of objects. The felt emotional 
component of desires constituted by such automatic affective responses need no inferences, 107 
they simply occur to the agent. The idea that this felt experience of desiring is automatic—that 
is, is outside of the conscious control of the agent—reflects the idea that the emotional aspect 
of desiring, like other emotions, is not the sort of thing that we can choose to experience.  
A feature of such desire responses is that they attach to other representations. Desire 
responses are additional to the basic sensory representation of an object, state of affairs, 
possibility, idea, etc. If this were not the case, then representing something would be sufficient 
for having a desire response to that thing, but this can’t be right, as is shown by the gap in 
Schroeder’s Reward Theory of Desire. I take the claim that there is such a felt emotional 
component of desires to be continuous with Schroeder’s Reward Theory of Desire. What it 
                                                 
104  Chaiken & Trope; Wilson. 
105  (Winkielman & Berridge, 2004) Their work provides persuasive evidence that “…people have 
automatic affective reactions (such as liking and disliking something) that are simple and rapid and may 
well guide online behavior and quick reactions.”(Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, p. 168.) 
106 Such automatic affective states are proposed by (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc; Murphy, Monahan, & 
Zajonc; and Winkielman & Berridge, 2004). 
107  Baumeister et al., p. 168. 
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does is supply the missing element of Schroeder’s view, by providing a way to differentiate 
between representations that drive a reward signal, and representations that do not. What 
plausibly provides such emotional responses a connection with many of the familiar clothes of 
desire is that it drives a reward signal in the agent, and thus engages her motivational and 
hedonic systems. Now, I do not mean to say that this is the only way in which a reward signal 
can be driven in Schroeder’s account. Rather that in his trickiest case, the case of spontaneous 
intrinsic desires that have no cognitive elements, such automatic affective responses can 
differentiate between representations that drive a reward signal and representations that do 
not. Another way in which such a reward signal could be differentiated in cases such as the 
‘cold’ intrinsic desire, that with no clear emotional affect, is through representations being 
representation of the good, the moral, the noble, etc. Thus the desire response can play the 
role of a missing element in Schroeder’s view, how it is that reward signals are produced in 
cases of spontaneous intrinsic desires. 108    
These felt emotional components of desires are the kinds of things that are often at the 
end of the explanatory road in Humean accounts of action. When the agent gets to the point 
that she cannot provide any other explanation for her desire than the response “I just like it” 
or “I just want it”, what she is talking about is an affective response that is out of her 
conscious control—she is simply wired in such a way that she responds to representations of 
that thing positively. By saying this I do not mean to say that there is no explanation of why 
                                                 
108 It is this aspect of automatic affective responses that Baumeister identifies as making them adaptive 
learning mechanisms for creatures like us. “Imagine an early human encountering a dangerous 
predator. For conscious emotion to mediate the flight, a sequence something like this would be 
necessary. The person must recognize the animal and cognitively appraise the danger. This gives rise to 
physiological arousal, which spreads through the person’s body. The bodily response then triggers a 
further cognitive process involving the brain, which recognizes the bodily state as fear and on that basis 
initiates a motor response, and the person flees. This sequence is plausible, but it would take some time 
(at least seconds, more likely minutes), during which the person is continually exposed to danger. 
Humans or animals whose responses depended on such a sequence might therefore make relatively easy 
meals for quick-acting predators.  
In contrast, automatic affect would arise in perhaps a tenth of a second, almost as soon as the predator is 
recognized” (Baumeister et al., p. 169.) 
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she has this response to the thing, but rather than the explanation is going to be psycho-
physical—in the way that explaining why I perceive stop signs as red is psycho-physical—
rather than cognitive or rational. In other words, such desire responses are the product of 
some sort of automatic system within the agent which I will call the ‘conative system’. The 
idea of the conative system is similar to that of the perceptual system, although it is meant to 
capture the agent’s psychological dispositions to value goods. As product of such an automatic 
system—a system that is outside of the direct conscious control of the agent—the 
appropriateness or otherwise of desire responses will be explained in terms of how well the 
conative system is working. It is in this sense that explanations of desire responses will by 
psycho-physical rather than cognitive. Note that I am not committing myself to the view that 
having such responses is either necessary or sufficient for desiring, rather, I am proposing that 
such responses are corollaries to desire in many common cases. 
What is interesting about these desire responses is that they are the type of affective 
element of a representation that (1) arises as a response to the relation between the subject and 
the object; (2) are exactly what is needed to distinguish representations capable of producing 
reward signals from representations that are not; and (3) are unconsciously caused in the 
agent, so are a sufficient explanation of any action that they may cause.  
In sum, the type of response that is at the center of the felt emotional component of 
desires that I am proposing is an automatic affective response. Such a response is the product 
of a representation of the thing, and various associations that the agent has with that thing. 
These states are both philosophically and psychologically plausible in that there is a place for 
such states in our folk and philosophical theories of desire. Scanlon, in his discussion of 
appetitive unmotivated desires, references such states in enumerating the elements of a desire 
for a drink. In Schroeder’s discussion such states appear in the guise of unconditioned stimuli. 
In the folk view such states appear in the guise of appetites and urges. The view that there is 
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such a felt emotional component to our desires is deeply entrenched in the literature, yet an 
in-depth discussion of the import and characteristics of this element of desire is conspicuous in 
its absence.    
Now, in order to make the view that there are such desire responses plausible, I need 
to do two things. The first is to flesh out the way in which such emotional responses work. 
The second is to show how such felt emotional component of desires can answer the challenge 
of temptation. I propose that both of these aims can be achieved through considering a loose 
analogy with D’Arms and Jacobson’s response-dependent account of emotions. The first aspect 
of this view that I will consider is what it is to understand certain mental states as essentially 
relational, that is, in terms of certain characteristic responses to perceived or imagined 
properties. This will give us the sense of a response that is appropriate for understanding 
desire responses. The second is an account of when it is that such a response is ‘fitting’, that is, 
when it is the appropriate response to have. I will use this account of fitness to argue that 
desire responses can be similarly more and less fitting, and it is this account of fit that will 
ultimately solve the challenge of temptation.  
Desires as Responses 
The kind of responses that I am proposing as the felt emotional component of desires 
is an expression of a relation between the desirer and the object of the desire. One context in 
which such relational aspects of mental states have been discussed is in terms of the distinction 
between primary and secondary properties. Locke, in his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding outlines the distinction between primary and secondary properties (qualities in 
his terminology) in the following way: Primary qualities are ‘utterly inseparable from… [a] 
body’, no matter how small (II. viii. 10), while secondary qualities ‘are nothing in…objects 
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themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us’.109 The classic examples are shape 
for primary properties, and color for secondary properties. The intuition behind this 
distinction is that primary properties are somehow objective aspects of the world, while 
secondary properties exist in the relationship between the mind and the world. According to 
Locke, a secondary quality is not a part of the object itself, but rather a power of the object to 
produce certain sensations in us. Response-dependent properties are a way to capture these 
secondary qualities, while the theory of response-dependence is a way of cashing out just 
where these properties exist within this relation. My interest in this view is not in the 
properties themselves, but with the idea of such a response capturing information about the 
relation between the agent and the world—the kind of relation that is at work in desire 
responses. 
The heart of a response-dependent analysis of a property is an identity claim of the 
form: 
Response Dependent Property (RDP): x has P = x elicits response R in [normal] subjects 
S under [normal] conditions C.110   
One classic use of the idea of response-dependence is in order to understand what properties 
such as NAUSEATING.111 If we apply the RDP schema to NAUSEATING, then we get the 
result that “NAUSEATING is the [property] of [being] disposed to produce nausea in normal 
people (perhaps in other animals as well) under normal conditions.”112 The class of nauseating 
things will be whatever falls under the concept NAUSEATING, while the property of 
NAUSEATING will be the property by virtue of which any particular thing is a member of 
this class.  
                                                 
109 Locke & Nidditch, 1975, II. viii. 10. 
110  LeBar, 2005, p. 181. 
111 Capitalisation of a term will indicate talk of a concept, while italicized caps will represent talk of a 
property. 
112  LeBar, 2005, p. 176. 
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Standardly, a response-dependent property is taken to possess a robust element of 
invariance. The RDP schema builds in a pair of normalcy conditions, one on the subject, and 
the other on the conditions. So, what it is for x to have P is for x to elicit P-responses in 
normal subjects under normal conditions. Each of these normalcy constraints guarantees a 
certain type of invariance in the possession of the property. The former excludes odd tastes, 
strange desires, and abnormal psychologies. The latter excludes improbable, miraculous, and 
simply odd conditions. Deployed together, these two constraints preserve what we might call 
the “anthropocentric objectivity” of the property. This is the idea that the thing in question is 
the same for all normal human beings in normal circumstances. Response-dependent 
properties are generally not taken to vary in virtue of the different responses of different 
agents. This is the type of objectivity that we are familiar with from the paradigmatic Lockean 
secondary property of color.  
Now, these two constraints—normal subjects and normal conditions—play two roles 
in response-dependent accounts. In the first instance, they ensure that the properties have the 
type of anthropocentric objectivity required by allowing only responses from those subjects 
and conditions that track the normal type of subjects and conditions to determine the 
possession of the property. Once such a norm has been discovered113, it functions as a second 
constraint in that the response of any particular subject in any particular condition is taken as 
appropriate if it tracks this norm. It is this latter constraint from norm to appropriateness of 
responses that generates an account of what it is for a response to be appropriate, and thus 
functions a constraint on the responses themselves. In order to get a sense of how these 
constraints work, we need to have some idea of how the norm that defines what counts as an 
appropriate response is determined. D’Arms and Jacobson cash out this aspect of how 
                                                 




invariance can be interpreted as a constraint on the appropriateness of responses in their 
account of the ‘fit’ of emotional responses. 
 Emotions, according to D’Arms and Jacobson, are complex psychological states which 
involve characteristic qualia and evaluative presentations. Emotions involve these evaluative 
presentations because: “…they purport to be perceptions of such properties as the funny, the 
shameful, the fearsome, the pitiable, et al.”114 D'Arms and Jacobson argue that there are 
properties, like fearsomeness, that should be understood in response-dependent terms. What it 
is for an object to have the property of fearsomeness, on this account, is for it to elicit the 
response of fear in normal subjects under normal conditions. Such a property is relational in 
that it is an artifact of the relation between the perceiver and the object.  
Central to what it is to have an emotion, on this view, is to have an evaluative 
presentation of, for instance, a person as pitiable, an action as shameful, or a state of affairs as 
fearsome.115 But what, precisely, are these evaluative presentations presentations of? D’Arms 
                                                 
114  (D'Arms & Jacobson, 2000a, p. 66.) In making this claim Jacobson and D’Arms point towards the 
work of (De Sousa, 1987; Greenspan, 1988; Roberts, 1988; and Solomon, 1976) on the emotions. 
115There are two ways in which such evaluative presentations could be construed. On one hand the view 
could be that emotions are constituted by judgments about objects/states qua the bearers of these 
evaluative properties. On the other hand, emotions could be taken as states that involve these evaluative 
presentations, which do not necessarily involve evaluative judgments. The former position is what we 
can call a judgmentalist view of emotion. The latter position is a non-judgmentalist view of emotion. To 
be a judgmentalist about emotions is to hold that emotions constitute judgments about the evaluative 
properties of the object. To be a non-judgmentalist is to deny that this is the case. The aim of Jacobson 
and D’Arms is to “…deny that [emotions] constitute judgments, while attempting to capture what is 
right about judgmentalism.” (D'Arms & Jacobson, 2000a, p. 67.) Judgmentalism seems right insofar as 
having an emotion seems intimately connected to various kinds of evaluative judgments. But the claim 
that having an emotion just is making such a judgment is to deny that we can ever feel an emotion 
without making the associated judgment—a claim which D’Arms and Jacobson oppose on the grounds 
that the nature of judgments is that they presuppose some form of endorsement. When I judge that the 
dragon is fearsome, I am in effect saying that it is appropriate for me to be afraid of the dragon. In the 
case of dragons, this seems harmless enough. But what about cases where the agent simultaneously 
feels some emotion and repudiates it. Some (although not all) cases of fear of flying fit this mold. We 
can present the person who is deathly afraid of flying with all the statistics, moreover she may well 
agree that it is irrational of her to be more afraid of flying than driving, but this will not alter her fear. 
The agent who fears, and yet acknowledges at the same time that her fear is irrational, is clearly not 
endorsing this fear. Yet the judgmentalist must ascribe to this understandable individual the state that 
she both does, and does not, judge that flying is fearsome. It is in cases such as this that we see the 
limits of Judgmentalism about emotion. What the judgmentalist gets right, in the view of D’Arms and 
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and Jacobson take them to be presentations of certain properties, such as the property of 
fearsomeness, pitiful-ness, and so on, which are best understood as response-dependent 
properties. In the case of emotions, these are response-dependent evaluative properties. In 
essence, the appeal is to a response-dependent account of value. If fearsomeness is a response-
dependent property, to say that something is fearsome is to say that it is so partly in virtue of 
the response (fear) that we have to that thing.  
Now, at the heart of D’Arms and Jacobson’s response-dependent approach to the 
emotions, is the claim that what it is to fear something is to perceive the property of 
fearsomeness in that thing. Thus D'Arms and Jacobson, in their understanding of emotions, 
are talking about emotional responses as determining response-dependent properties in the 
objects.116 Although they restrict their account to a small number of basic emotions like fear, a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Jacobson, is that the agent who both fears flying, and judges that flying is not fearsome, is in an 
unstable state. “Such conditions put psychological and rational—that is, causal and normative—
pressure on us to alter our feelings or our judgments in order to bring them into harmony.”(D'Arms & 
Jacobson, 2000a, p. 67.) What the judgmentalist gets wrong, then, is that she holds that there cannot be 
an emotion without a judgment, by substitution, the claim is that an agent cannot have an emotion 
without endorsing it in this way. In the face of the clear multitude of plausibly irrational fears, envies, 
and jealousies, this latter claim just seems wrong. Judgmentalism about emotions is not a tenable 
position to hold, as it cannot account for this large class of emotions, however respecting the elements of 
emotion that Judgmentalism gets right—that feeling an emotion and not endorsing it is an unstable 
state for creatures like us—is also important. Thus D’Arms and Jacobson hold a non-judgmentalist view 
of emotions—the view that emotions involve evaluative presentations of objects/states, but they do not 
take the further step of holding that emotions constitute judgments about the evaluative properties of 
the object/state.  
116 I am talking about response-dependent properties here, which may strike you as odd. Historically, 
response-dependence has been taken to be a way of understanding concepts, rather than properties. 
However, giving a response-dependent account of properties has certain advantages. The strength of the 
property view, and the weakness of the concept view, is that concepts need to be grasped a priori, while 
we can discover what properties are. Clearly, a prioricity is plausible in cases such as nausea, but not so 
in other cases of widely promoted response-dependent concepts such as colour. Mastery of the concept 
of nauseating does seem to entail knowing that it will produce nausea in normal subjects under normal 
conditions—without knowing this, it seems, you simply do not understand what it is for something to 
be nauseating. Mastery of the concept of green, on the other hand, seems to be possible without it being 
the case that the individual has any complex story to say about green being the kind of colour response 
produced by normal subjects gazing upon some thing in normal conditions. That little Johnny can 
accurately distinguish and report on a wide selection of green things seems to be a pretty good grasp of 
GREEN. As LeBar puts it: "I propose instead to think about evaluative properties, such as good and bad 
(or evil), and to take the position that we can best understand such properties as response-dependent.  
The advantage of this move is that the nature of properties, unlike concepts, is not tied tightly to the 
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danger of such an approach is what we can call the problem of metaphysical profligacy. It is 
very easy to have an emotional response to some thing, and if each emotional response 
succeeds in attributing the emotion-eliciting property to the thing, then such properties are 
going to abound in a fairly suspicious manner. What such a view needs in order to be plausible 
is some constraints on when the response succeeds in discovering the property. 
D’Arms and Jacobson argue that such a constraint can be supplied by a theory of when 
an emotional response is ‘fitting’. On this view, a response only succeeds in attributing the 
property to the thing if the response is appropriate. D’Arms and Jacobson117 maintain that the 
fitness of an emotion tracks how accurately the emotion “…presents its object as having 
certain evaluative features.”118 The notion of fittingness proposed here is a relation between 
the presentation of the object by the emotion and the world that is analogous to the relation 
between a belief and the world. The analogue is that they are both veridical notions—as the 
accuracy of the belief is related to how well it reflects the world, so the fit of the emotion is 
related to how well it reflects the world.  
One distinction that it is important to keep in mind when considering D’Arms and 
Jacobson’s view is that between the ‘correctness’ of an emotion (whether or not that emotion 
accurately presents its object), and whether or not the agent is correct in feeling that emotion 
(in other words, is the agent justified in feeling that emotion in the circumstances). In talking 
of the fit of an emotion, D’Arms and Jacobson are exclusively addressing this first issue, the 
issue of whether or not the emotion accurately presents its object. This is the analogue of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
way we represent them.  We are at liberty to discover, through investigation and theory, that properties 
are unlike how they naively appear to us, and this is just the sort of case I want to make for the 
response-dependence of value."  (LeBar, 2005, p. 181.) 
117 D’Arms and Jacobson have coauthored a series of papers that work on this concept including 
(D'Arms & Jacobson, 2000a; D'Arms & Jacobson, 2000b) 
118  D'Arms & Jacobson, 2000a, p. 65. 
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success condition of accuracy in the belief case. It is the appropriateness of these evaluative 
presentations that is the concern of this account of fitness for the emotions.  
D’Arms and Jacobson present their account of appropriate emotional responses in the 
following extract: 
What it is for something to be fearsome it is for fear of it to be appropriate; a joke is funny 
if and only if it is appropriate to be amused by it; and, in general, for an evaluative 
property φ to be instantiated by X is for an associated response F to be appropriately held 
toward X.119 
The property is defined by the appropriate response that normal subjects have under normal 
conditions. On this view, what it is for Jack to experience fear is for him to perceive some 
object or state of affairs as fearsome. The object is presented to him by the emotion as having 
the property of FEARSOMENESS. The property that figures in this explanation, the property 
of FEARSOMENESS, is a response-dependent property. The normal subject/normal 
conditions constraint means that not every fear response is a response to the property of 
FEARSOMENESS. A fear response is only a response to that property if it fits, that is, if it is 
an appropriate response for the agent to have to that thing. 
D’Arms and Jacobson propose that there are two dimensions of fit for emotions, 
intensity120 and shape. Roughly speaking (and D’Arms and Jacobson note that this analysis, 
for principled reasons, can only be given roughly) the shape of an emotion is determined by 
the evaluative features that it presents an object as having. To the extent that the object has 
those features, the emotion is fitting in terms of its shape. Consider ‘fearsomeness’ to be a 
higher level role property which, in some specific case such as snakes, is instantiated in a 
                                                 
119  D'Arms & Jacobson, 2000b, p. 732. 
120 D’Arms and Jacobson use the term ‘size’ to denote this dimension of fit, however I take the term 
‘intensity’ to be a more appropriate term for the type of emotional response at issue. 
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group of lower-level realizer properties.121 Snakes are fearsome in a way which is plausibly 
biologically hardwired, and this fearsomeness is constituted by their dangerousness. This 
dangerousness is itself a higher level role property which is instantiated in a particular snake 
by still other lower-level realizer properties. In the case of water moccasins, a member of the 
pit viper family, their dangerousness is realized in their venomousness and their aggression. 
The emotional response is fitting in terms of its shape if it correctly attributes these properties 
to the thing. If I fear a long shape on the ground in the dark because I take it to be dangerous 
(I erroneously perceive it as a snake), then my emotional response is not fitting in terms of its 
shape—it gets the properties of the object wrong. The intensity of the emotion is concerned 
with whether or not the intensity of the reaction correctly tracks the magnitude of the 
evaluative features.122 In the case of the snakes, fearing a mildly venomous and non-aggressive 
snake with the same intensity as a water moccasin is getting the intensity of the emotion 
wrong. I am, in other words, taking the snake to be more fearsome than it actually is. Thus 
there are two dimensions of fit for emotions, intensity and shape. An emotion which is not 
appropriate—it does not ‘fit’ the stimulus—is mistaken in one of these quantifiable ways.  
What it is for an emotion to be fitting, then, is that it is the appropriate response to 
the relevant property. That is, the response gets the property right. What it is for the response 
to get the property right is that the response tracks the norm established by the responses of 
normal subject under normal conditions. Note that this property, as a response-dependent 
property, is a higher-level role property which exists in the relation between the agent and the 
object, which is instantiated in the object by various lower-level realizer properties. With a 
property such as FEARSOMENESS, there are elements of both fact and value. The facts 
reflect the lower-level realizer properties which instantiate the value element, which is the 
                                                 
121 The distinction between higher level role properties and lower level realizer properties is due to 
Frank Jackson and Phillip Pettit in (Jackson & Pettit, 2002, p. 106. 
122  D'Arms & Jacobson, 2000a, pp. 73-4. 
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higher-level role property. In the case of response-dependent accounts of properties it is easy 
to understand this sort accuracy talk because although response-dependent properties are 
defined and discovered through our responses, they are properties of the object itself. A fear 
response is fitting, then, only if it accurately attributes the property of FEARSOMENESS to 
the object/state of affairs. Thus, D’Arms and Jacobson’s theory of the fittingness of emotions 
is veridical, in that it purports to track, in the sense of appropriateness, the ‘right’ response. 
However, it is not necessary to appeal to such a property in establishing a norm for such 
responses. All we require is that a response is invariant in some way—that is, reliably elicited 
under identifiable conditions. So, in order to understand how such an account of fitness could 
apply to emotional responses such as desire responses, I need a detailed account of how 
invariance operates within the response-dependent account. 
There are two normality constraints cited in the analysis of response-dependent 
properties, and thus two dimensions of invariance—subjects and conditions. The ‘normal 
conditions’ constraint ensures that the agent’s perceptual apparatus is working properly, and 
thus a certain type of consistency among the agent’s own experiences, while the ‘normal 
subject’ constraint ensures consistency amongst different agents. Moreover, it is these two 
aspects of invariance—invariance among subjects; and invariance across conditions—which 
allows the ‘normal’ response to be established, and thus functions as the norm which 
responses must track is order to count as appropriate. But the felt emotional component of 
desires does not meet this second condition, by virtue of being a ‘desire’ response. If a theory 
claims that desires are (or should be) invariant with respect to subjects, then this looks to be an 
implausible theory of any element of desiring, as desires are essentially subjective.  
I will begin by considering how such appeals to invariance amongst responses 
functions in a clear instance of a response-dependent property, that of RED, and then 
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extrapolate this analysis to the case of desire responses.123 What do the two dimensions of 
invariance—normal conditions and normal subjects—do in this case? In the case of the 
‘normal subjects’ constraint the aim is to respect the idea that properties such as color should 
be invariant amongst subjects. The color of the rose does not change when it is viewed by 
different agents, although under normal conditions someone who is color blind may perceive 
it as a different color than someone who is not color blind. An alteration in the perceptual 
system such as color blindness is taken to be a flaw because it occurs in a relatively minor 
portion of the population. In a certain sense, what we take to be red is determined by a 
democracy of perceptual systems. It is ‘group-determined’, if you will. So, if most perceptual 
systems take a color to be one way, then the color will enter the language in that way and this 
will become the norm. This process is initiated by the intuition that the property itself is (or 
should be) invariant amongst people. Color is not a property that is plausibly individually-
determined in the way that certain more subjective properties may be. I propose that in the 
absence of the view that a particular response should be anthropocentrically objective, there is 
no need to impose a ‘normal-subject’ constraint on a response-dependent account—a 
circumstance which is true of the felt emotional component of desires. In this there should be 
no requirement of consistency amongst agents, as any plausible account of desiring must do 
more than lip service to the platitude ‘de gustibus non disputandum’, by allowing desires to 
be, in large part, determined by the agent herself. So, the type of response that I am concerned 
with need only contain a ‘normal conditions’ constraint.  
What, then of the ‘normal conditions’ constraint? If I look at a red object in blue light, 
it will generate a ‘purple’ response in me. If I look at the same object in very low light, it will 
appear almost black. If I am wearing yellow tinted glasses, it will appear orange to me. We 
easily recognize that the color of the object is not changing with these altered conditions; 
                                                 
123 Clear, that is, for anyone who accepts the existence of response-dependent properties. 
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rather, what alters the appearance of the object is that my perceptual system is being affected 
by the conditions. The ‘true’ appearance of redness is taken to be the way that it appears in the 
most normal conditions for seeing, that is, reasonably bright daylight. These are the 
conditions under which we ‘calibrate’ our color vision, and so it is these conditions that count 
as normal for viewing colors. In one way, we can see the normal conditions constraint as 
providing paradigm working conditions for our perceptual apparatus. My response of 
‘redness’, and thus the perceptual apparatus that generates this response, is only reliable under 
these normal conditions.  
Such an account of the ‘normal conditions’ constraint on responses relies upon the 
view that the responses in question should be invariant. In order to show that our desire 
responses should be invariant, I will begin by motivating the idea that full-fledged desires 
have such characteristics of invariance. Then I will argue through the connection between 
desires and the emotional response of desiring, that our desire responses are invariant in 
similar ways. I propose that the folk theory of desire builds two identifiable types of 
invariance into the definition of desires.  
The first type of invariance is invariance across circumstances. A part of what it is to 
desire some thing is to desire that thing over a wide range of circumstances. If desire chocolate 
cake, it seems that there are lots of different circumstances that I may be in, and shifting 
among these circumstances should not change my desire for the chocolate cake. Intuitively, it 
should make no difference to my desire whether I had skate or cod for dinner, if I am dining 
beside the river, or on the balcony, if I am wearing red or black and so on. Moreover, if you 
only desire some thing under very particular circumstances, it seems that those circumstances 
should enter into the description of the desire. For instance, if I only desire fruit cake on 
Christmas day, then it seems that my desire is not for ‘fruit cake’, but rather ‘fruit cake on 
Christmas day’, or possibly even ‘Christmas cake’. But in most desires we omit such 
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conditions, and that omission is telling, because it expresses the presumption that desires do 
not, in general, have these conditions built in. An additional indication that we generally 
assume desires to be invariant over some wide range of circumstances is that when we 
attribute a desire for some thing to someone only in very specific conditions, we are usually 
implying that they really don’t desire that thing at all. If I say that President George W. Bush 
only desires the freedom of the people once in a blue moon, I am not implying that he desires 
the freedom of the people on the second full moon in a calendar month; rather, I am implying 
that he does not really desire this at all. Now, in saying this I am not proposing that desires 
should be invariant with respect to all circumstances. Whether or not I have a mouthful of 
sardines surely affects my desire for chocolate cake at that moment, as does whether or not I 
am running for my life, or have just eaten a large amount of chocolate cake and so on. Thus, 
the presumption of desiring some thing is that you desire for that thing is invariant across 
circumstances to some reasonable degree—in other words, our desires are stable across 
circumstances.  
The second type of invariance is the stability of desires with respect to the passage of 
time. Another part of the folk understanding of what it is to desire some thing is that desire 
should, to some extent, be temporally invariant—that is, stable with respect to the mere 
passage of time. If you desire to be an opera impresario for 1/30th of a second, and the thought 
never crosses your mind again, then this really should not register as a desire at all. If you 
desire for 10 minutes Tuesday next, then this still does not look like a desire.124 The term for 
such a state is a ‘whim’. What will count as a sufficient duration for something to count as a 
real desire will be a function of the magnitude of the aim expressed in that desire. It seems 
                                                 
124 To be explicit: If you have the desire to be an opera impresario for only 10 minutes Tuesday next, 
then it doesn’t seem as if you actually have the desire to be an opera impresario. However, if you stably 
desire to be an opera impresario for only 10 minutes Tuesday next, this looks like a desire, if a slightly 
odd one. What is at issue is not the duration of the object/experience/thing desired, but rather the 
duration of the desire itself. 
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that 10 seconds is too short to count as a desire to be an opera impresario, but may well be 
sufficient for a desire to scratch an itch. I am not concerned to give an account of what this 
duration may be, only to suggest that such a notion is built in to our understanding of desires. 
I think that it will turn out that most of our desires are quite temporally invariant. What it is 
to ‘really’ desire some thing is to be disposed to desire that thing over some significant period 
of time. That is, we assume that a part of what it is to desire some thing is that your desire is 
stable with respect to time—our desires are invariant over time. Thus there are two types of 
invariance for desires, invariant across circumstances, and invariance over time. And these 
senses of invariance are best understood in terms of the notions of stability for desires that I 
proposed in the first chapter. 
There are two reasons that such invariance should extend to the felt emotional 
response of desiring. I propose that, to a significant extent, our desires and our desire 
responses should track one another. If this is true that our desires have these stability 
properties—invariance across circumstances, and invariance over time—our desire responses 
should also have these stability properties. Now, I need to introduce a distinction in order to 
motivate the idea that our desires and our desire responses track one another. The distinction 
that I am proposing is between what I will call ‘considered preferences’, and desire responses.  
A considered preference is a full-fledged desire that is stable with respect to minimal 
reflection, over time, and across circumstances. By minimal reflection, I mean a fairly cursory 
consideration of the desire in light of your beliefs and other desires. I take it that a desire 
which is not stable with respect to such a minimal act of reflection is a degenerate desire, if it 
counts as a desire at all. In short, a desire which does not survive such an act of reflection looks 
more like a whim than a desire. The minimal standards of stability across circumstances and 
over time are in a similar spirit. If a desire changes as a result of the mere passage of small 
periods of time—that is, if it is very unstable with respect to time—then it is a degenerate 
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desire. These requirements of minimal stability are meant to exclude desires which are 
degenerate in a variety of ways. As was discussed earlier, a certain amount of stability with 
respect to a time is built into our concept of desire. Similarly, the idea that a desire is stable 
with respect to a fairly wide range of normal circumstances is built in to the notion of a 
desire.125 Thus a considered preference is reasonably stable with respect to time, circumstance, 
and reflection. 
Such considered preferences are distinct from desire responses, in that a desire 
response is the felt experience of desiring something—the automatic affective response of 
desiring. Desire responses, in virtue of their nature as felt experiences, are occurrent states. As 
automatic affective responses triggered by representations, their existence is closely tied to the 
period that the agent is consciously aware of that representation. Desire responses, as 
occurrent states, cannot be said to be stable in the same way that considered preferences are, 
but there is still a presumption of invariance.  What produces the effect of invariance in desire 
responses is going to be the reliability of the mechanism that produces them—in this case the 
conative system. It seems that if I have an emotional response of desiring some thing, and 
neither I, nor the properties of the thing in virtue of which I desired it change, then my 
response to that thing should be roughly the same.  
Considered preferences and desire responses are not necessarily connected for the 
same reason that desires and the felt experience of desiring are not necessarily connected. One 
way to think of them is as separate effects of the same cause, where that cause is the properties 
of the thing in virtue of which it is desirable to the agent. So, although considered preferences 
                                                 
125 Note that this is true even of desires that hold only in specific circumstances, when those 
circumstances are built in to the content of the desire. So, if I have a desire to drink egg nog at 
Christmas, then it seems that I should have this desire whether or not it is raining, if I am wearing read 
or black, if I am in New Zealand or America, and so on. 
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and desire responses are distinct, they tend to track one another as effects of a common cause 
are wont to be.  
The second reason to think that such invariance is true of our desire responses is a 
function of such responses being automatic affective responses that are produced by some 
system within the agent—the conative system. As we saw from the color case, a constraint of 
‘normal condition’ is generally meant to ensure the accuracy of such automatic psycho-
physical systems. This is the condition in which we ‘calibrate’ our perceptual system, and is 
meant to capture the paradigm working conditions for that system. I propose that this is also 
true of our conative system. There are identifiable conditions under which the system 
generates the wrong response. What will count as abnormal conditions for the conative 
system are those conditions in which it reliably makes mistakes. What counts as a mistake for 
the conative system will be violations of the two types of invariance I have just presented, and 
thus will be responses that do not ‘fit’ in D’Arms and Jacobson’s terms. I propose that just as 
misperceptions of color are subject to a type of epistemic criticism (if you perceive green as 
red, there is something wrong with either the conditions of your perception, or your 
perceptual apparatus, and the burden is on you to compensate for this), inappropriate desire 
responses are also subject to a type of criticism. In order to motivate this claim, I need to say 
more about the notion of fit with respect to desire responses.  
Before I can give an analogous account of fit for desire responses, I need to stipulate 
two caveats on the account. The first is that I can only give an account of the fit of desire 
responses in the case of changes in the intensity of the desire response. In the case of desire 
responses, the initial acquisition of a desire response pegs it into your motivational/evaluative 
system at a certain strength. Once a desire response has been acquired, and accorded its ‘level’ 
as it were, then it seems that any changes in the strength of that desire response should be 
explicable. However I am making no claims about how the initial strength of the desire 
 102
 
response is, or should be, established. Note that this is explicitly a claim about changes in 
desire responses, not a claim about the initial acquisition of a desire response. The second 
caveat is that I take the fit of desire responses in the interesting cases to be mainly a matter of 
the intensity of these responses, rather than their shape. I will not have much to say the 
question of the ‘shape’ of these desire responses—how the properties of the desirable thing 
actually are connected to the existence or initial intensity of the affective response—but what I 
will be focusing on to illuminate the temptation cases is the way in which the intensity of such 
desire responses changes.  
How such changes in intensity of an emotional response may be more or less mistaken 
lies in the view that desire responses may be inappropriate under abnormal conditions. First 
let me describe the case of mistakes in desiring that I take to be fairly straightforward, and not 
terribly surprising. According to D’Arms and Jacobson, our emotions can fail to fit on two 
dimensions, shape and intensity. When an agent makes a mistake about the shape of the 
thing—takes it to have properties that it does not—this can clearly lead to desire responses 
that are flawed in some sense. If I desire a piece of that cake because I falsely believe that it 
was made with sugar, rather than salt, then I am making a mistake about the shape of the 
thing in that I am taking it to have the property of sweetness when it does not. A mistake 
about the shape of the thing is going to be a mistake in my beliefs, rather than a mistake in 
my desires, and thus not of particular interest here. This is at bottom a cognitive mistake, a 
mistake about the way the world is, rather than strictly a conative mistake in desiring. It is the 
other case that I am primarily interested in, the case of disproportionate desire responses. An 
inappropriately intense desire response can, I believe, truly be thought of as a conative 
mistake—a mistake in the system that generates the desire response to the thing.  
How do such conative mistakes work? Let us say that I desire a caramel in virtue of its 
sweetness. Sweetness is a higher level role property which is realized in many different ways – 
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sugar, agave nectar, golden syrup, etc. And it seems that sweetness is a response-dependence 
property. What it is for something to be sweet is a matter of the particular response that we 
have to the chemical make-up. Moreover, sweetness is inherently motivating. All mammals 
like sweet, and absent confounding factors, mammals, including infants, rats and monkeys will 
seek out sweetness. Consider a case of temptation involving a sweet thing such as caramel. A 
standard case of temptation looks to be a mistake in intensity. If I am strongly tempted to eat 
the caramel when it is right in front of me, but only mildly attracted to the prospect of eating 
the caramel at some distance, it is not as if I believe the caramel has different properties when 
it is right in front of me. What changes between the two cases is the intensity of my desiring 
response. In both cases I am correctly attributing the property of sweetness to the caramel, but 
I am intuitively putting too much emphasis on sweetness in my emotional response when it is 
right in front of me. It is this shift in intensity, rather than shape, which changes my desire 
from one perspective to the other. So, in a case of temptation such as this, my cognitive states 
remain the same, but there is this shift in my conative states—it is the felt emotional 
component of my desire, my desire response, which changes.  
So, what makes a subjective response such as a desire response a more or less 
appropriate response? I contend that the appropriateness of a response has something to do 
with what the ‘normal’ response for that agent is. Now, there is more than one way that we 
can understand such a norm, and many of the ways of understanding these norms will give 
coincident determinations of what is, and what is not, an appropriate response. I do not want 
to argue for a particular interpretation of such a norm, just for the idea that such norms exist. 
One way of determining such a norm, which looks like the kind of account that would be 
given for the appropriateness of finding a joke funny, is in terms of how frequent a response is 
in a population. If the majority of people find a joke funny under normal circumstances, then 
amusement is an appropriate response to that joke. What determines the normal response (the 
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norm) in this case is the frequency of responses amongst the majority of people, and any 
particular response is appropriate if it tracks the norm. Another sense of norm which is in play 
with respect to such emotional responses is the case in which the response has some biological 
function such as fear. It seems that a fear response is appropriate when it fulfills the biological 
function of avoiding danger. The norm in this case is a biological one, and the appropriateness 
of a particular response is determined by how well it fulfills the biological function of the 
emotion. Another sense of normal that can determine a sense in which an emotional response 
is appropriate is the idea of the ‘normal observer’. This is what the response of the normal 
observer—the agent who is free of prejudices, biases, imperfect perceptions etc.—would be 
under normal circumstances. In this idea of the norm, what determines the appropriate 
response is the response which is free of any of a number of confounding or distorting 
influences.126  
The analogy to the case of the desire responses is that there is a normal response 
which is determined by the responses that the agent has to that thing over time. The norm is 
some combination of the types of norms outlined above. I propose that what determines a 
‘normal’ desire response for any given agent is the response that the agent has when she is 
free from confounding influences. Then what it is for the agent to have an appropriate 
response is that it tracks this norm. Why is this plausible? Because these emotional responses 
are connected to the properties of objects, and this connection is not accidental. The properties 
in virtue of which the thing is desirable cause me to desire that thing in some way. Moreover, 
these responses should track the properties in virtue of which you desire the thing in the sense 
that the intensity of your desire response should only change if there is either a change in the 
                                                 
126 Note that these norms do not prevent the agent from reasonably and legitimately changing the way 
that they evaluate outcomes, and thus the intensity of their desire responses to things. In such a case, it 
is not true that both the agent, and the properties of the thing in virtue of which it is desirable to the 
agent, have remained the same. Rather, there is a change in the agent, which justifies the change in the 
agents desiring response.  
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properties of the thing, or in the desiring agent. Moreover, this norm captures the 
presumption of invariance in our considered preferences and desire responses. Thus what it is 
to have a mistaken desire response is for it to be inappropriately intense in that it does not 
conform to the agent’s normal responses to that thing. 
How plausible are such mistakes in the conative system? I take it that a conative 
mistake in the intensity of a desire response is on a par with other well known perceptual 
mistakes. Consider the case of perspective in visual representation. When I am standing 
looking down an avenue of oak trees, the trees appear smaller to me as they dwindle into the 
distance. If I attribute the property of size to the trees solely on the basis of their relative size 
in my perception, then I will believe the trees that are further away from me are smaller than 
the ones that are close to me. Of course, I am not in fact going to believe this. In the case of 
visual perception, we are clear about what the apparatus is that produces the apparent effect of 
similar sized objects appearing smaller as they get further away, and we are also pretty adept 
at compensating for this mistake. It is only the very young (or significantly impaired) who do 
not automatically account for these variable appearances in their attributions of relative size. I 
think that there are similar flaws in our conative system that can produce systematic mistakes 
in our perceptions of the ‘intensity’ of the attractive properties that are reflected in 
inappropriately intense desire responses. However the conative system differs from the visual 
system in that we are not particularly adept at compensating for these flaws. Thus our 
conative systems have abnormal conditions for operation, which can be identified by the 
pattern of mistaken desire responses that they produce. This claim is central to my response to 
the challenge of temptation as I will argue that temptations are instances of these mistaken 
desire responses. What happens in a case of temptation is that the agent’s desire response is 
out of proportion to her considered preference, and what causes the challenge of temptation is 
that the same thing that causes the mistaken desire response interferes with the agent’s ability 
to reason about her considered preferences. Thus it is easy for her to mistake the inflated 
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desire response for her considered preference, and treat it as such in her deliberations. So, in 
order to motivate my answer to the challenge of temptation I need an account of what 
constitutes the abnormal conditions of operation for the conative system.  
Gauthier on proximal and vanishing point preferences 
 I propose that the normal and abnormal conditions for the operation of our conative 
systems can be understood in terms of Gauthier’s distinction between vanishing point and 
proximal desires. My hypothesis is that the conative system tends to produce inappropriate 
emotional responses of desiring, that is, desire responses whose intensity is out of proportion 
with the desirability of the object for the agent, under conditions of proximity. Thus it is 
proximity which constitutes abnormal conditions of operation for the conative system.  
As temporally extended beings, we both form, and consider, our desires from more 
than one temporal perspective. We form desires now that can only be satisfied much later. We 
form desires that will be satisfied now, or not at all. We desire both in the present moment and 
the far future and at all points in between. Thus our desires can conflict not only at a time, but 
also across time. David Gauthier takes the intertemporal nature of this conflict seriously when 
he distinguishes between ‘proximal’ and ‘vanishing point’ desires.127 Gauthier notes that for 
certain types of choices, agents have a pervasive tendency to desire one thing when a choice is 
imminent, and another thing when the choice is not imminent. The former is the agent’s 
proximate desire, while the latter is the agent’s (temporal) vanishing-point desire. Gauthier 
argues:  
Now, at any given time, although a person may want to act on his now proximate 
[desires], he does not want to act at other times on what would be his then proximate 
[desires], where these are in conflict with the vanishing-point [desires] that he now holds.  
Recognizing this, he is able to understand that if, given proximate [desires], he chooses the 
                                                 
127Gauthier terms these preferences. I am calling them desires for the sake of the consistency of the 
paper. In the context at hand there is very little difference between these two things. (Gauthier, 1997) 
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action that best realizes his immediate concerns, he is deliberating in a way that may not 
lead him to the best realization of his overall concerns, as viewed at that or any other 
time.128   
Vanishing point desires, according to Gauthier, are the desires that an agent has when a choice 
is not imminent. This is contrasted with the agent’s proximal desires, which are those held by 
the agent when a choice is imminent. In many cases, an agent’s vanishing point and proximal 
desires will be the same, but in various instances such as cases of temptation, hyperbolic 
discounting, or weakness of the will, the agent’s proximal and vanishing point desires come 
apart. This distinction between vanishing point and proximal desires is coincident, to a great 
extent, with the distinction that I have proposed between considered preferences and desire 
responses.  
The existence of these two perspectives on one’s desire can be illustrated in cases 
where they come apart. Now, certain people who loath going to the dentist but desire good 
teeth will exemplify just such a split between their proximal and vanishing point desires. In 
the period immediately prior to a dental appointment, such an agent will have a proximal 
desire not to go to the dentist. At any other time, her vanishing point desire will be to do what 
is necessary to maintain her teeth, including attending dental appointments. That these two 
types of desire are capable of separating in such cases indicates that they are two distinct 
perspectives. Gauthier talks of such cases as instances of temptation. 
Using such examples, Gauthier motivates the intuition that there is a difference 
between vanishing point and proximal desires by highlighting the strangeness of proximal 
desires. Then, using an appeal to the agent’s overall good, he argues for a rule of choice which 
favors vanishing point over proximate desires whenever the benefit of having a proximate 
desire satisfied falls beneath a certain threshold. This is, in many ways, an attempt to answer 
the challenge of temptation. However, by arguing in terms of a brute appeal to the overall 
                                                 
128  Gauthier, 1997, p. 20. 
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good of the agent, Gauthier leaves it a mystery why we have these proximal shifts in our 
desires, and does not address the question of precisely what it is that is wrong with them. This 
is particularly worrying for his view as not all proximal desires look bad in the way that he 
describes, as it is only proximal desires that are in conflict with vanishing point desires that are 
problematic. However on Gauthier’s view all proximal desires are tarred with the same brush. 
Thus he does not give an account of what is peculiarly wrong with temptations, although he 
identifies properties of desires that are relevant to this question.  
Proximity, in the case of desire responses, has the following effect: When you have a 
change in the strength of your desire response when a good is proximal, it is not that you take 
the thing to have different properties at that point; the difference is in the response generated 
by the conative system. In the proximal case you are drawn more to the sensory features of 
the thing that support your desire, without in fact taking those properties to be any different 
to how you understand them in the vanishing point case. It is that these features engage your 
desiring response (and thus your motivations) to a greater extent in the proximal case—so 
your desire response is disproportionate in that it is anomalous. If you were to contemplate 
precisely those same features from many other, less proximal, perspectives then your desire 
response would be less intense. Thus the case where we have the difference between proximal 
responses and considered preferences in play is one in which your beliefs about the properties 
of the thing remains the same, although the response of desiring is more intense in the 
proximal case than it is in the vanishing point case.  
In the case of desire responses, I propose that the abnormal conditions of operation for 
the conative system—that system (whatever it is) that produce the automatic affective 
responses that are the emotional components of desires—are present in the proximal case. As 
creatures we are pretty reliable in what we do and do not have a desire response to. If some 
object regularly evokes a certain desiring response under certain conditions, you would expect 
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it to continue to do so. This is a reflection of the characteristics of invariance in desire 
responses that I introduced earlier. What differentiates an appropriate desire response from a 
mistaken one is that appropriate desire responses track, in some sense, the norms for such 
responses introduced earlier. The norm of desire responses is the desire response that the 
agent has to some thing when she is free of distorting influences. This is the idea of the norm 
being determined by her response qua ‘normal observer’. In the proximal case, the agent 
departs from these norms. 
Of course, as there is no ‘normal subject’ constraint in this account, desirable for you 
may well not be the same as desirable for me which seems to be exactly the right result. Thus 
what it means for conditions to count as normal for the operation of the agent’s conative 
system will be linked to the vanishing point perspective in the sense just outlined. Through 
this connection to the vanishing point perspective, there is also a connection between the 
normal responses of the agent and the stability of certain desires and desire responses over 
time, across circumstances, and with respect to reflection.   
My hypothesis about the abnormal conditions for operation for the conative system is 
that proximity undermines the fit of our desire responses in the same way that distance 
undermines our visual perceptions of relative size. On this picture the vanishing point for an 
agent represents a perspective on her desires which is free from distorting influences. It is 
freedom from distorting influences which determines what the ‘normal’ response for the agent 
is, and thus what the appropriate desiring response is. So, the importance of the vanishing 
point is that it gives us evidence of what the appropriate desire response would be.  Thus what 
it is to have an appropriate desire response will be for it to track the norm determined by 
responses in the absence of distorting influences, and the vanishing point desire give us 
evidence about what that normal response is. Differences among proximal responses and 




producing the proximal desire response. Defending this hypothesis is the aim of the fifth 
chapter.   
I began with two claims about the felt emotional component of desires. I said that it 
could distinguish representations that are capable of producing a reward signal from 
representations that are not, and that it could answer the challenge of temptation. Even with 
only this basic sketch of the view in hand we can see how it fulfils the first claim. According to 
the view that there are such felt emotional components of desires, what distinguishes a mere 
representation from a desire is that the desire includes a desiring response to the object of the 
representation produced by the agent’s conative system. Jack has a representation of a piece of 
chocolate cake which drives a reward signal, thus engaging his motivations, and a 
representation of a piece of yellow cake, which does not drive a reward signal, and thus does 
not engage his motivations. I propose that Jack’s representation of the chocolate cake causes a 
certain response— a craving (desiring response) which is a felt emotional component of desire 
—which his representation of the yellow cake lacks. Thus a representation that will produce a 
reward signal is one which possesses a felt emotional component of desiring in virtue of being 
a particular kind of conative response, a desire response. 
The second claim was that I could answer the challenge of temptation by paying 
attention to such felt emotional components of desires. So far I have laid the groundwork for 
this solution, which will be presented in full in the next chapter. There I will defend this 
analysis of abnormal conditions of operation for the conative system by identifying systematic 
mistakes in intensity in emotional responses of desiring that occur in the condition of 
proximity, and the mechanism through which they are produced. Ultimately I will argue that 
it is these mistakes that generate the phenomenon of temptation, and make it the case that 
temptations should be treated differently from other desires in rational deliberation.  
 
C H A P T E R  5  
THE CHALLENGE OF TEMPTATION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to answer the challenge of temptation. I will identify a 
systemic mistake in the conative system that is (1) the product of the conative system working 
under the abnormal conditions of proximity; and (2) that systematically produces the flawed 
desire responses that constitute a significant type of temptation. In addition I will argue that 
paying attention to the relative stability of our desires will yield a method for identifying such 
flawed desire responses in the course of our deliberations, thus allowing us to ameliorate their 
influence in determining what it is that we should do.  
We are agents that exist and act over time. One aspect of being temporally extended 
beings is that we face intertemporal conflicts amongst our desires. We are often called upon to 
weigh a desire that is right in front of us against a desire for some future good. Temptations 
are a class of such intertemporal conflicts. What it is to experience temptation is to have 
difficulty delaying gratification by resisting the smaller, more immediate satisfaction of the 
temptation in favor of achieving the later, larger satisfaction of the conflicting desire. Thus 
temptation is a product of being agents who act not only at a time but also over time, and is 
thus endemic to the human condition. 
Now, the insidiousness of temptation is not that we sometimes have an intense 
emotional experience of desiring some thing when it is proximal, even if that thing is contrary 
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to our longer term aims. Rather, it is that it is not obvious to us at the moment of desiring that 
satisfy this urge is contrary to our considered preferences, and thus irrational. Temptation is 
not merely an emotional overlay of desires that can easily be dismissed when it leads us 
astray; it misleads us about what our considered preferences are by undermining our ability to 
effectively reflect on our considered preferences. I am only considering a specific, if fairly 
common, class of temptation here. This class of temptations is those temptations which are 
generated by some sort of temporary shift in the apparent motivational strength of the agent’s 
desires, which is exemplified by the case of Kim and the chocolate cake that I introduced in the 
first chapter. However, I take it that all types of temptations have in common this effect of 
undermining the agent’s ability to reflect on her considered preferences, which is what makes 
temptations such pervasive deliberational difficulties.  
In chapter four I proposed that we can begin to understand temptations in terms of a 
conflict between vanishing point and proximal desires. However, the mere distinction between 
proximal and vanishing point desires cannot tell us what is wrong with temptations, as not all 
proximate desires are temptations. A proximate desire which does not conflict with any 
vanishing point desires looks to be just as rational a candidate for acting upon as many 
vanishing point desires. There are two characteristics which make a proximal desire a 
temptation: (1) it conflicts with some more important, longer term, goal, (2) there is some 
effect at work that interferes with the agent’s ability to reflect on her considered preferences. 
It is through these mechanisms that temptations pose deliberational difficulties. In order to 
flesh out how temptations can be understood in terms of this distinction, I need an explanation 
of how it is that such proximal desires interfere with an agent’s ability to reflect on what her 
considered preferences actually are, as well as an account of why it is that the proximate 
desires which count as temptations should be discounted in deliberation. 
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I propose that temptations should be discounted in deliberation because they are, in 
some robust sense, mistaken. As was outlined in the previous chapter, the kind of mistake that 
I will be looking for is cases of mistaken strength in the desire responses that constitute the 
felt emotional component of desires. I will argue that in the case of temptation you are being 
misled. Specifically, you are being misled about the motivational strength of your considered 
preference by the motivational strength of your desire response. What goes on in the 
temptation case is that the strength of the felt emotional component of desire is out of 
proportion with the strength of your considered preference. By overestimating the 
motivational strength of your considered preference because of the increased strength of your 
desire response, you end up treating a desire that is all-things-considered weaker, as stronger 
than some other, competing, desire which is not affected by these proximity effects.  
My case relies on several elements. The first issue that I need to address is the 
question of how the strength of considered preferences and desire responses is determined. 
Then I will explore how it is that the strength of these states can go wrong, by examining the 
phenomena of hyperbolic discounting. The next step is to use these mechanisms to analyze the 
case of temptation, and show why it is that temptations occur, how it is that they are 
mistaken, and thus why it is that they should not be treated on a par with other desires in 
deliberation. Then I will suggest an explanation of why it is that our ability to reflect upon our 
considered preferences is impaired in cases of temptation. Finally, I will argue that we can use 
the relative stability of desires to determine which desires (or desire responses) should be 
discounted in deliberation, thus answering the challenge of temptation. 
Considered preference, desire responses, and motivational strength.  
In the previous chapter I began motivating the idea that the considered preferences of 
an agent are not the same as her desire responses. In this section I want to explore these states 
in greater detail, paying particular attention to what determines the strength of these states, 
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and what it is for these state to track one another. I propose that there should be a loose 
reflective equilibrium between our considered preferences, and our desire responses such that 
a mismatch between these two is evidence that something is wrong somewhere.  
Recall that a considered preference is a full-fledged desire that is minimally stable with 
respect to reflection, over time, and across circumstances. By considered preference I do not 
mean a desire that has been considered in light of all possible information, as I am not positing 
that considered preferences are an ‘ideal observer’ phenomena. In this way, the position that I 
am proposing is different from the view put forward by Michael Smith in defending a 
rationalist form of instrumentalism. 129 Smith argues that the desire which it is rational for an 
agent to pursue in means-end reasoning is the desire that the ‘ideal’ version of her would 
have. That is, it is what it is that she would desire if she had all the relevant information about 
herself and the world. In my view, a considered preference is what the agent would want if 
she took the information that she possesses now into account. Smith’s ideal version will, on 
many occasions, rely on information that the agent does not, at this point in time, possess. It 
may even rely on information that the agent cannot in principle possess at any time. My view 
of a considered preference is that this is the desire that the agent would have were she to take 
the information that she has at her disposal now, including information about recent changes 
in her desires, and the causes of those changes, and come to some type of equilibrium state 
through reflection. Such considered preferences are distinct from our desire responses.  
Considered preferences and desire responses are not necessarily connected for the 
same reason that desires and the felt experience of desiring are not necessarily connected. One 
way to think of them is as separate effects of a common cause, where that cause is the 
properties in virtue of which the thing is desirable to the agent. Under normal circumstances, 
                                                 
129 Smith, 1995. 
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we have the default expectation that desire responses and considered preferences will track one 
another in certain ways. The main respect in which we expect there to be a connection 
between our desire response and considered preferences is in terms of their motivational 
strength. 130   
Both desire responses and considered preferences have the capacity to move the agent 
to action—that is, they can both be motivationally efficacious. A characteristic of any 
motivationally efficacious state is that its motivational strength can be measured. It is easy to 
understand what the motivational strength of a desire response is, as it is captured in the felt 
intensity of the desire response. So the motivational strength of a desire response is a function 
of the intensity of the emotional response of desiring.  
The motivational strength of a considered preference is a little more complex. I will 
borrow from the decision theoretic presentation of desire and represent the strength of desires 
in terms of what the agent is willing to pay for a state of affairs in which the desire is satisfied. 
There are various problems with this way of measuring the strengths of desires, but it is close 
enough for these purposes. Given that a requirement for considered preferences is that they 
sustain a certain degree of stability in these respects, I take it that this is also a requirement of 
the motivational strength of such states. This measure of motivational strength, like the 
considered preferences that it is a characteristic of, can be more or less stable with respect to 
reflection, across circumstances, and over time. Now, we can discover the motivational 
strength of a considered preference at any particular time or in any particular circumstance 
through the price that the agent is willing to pay for the satisfaction of that preference at 
                                                 
130 There is another dimension in which we can think of considered preferences and desire responses 
tracking one another. This is the question of the states that they are stable with respect to. Both 
considered preferences and desire responses can be more or less stable with respect to reflection, time, or 
circumstance. So another dimension on which they can be more or less the same is in terms of the acts 
of reflection, times, and circumstances that they are stable with respect to. This is not a dimension of 
matching which figures in this analysis, so I will not dwell on it here. 
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different times and in different circumstances. Through this we can identify the approximate 
motivational strength of the considered preference that is stable with respect to those same 
circumstances, acts of reflection, and periods of time that the preference itself is. Thus in light 
of the stability constraints on considered preferences, I propose that the motivational strength 
of a considered preference is this stable motivational power. 
I propose that a case in which the strength of the considered preference does not match 
the strength of the desire response generates grounds for questioning the legitimacy of the 
motivational strength of both states. After all, in a rational agent there is an underlying drive 
for consistency amongst our motivations, because as a matter of metaphysical fact we can only 
act on one in a set of competing motivations, and it seems to be a matter of rationality that we 
act on the most important or valuable of any such competing options. I take it that this most 
important motivation is the one which is ‘rationally’ strongest, where what I mean by 
‘rational’ strength is that the strength of the state which is relatively stable (over time, across 
circumstances, and with respect to reflection). It is this idea that drives my view that we aim at 
a loose reflective equilibrium between our considered preferences and desire responses to some 
state of affairs, such that a mismatch between the strength of these states is evidence that 
something is wrong somewhere, and that something needs to change.  
How, then, does such a reflective equilibrium work? There is a range of conditions 
under which I desire the cake, and I desire it in virtue of its desirable features. This is true of 
both my considered preferences, and my desire responses. Thus these states, when directed 
toward the same object, are in part produced by a common cause, which is the property in 
virtue of which the thing is desirable to you. However, we tend to encounter difficulties when 
the strength of these two states does not match.131 For instance: If I have a strong considered 
preference to play the Cello and I reflect on that considered preference by generally 
                                                 
131 By ‘match’ have the fairly loose notion of approximately the same motivational strength in mind. 
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representing to myself in detail what it would be like to have it satisfied, yet I lack a matching 
(roughly equally strong) desire response, then I have reason to question that considered 
preference. Conversely, if I have an intense desire response to the idea of playing the Cello 
and I represent to myself what it would be like to have that desire satisfied, and this fails to 
generate in me a matching considered preference to do that thing, then I have reason to 
question that desire response. In the case where all is well with our desires, it seems that the 
strength of our considered preferences matches the strength of the related desire responses. 
However, when this is not the case, one of these states must either change, or be discounted in 
deliberation, as the agent’s actual motivation to obtain a particular state of affairs must have 
only one measure of motivational strength. 
So, in those cases where the strength of the considered preference and the desire 
response state do not match, the agent can either reject the motivational strength of one or the 
other, or change one in order to match the other. However, there is no one right way for an 
agent to reconcile such inconsistencies. Either of these cases can be made consistent by 
rejecting either the desire response or the considered preference as flawed, and thus in need of 
being brought into line with the other form of motivational strength. I take it that the 
question of which state is rejected in any particular case is going to be determined on the basis 
of a variety of relevant reasons. For instance, if it is a case where your considered preference is 
to do your duty, and the strength of your desire does not match, then it seems likely that your 
desire response will be rejected, as gaining emotional satisfaction is not a part of the aim of 
doing your duty. Conversely, there are other cases where it seems that the aim of desiring just 
is to gain such emotional satisfaction, as in the case of choosing a career in order to live a 
satisfying life. A mismatch here seems to provide a reason for rejecting the considered 
preference in light of a lack of a matching desire response. There are also other reasons that 
might come into play in making such a choice. The type of case that I am interested in is one 
in which one of the states is plausibly mistaken in the level of motivational strength that it is 
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displaying, and thus should be rejected in reaching equilibrium amongst motivations on these 
grounds. The specific case is one in which our conative system reliably produces desire 
responses which demonstrate an inappropriate strength. It is this, I will argue, which is going 
on in the case of temptation. 
Because the motivational strength of a desire response is determined by the intensity 
of that emotion, the motivational strength of that desire response is inappropriate if and only 
if the intensity of the desire response is inappropriate. The intensity of a desire response is 
inappropriate when it does not track the ‘normal’ response that the agent has to that thing 
when she is free from distorting influences, as was discussed in the previous chapter. I propose 
that what explains a violation of this norm, such as is evidenced in cases of temptation, is the 
conative system operating under abnormal conditions, conditions that interfere with her 
conative system and thus distort her desire responses.  
In the next section I will identify the conditions in which our conative system reliably 
produces desire responses whose strength tracks neither the normal strength for that desire 
response, nor the strength of the associated considered preference. In the last chapter I 
suggested that it is proximity which counts as abnormal conditions for the operation of the 
conative system. In the next section I will offer an analysis of why this is plausibly the case, 
by presenting a systematic way in which the strength of our desire responses increases as a 
result of the mere proximity of the good.  
Discounting the Future 
I propose that the mechanism that generates mistakes in our conative system under 
the condition of proximity is hyperbolic discounting, which is a particular way of discounting 
the future. Now, there is nothing troubling about discounting the future per se. It is natural 
that in some sense our evaluation of goods in the future is mitigated by how distant we are 
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from those goods. Experiencing a delicious cup of coffee is worth more to me at this moment 
than the same experience occurring two years, two weeks, two days, or two hours in the future. 
So, the intuition goes, the agent’s perception of how desirable or valuable some thing or event 
is to her, should, in some way, take into account the agent’s temporal distance from that thing. 
There are three closely connected questions that occur when we talk about agent’s discounting 
the future: (1) why do agents discount the future; (2) how agents should discount the future; 
and (3) how agents do in fact discount the future. It is through answering these questions that 
I can demonstrate that hyperbolic discounting is a mechanism through which our conative 
systems reliably yields mistaken felt emotional components of desire—desire responses whose 
intensity is not appropriate—under the condition of proximity. 
The first answers to the ‘why’ question were economic explanations of discounting the 
future produced in the thirteenth century debate over the moral permissibility of charging 
interest on loans. In hindsight, we can see that core of the issue was that people were willing 
to take money now on the condition that they repay a greater amount in the future. There was 
something about these people’s subjective attitudes toward money that made money possessed 
now worth more to them than the same amount of money possessed in the future. Conrad 
Summenhart, a late scholastic theologian at the University of Tübingen, in his ‘Treatise on 
Contracts’132 argued from the recognition of such time preferences to the conclusion that the 
fair price of a newly created debt was below the amount lent.133 This insight led to the 
argument that if the present value of a sum of money is greater now than it is in the future, 
then interest is simply making up this difference. The revolution behind this view was moving 
from valuing money in terms of its face value (objectively), to valuing money in terms of how 
much it is worth to the person (subjectively).  
                                                 
132  Summenhart, 1499. 
133  Rothbard, 1987. 
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When economists talk about discounting the future, part of what they have in mind is 
‘present value’ calculations. Consider an agent receiving $100. If the agent receives the sum 
today, according to her present value calculation, it will be worth $100. But if she receives 
$100 one year from now, her present value for it might be $95. Why might the present value 
of a good consumed now differ from its value if it is consumed in the future? There are three 
reasons.  
The first is that the good might be what is called a ‘dated commodity’. A ‘dated 
commodity’ is a commodity whose time of delivery causes fluctuations in its value to the 
agent. For instance, a bottle of wine that improves with age will gain value as time passes. In 
this case, the properties in virtue of which the wine is desired improve as time passes—the 
wine gets better and thus intuitively more valuable to the agent. Another sense in which a 
good can be a dated commodity is if there are opportunities that are gained or forgone by 
possessing the good at a particular time. For instance, if I have $100 today, I can invest it for 
the year and earn $5, so the $100 is worth $5 more to me now than it will be in one year’s 
time. This $5 difference is often referred to as an ‘opportunity cost’, and this represents a 
different type of change in the properties in virtue of which the good is valued. In this case, an 
earlier time of arrival of the $100 is an identifiable benefit to the agent, which should be 
included in her subjective valuation of the good.  
The second and third ways in which the present value of a good may be influenced are 
both variations on the theme of the risks or certainties related to receiving a good now vs. 
receiving the same good after a delay. One case is uncertainty about the delivery of the good 
itself. If I am certain that I will receive a good if I take delivery of it in the very near future, 
but I am to some degree uncertain that the good will be delivered if I contract to have it 
delivered at a future point, then there is an identifiable difference between what the good is 
worth to me now and what the promise of the good in the future is worth to me now. Let us 
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say that a piece of cake bought and consumed right now is worth $3 to me. However, if I 
purchase a contract to have an identical piece of cake delivered to me in three months time, 
there will be certain risks that something will go wrong in the interim. Perhaps I will fall 
under a bus; it is conceivable that the cake supplier may go out of business, and so on. All of 
these risks contribute to a measure of uncertainty about the outcome of receiving the cake in 
three months, which make the promise of a future good now, worth less than possessing the 
good itself now.  
The other case is that I may be uncertain about my tastes for cake in the future. The 
value of a good to an agent comprises not only of the good itself, but also what we might call 
the ‘uptake’ of the good. The goodness of the cake to me depends not only on the objective 
properties of the cake, but also my tastes for the cake. It is clear that having a cake when I 
greatly desire it will be worth more to me than having a cake when I am already sated, or have 
resolved to eat no more cake, or have developed an allergy to the cake, and so on. As agents it 
is both plausible and possible that our tastes will undergo such endogenous changes. These are 
causes for uncertainty, entailing that the promise of a cake in three months will be worth less 
to me than cake right now.  
These three cases all highlight some difference between what it would be worth to me 
now to have the good now, and what it would be worth to me now to have the promise of the 
same good later. The contrast is between my present view of present goods, and my present 
view of future goods. Thus the difference between the subjective valuation of money in the 
present and the subjective value of a good in the future is generally explained in terms of three 
factors: (1) changes in the properties in virtue of which the good is valued and opportunity 
costs; (2) uncertainty about the future delivery of the good, contrasted with the relative 
certainty about delivery in the very near future, and (3) uncertainty about my future taste for 
the good, contrasted with the relative certainty about my tastes in the very near future. A 
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present value calculation is the agent’s subjective valuation of a present or future good at the 
present time which takes into account these three types of change in the value of the good, 
which captures why it is that discounting the future is a natural, and in some form rational, 
aspect of our evaluative process. 
Exponential and Hyperbolic Discounting 
The second question is how it is that we do in fact discount the future. The default rate 
at which we discount the future is a feature of the way that we are psychologically disposed to 
value goods. In other words, this is an element of the conative system that produces the felt 
emotional response of desiring, our desire responses. The way in which any agent discounts 
the future is captured by the shape of her discount curve. There are two natural possibilities 
for the shape of this discount curve: hyperbolic and exponential. The shape of the agent’s 
discount curve is dictated by the equation which captures the way in which she discounts the 
future, and represents the agent’s present estimation of how desirable the promise of that good 
will be at various times. To borrow some terminology from Gideon Yaffe: Let G = the actual 
value of consuming the good to the agent; Y = the present value of the good with an actual 
value of G; C = the rate at which she discounts the future; and D = the delay between the 
present time, and the time at which the good will be consumed. Exponential discounting is 
expressed in the equation Y = G × CD; while hyperbolic discounting is captured in the 
equation Y = G (1 + D).134 An agent discounts the future exponentially when she discounts the 
future at some constant rate. If an agent discounts the future hyperbolically, when she is 
furthest from the good she discounts it to some large degree, and the rate at which she 
discounts reduces rapidly as the good becomes temporally proximal. 
                                                 









Figure 3: Discount Curves: Hyperbolic and Exponential 
In this diagram, both curves represent an agent’s views at time t0 with respect to the delivery 
of a good at t1 , t2 , t2,…, tn. The exponential curve demonstrates a constant rate of discount 
over time. The hyperbolic curve demonstrates a rapid decrease in the rate of discounting in 
the temporal proximity of the good, and a very large rate of discount when it is not in the 
temporal proximity of the good. Thus the difference between hyperbolic and exponential 
discounting is not a question of the value of the good in the present or the value of the good in 
the far future—both curves converge at these points—rather it is a question of how it is that 
the agent values the good in between.135  
 Consider what I will call a case of ‘simple’ goods. I will define a ‘simple good’ as a 
good which is not a dated commodity. In the garden variety of cases that I am going to 
consider, all simple goods will be subject to roughly the same uncertainties, and these 
uncertainties will be essentially constant over time. It might help to think of these 
uncertainties as the base line of general existential uncertainty that we all live with on a day to 
day basis—we may fear that we will have the flu or a headache tomorrow, or extra work of 
                                                 
135 The goods that I am talking about are a type of ‘Savage outcome’. In his seminal work of expected 
utility theory, the ‘Foundation of Statistics’, L. J. Savage defined an outcome as a ‘state of affairs in the 
world’ where that state of affairs includes not only a description of the world, but also a description of 
the way that the agent is interacting with the world. It is important to include the state of the agent in 
the outcome, because goods are valued by agents not merely in virtue of their properties, but also in 
virtue of how those properties affect the agent. No matter how laudable spinach may be on its own 




some kind, a crisis in the family (minor or major) and so on, but these are pretty constant 
fears. So, for any pair of simple goods, it seems that the mere passage of time should not 
change the agent’s desires for the goods. 
 
Figure 4: Exponential Discounting Curve 
The intuition is that if there is no change in the properties of the good in virtue of which it is 
valued, nor an endogenous change in the agent that would make the good more or less 
valuable to her, then there should be no change in the comparative desirability of the good to 
her. A way of putting this thought that we explored in the previous chapter is that there is an 
invariant character to our desires: your present value at time t for some simple good g 
consumed at t will be the same for every t which is the present. This invariant character does 
not imply that the agent should always value g to the same degree in another sense—it allows 
that when you view two instances of the same good, which are promised at different times, 
from the same temporal location, the good may be valued differently. It is consistent with this 
view about the invariant character of desires that your present value at t0 for some simple 
good g consumed at t0 + ε is different to your present value at t0 for g consumed at t1. The 
invariant characteristic of such non-dated goods is that the passage of time does not make 
them intrinsically better or worse, so they are not intrinsically better or worse for the agent to 
possess at any particular time. Thus in all cases of simple goods it is plausible to say that for 
each possible t qua the present, this graph should represent the agent’s relative desires for two 








Despite these plausible intuitions in favor of exponential discounting in the case of 
simple goods, as a matter of psychological fact, we do not naturally discount the future 
exponentially. In Picoeconomics and The Breakdown of the Will, George Ainslie presents a 
persuasive case that the default rate at which we discount the future is hyperbolic.136 In 
hyperbolic discounting, the rate at which the agent discounts future goods decreases as the 







Figure 5: Hyperbolic Discounting Curves 
g1 is a hyperbolically discounted simple good delivered at t1; g2 is a hyperbolically 
discounted simple good delivered at t2. If an agent discounts the future hyperbolically, the rate 
of discounting will be large when she is some temporal distance away from the good, but will 
rapidly decrease when the good is proximal. The problematic consequence of hyperbolic 
discounting is that it allows the possibility of earlier, smaller, goods being desired more than 
later, larger, goods when they are proximal. The period in figure 3 where the peak of the line of 
desirability of the smaller good g1 protrudes above the line of desirability for the larger good g2 
illustrates how such a reversal in comparative desirability occurs.  
Consider the case of choosing a desert at a restaurant. Jim has been to this restaurant 
before, and knows that the molten chocolate cake is by far his favorite desert, although there is 
                                                 
136  Ainslie & Haslam, 1992; Ainslie, 2001. 
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a key lime pie which comes a distant second. Now, Jim has gone to this restaurant with the 
express intention of ordering the chocolate cake, and he knows that if he had a choice between 
the key lime pie and the chocolate cake being delivered at the same time, he would, at all 
points prefer the chocolate cake to the pie. Moreover, he knows that if he does not have the 
chocolate cake he will regret it. Usually, when he is at this restaurant, the waiter takes orders 
for the molten chocolate cake before the entrée, as it takes 30 minutes to prepare. On this 
particular day, the restaurant is trying to get rid of its key lime pie, so the waiter doesn’t 
request orders for the chocolate cake before the entrée. Instead, the waiter comes to the table 
at the end of the meal carrying a piece of pie, and offers Jim the following choice: Either have 
the key lime pie now or the molten chocolate cake in 30 minutes. Let us assume that Jim is in 
no hurry, the ambience of the restaurant is lovely, and he and his companion are enjoying 
their conversation. There are no bad effects in the mere fact of waiting 30 minutes for desert 
(indeed, he may even enjoy it more after his dinner has settled, and he will certainly enjoy the 
conversation). Let t1 in the above diagram be the point at which Jim is offered this choice, t2 be 
the point at which he could have the chocolate cake, g1 the key lime pie, and g2 the chocolate 
cake. Because of his hyperbolic discounting, at the time that he is offered the pie his desire for 
the pie is stronger. So, it seems that as a result of hyperbolic discounting and the passage of 
time, Jim will choose the pie over the cake, even though in another perfectly reasonable sense, 
he ‘always’ prefers the cake to the pie.137 This example illustrates how it is that discounting 
the future hyperbolically can lead to reversals in preferences, and thus intuitively perverse 
choices as a result of the mere passage of time. Thus if an agent discounts the future 
hyperbolically, a shift in time alone will affect the comparative desirability of future goods for 
her. In short, the strength of her desire response will alter when the good is proximal.  
                                                 




The default hyperbolic shape of our discount curves is exemplified in many common 
cases of temptation. For instance, the difficulty of: keeping a diet, not procrastinating, 
refraining from scratching an itch, going to bed the optimal time, cleaning house, etc. These 
are not terribly exotic cases—they occur all the time. Such cases fall into the category of 
‘temptations’, as they have the structure of a hyperbolically discounted earlier good appearing 
to the agent to be more attractive than some longer term goal when the earlier good is 
temporally proximal.   
Such common cases of temptation work in the following way: Our considered 
preferences and desire responses are both effects of a common cause, which is the property(s) 
in virtue of which the thing is desirable to you. Now, these properties are nothing as general 
as a property of desirability. What happens in these temptation cases is that we have a 
property, such as tastiness (that may be a response-dependent property), where from both the 
proximal and the vanishing point my attribution of that property to the object remains the 
same. So, to use the terms of D’Arms and Jacobson about the fit of emotions, the object has 
the same shape for me from both perspectives. What changes between the vanishing point and 
the proximal cases is the strength of my desire response.  
We are no strangers to such temptations. Most of us have, on a daily basis, the 
opportunity to satisfy a short term desire which, if acted upon, will undermine the fulfillment 
of some presently weaker yet ultimately stronger, longer term, desire. A simple case of this 
would that of Kim which I introduced in the first chapter. Now, Kim’s desire to maintain her 
diet is stronger than her desire for forbidden foodstuffs, but she has a weakness for chocolate. 
Most of the time Kim succeeds in maintaining her diet, but when the opportunity to eat 
chocolate cake is to hand, she is overwhelmed by her desire for the cake. Consider a particular 
instance: Kim is passing her favorite bakery at 4pm on Tuesday. At that time, she is more 
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motivated to eat cake more than to maintain her diet. But when she is temporally separated 
from the opportunity to eat cake, she is more motivated to maintain her diet more than to eat 
cake. If we look at the strength of her desires over the course of Tuesday, she will begin the 
day desiring to maintain her diet more than to eat cake. But as she approaches the bakery (and 
thus the opportunity to eat cake) at 4pm, she is tempted to eat cake.  Over the day, the 
interaction between her desires for cake and dieting look like this: 
TIME ⇒ 





Figure 6: Kim’s temptation 
So Kim has a stronger motivation to eat cake than to maintain her diet around 4pm. Because 
the felt intensity of the urge to eat cake spikes when the opportunity to eat cake is proximal, 
she is discounting the eating of cake hyperbolically. However, dieting, as the kind of good that 
has no specific date of delivery, is going to behave more like an exponentially discounted 
good—it has no spikes in strength as there is no specific time of delivery where proximity 
effects can manifest. In sum, Kim’s problem is generated by the fact that her hyperbolic 
discounting of the cake causes a reversal of her comparative motivational strength of her 
desires for diet and cake when the possibility of the cake is proximal. 
Warranted Change in Desire 
Let me consider then, the general question: In which cases would such changes in the 
motivational strength of a desire, and thus when such a reversal in the comparative strength of 
two desires, be warranted? (Note that in this section I will use the generic term desire to apply 
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to both considered preferences and desire responses, as the same points apply to both.) 
Consider a case: 
 
TIME ⇒ 




Figure 7: Changeable Discount Curves 
In this example g1 and g2 have different discount curves. The shape of the discount curve 
represents the agent’s present estimation of how desirable the delivery of that good is at 
various times. Here the agent’s discount curve at time t0 reflects her present values at t0 for a 
good gn promised at times t1 … tn.    
There are, I propose, (at least) three ways in which the strength of a desire can change 
over time, and yet be rational. One case in which changes in the strength of a desire over time 
looks rationally irreproachable is the case of dated goods where the properties in virtue of 
which the thing is desired change as a result of the passage of time. Take the case of a wine 
which gets better as it matures. If my desire for the wine is grounded in the sensory pleasure 
of consuming the wine, then the properties in virtue of which I desire the wine are those very 
properties which will improve as it ages. It seems correct that the amount that I am willing to 
pay for the wine should track these properties. As the wine improves (or declines) so my price 
should increase (or decrease). I will call this the case of ‘property change’. This is a case where 
the underlying properties of g2 may change in a way that the underlying properties of g1 do 
not. Let us take g2 be a nice bottle of Chablis. Unlike most white wines, this fictional Chablis is 
good when it is young, declines a little with the loss of the freshness of youth, improves into 
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middle age, and then severely declines in old age. In this case changes in the agent’s discount 
curve are explained by changes in the properties in virtue of which the good is desired. 
The second and third cases in which it seems perfectly reasonable that the strength of 
my desires fluctuate over time, are both generated by my uncertainties about the future. For 
instance, it seems reasonable to be willing to pay less for a piece of cake to be eaten in three 
weeks time than a piece of cake to be eaten now. In paying in advance for a piece of cake I am 
running two risks that I do not run if I eat the cake immediately. I run the risk that the cake 
will not be delivered at the later time (uncertainty about the good). In general, the closer I am 
to some good the more certain I become of receiving that good. Such certainty (uncertainty) 
about the promise of a good in the future being fulfilled underwrites the second type of 
reasonable change in desires over time, an uncertainty about the external world that I will call 
‘delivery doubt’.  
The third case is a type of internal uncertainty. The value of a good to me resides not 
only in the properties of the thing itself, but my uptake of those properties as an agent. If I 
contract to receive a good in the future I run the risk that I will not be in the relevantly same 
state at the time of the delivery of the good. For instance, in the case of the cake I run the risk 
that my hunger for the cake will not be the same in three weeks time. I may simply not feel 
like eating chocolate cake at the appointed time, and chocolate cake eaten when you don’t feel 
like it is clearly less valuable than chocolate cake eaten when you really want it. Call this 
‘internal state uncertainty’. Another case of this which is pertinent in the case of goods 
promised in the far future is the concern of mortality.     
Thus warranted changes in the strength of desires happen in three ways: (1) there is 
some change in the properties of the thing in virtue of which it is valued (property change); 
(2) uncertainty about the likelihood of getting the good at the future time (delivery doubt); 
and (3) uncertainty about what your future attitude toward the thing might be (internal state 
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uncertainty). Note that these are derived from the three reasons that we canvassed earlier to 
explain why it is that we discount the future at all. 
The fact that such an account of warranted change in the strength of desires is 
available tells us that when desires are working properly, changes in desires—both in our 
considered preferences and desire responses—are explicable. We can trace them back to 
changes in ourselves or changes in our information about the desired thing, which are causally 
and reliably linked to the desirable properties of the thing. What is so strange about the 
change in desire which results from hyperbolic discounting is that this change is not a result of 
property change, delivery doubt, or internal property change. There is no alteration in Kim’s 
capacity to enjoy the cake, nor the cake itself, such that having the cake at that point would be 
a better outcome for her. The fluctuation of the felt intensity of her desire to eat the cake (her 
desire response) is not a response to changes in the properties in virtue of which she finds the 
cake desirable. The strength of Kim’s desire for the cake is changing in response to the mere 
proximity of the cake, rather than any change in either her certainty about receiving the cake, 
or the relevant properties of the cake. The claim that certainty is not causing this effect is the 
most delicate, so let me make this clear by considering what would happen if Kim was dining 
at the probabilistic restaurant. At the probabilistic restaurant, you do not simply order 
chocolate cake, but you order the gamble that you will receive a piece of chocolate cake with a 
probability of .6, and nothing with a probability of .4. The waiter will come to your table not 
only with the glorious piece of cake that smells deliciously chocolaty, but also the list of 
gambles that you can purchase.138 In this case, any shifts in Kim’s desire when the possibility 
of the cake is proximal are clearly not a matter of mere certainty about the outcome of having 
the cake, as the delivery of the cake is not certain. Yet if Kim discounts the possibility of 
having the cake hyperbolically, then she will have precisely the same reversal of preferences as 
                                                 
138 This example is due to James M. Joyce. 
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she does in the case where the delivery of the cake is certain. The reversal in Kim’s preferences 
that occurs through hyperbolic discounting cannot solely be caused by the effects of certainty 
and delivery doubt. Thus the change in Kim’s desire for the cake is not warranted, it is 
generated by some mistake that she is making about the characteristics of the desire, a mistake 
which is generated by hyperbolically discounting the future. It is this mistake which makes 
Kim’s case a case of temptation, rather than simply a case of changing desires. What, then, is 
this mistake? 
Hyperbolic discounting and temptation 
In the case of temptation generated by hyperbolic discounting, the time at which the 
good is delivered influences the felt intensity of the desire response in the absence of any 
changes in the properties in virtue of which the outcome is desired. So, what is it rational for 
Kim to do, in this case? Should she give in to temptation and eat the cake, or resist temptation 
and maintain her diet? The challenge of temptation is that if we deliberate just by weighing 
the relative motivational strengths of desires (and desire responses) then arguably she should 
give in to temptation, as ex hypothesi, her strongest motivation is that which she is tempted to 
do. However, this does not seem like the right response, as a part of what it means for 
something to be a temptation in the folk sense is that it is somewhat irrational compared to 
the other desires of the agent. I propose that through understanding how hyperbolic 
discounting works in such a case we can understand why it is that temptations should not be 
taken at their face value in terms of motivational strength, and thus should be rejected in 
deliberating about what it is rational to do in such cases.  
The case of hyperbolic discounting is one in which the difference between the strength 
of the desire from the proximal and the vanishing point perspective is a difference in the 
evaluative impact of the properties in virtue of which you desire that thing. What happens is 
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that the sensory features of the tempting alternative—its immediate properties—loom larger 
in your desire responses in the proximal case than they do in the vanishing point case. The 
properties of the objects of our desires can be (very roughly) divided into the categories of the 
attractive and the unattractive. It is seldom the case that all of the properties of some possible 
object of desire are univocally attractive or unattractive, and indeed, in these cases there is 
somewhat less room for conflicted responses to that thing. In most cases, objects of desire have 
a mix of such properties, which a desirous response tracking a balance of attractive over 
unattractive properties, and an undesirous response tracking the opposite balance. What 
happens in the case of hyperbolic discounting is that your desiring response emphasizes the 
immediate sensory properties of the thing, whether positive or negative, while minimizing its 
distal consequences, when the good is proximal. This is generally called a ‘salience’ or 
‘focalizing’ mechanism. In this way it is not that your response is getting the properties of the 
thing wrong—they are all still there—but rather that the intensity of the response to the 
properties is altered. This salience mechanism interferes with your conative system, which 
then produces a desire response that does not track your norm for such responses. I propose 
that Kim’s desire response (her desire for cake) is mistaken because it fails to track her normal 
response to the cake because of proximity effects, and in doing so comes apart from the 
strength of her considered preference. Thus hyperbolic discounting gives an explanation of 
why it is that temptations are mistaken desire responses, rather than desires on a par with all 
other desires. 
So, in cases of hyperbolic discounting, the earlier, smaller, good looms larger in the 
agent’s perceptions than does the later, larger good. This is effectively a spilt between her 
desire responses and her considered preferences. Insofar as the felt intensity of the agent’s 
desire tracks the goodness of the outcome for the agent, the desire responses and considered 
preferences of the agent will not conflict. But in cases of hyperbolic discounting, they come 
apart, because of the agent’s inappropriately intense desire response. 
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Recall how the reflective equilibrium between the strength of considered preferences 
and the strength of desire responses is supposed to work. There is a range of conditions under 
which I desire the cake, and I desire it in virtue of its desirable features. The automatic 
affective response that is the desire response also occurs over a range of conditions. Both 
considered preferences and desire responses are in part produced by a common cause—the 
properties in virtue of which the thing is desirable to you. However, we tend to encounter 
difficulties when these two conditions come apart, and thus require, for the purposes of action, 
to establish a rough equilibrium between them. There is no set way in which this should be 
done except for the case in which one of the states is mistaken. If one of these measures of 
motivation is mistaken, then it is the one that should be discounted in achieving this 
equilibrium. This is precisely what is going on in the case of temptation, and thus conflicts 
between the stronger motivational strength of temptations generated through hyperbolic 
discounting, and the weaker motivational strength of the associated considered preference, 
should be resolved by adopting the motivational strength of the considered preference.  
The trick, however, is to be able to identify when your motivations are being supplied 
by such a flawed desire response rather than a considered preference when you are in the grip 
of temptation. One of the characteristics of temptations is that it is not necessarily obvious to 
us at the moment of desiring how contrary this urge is to our considered preferences. I 
contend that temptation is not merely an emotional overlay of preferences that can easily be 
dismissed when it leads us astray; it also misleads us about what our considered preferences 
are in this case by undermining our ability to effectively reflect on what our considered 
preferences actually are. All temptations have in common the effect of distorting the agent’s 
reflections on her considered preferences. Due to the same focal and salience effects that 
generate the mistaken desire response, it is difficult to engage in clear-headed reflection about 
just what it is that your considered preferences are in such a situation, and thus to act 
rationally through resisting temptation. Specifically, given that we have more immediate 
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access to the felt intensity of the emotional response than to the strength of the desire, 
especially in cases of temptation when our evaluations of the properties in virtue of which we 
desire things have been distorted (thus distorting our reflections on our considered preferences 
in that moment), it is easy to confuse the strength of the desire response with the strength of 
the considered preference.  
Now, I began with the claim that there are two characteristics which make a proximal 
desire a temptation: (1) it conflicts with some more important, longer term, goal, (2) there is 
some effect at work that interferes with the agent’s ability to reflect on her considered 
preferences. I have identified the cause, nature, and structure of the conflict between the 
motivationally stronger yet ultimately weaker desire response, and the ultimately stronger yet 
presently weaker competing desire. What I now need to address is precisely what the effect at 
work that interferes with the agent’s ability to reflect on her considered preferences is, and 
how this is connected to hyperbolic discounting and inappropriately strong desire responses.  
How temptation undermines reflection 
That hyperbolic discounting is connected to the problematic aspect of temptation of 
interfering with the agent’s ability to clearly reflect on what her considered preferences are, 
can be discovered through considering why it is that our default rate of discounting the future 
is hyperbolic. I will describe three representative studies that support the conclusion that the 
default rate of discounting the future is hyperbolic, and also suggest why hyperbolic 
discounting tends to go along with the agent’s ability to reflect on her considered preferences 
being impaired.   
In all of these studies, the degree to which an agent will choose a smaller, sooner (SS) 
reward over a larger, later (LL) reward is taken as a measure of his impulsivity. The degree to 
which an agent resists this temptation is taken to be a measure of his self-control. The 
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experiments all display a preference reversal in preferences for LL over SS rewards when the 
delay before both rewards increases the same amount. The greater the tendency the agent has 
to choose SS over LL rewards as the delay increases, the more impulsive the agent. The 
discounting function which makes sense of such choices is hyperbolic, hence the findings of 
pervasive impulsivity in these studies is evidence for the existence of hyperbolic discounting. 
The first of these experiments is a series of amount versus delay trials using aversive 
sounds.139 The subjects were exposed to an uncomfortable level of white noise, with the 
reward being the cessation of that noise for some period. The delay in the experiment was th
time before the noise would cease, and the amount was the duration of time for which the 
noise ceased. As the delays before the LL reward increased, the participants chose SS rewar
in significant numbers, even though the LL reward was four times the size of the SS reward





                                                
140 These types of choices also demonstrate a robust tendency to hyperbolically 
discount the future.  
The second experiment also uses amount versus delay trials, with a period of access to 
a video game as a reward.141 This differs from the previous experiment in that the reward is a 
positive reinforcement, although it is similar in that it is a reward which is immediately 
consumed. The subjects of this experiment were asked to choose among a variety of different 
combinations of access to the game, and waiting time, with an initial series of trials 
establishing that the subjects, on balance, preferred playing the game to waiting. In trials 
where the two options had an equal amount of delay, and unequal amount of reward, the 
subjects preferred the greater playing time to the lesser. In trials where the amount of delay 
 
139 This description is taken from two such studies, (Navarick, 1982/8; Solnick, Kannenberg, Eckerman, 
& Waller, 1980/2). 
140  Navarick, 1982/8; Solnick et al., 1980/2. 
141  Millar & Navarick, 1984/5. 
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was unequal and the amount of reward equal for the two options, the subjects preferred the 
lesser to the greater delay. As in the previous case, the trials that supported the hyperbolic 
discounting hypothesis were the ones where one option embodied an SS reward, and the other 
a LL reward. If the delays were short, the agents preferred the LL to the SS reward. However, 
in a series of trials where the delay before both options was increased equally, a significant 
number of subjects reversed their preferences, choosing the SS over the LL reward. This is 
another situation that is naturally explained by the hypothesis that the default rate of 
discounting the future is hyperbolic. 
The third is a series of experiments testing the self-control of food-deprived adults 
using food as a reward.142 In this study, equal numbers of experimentally naïve men and 
women from 18-47 years were given controlled access to their favorite juice in an amount 
versus delay trial after refraining from eating or drinking for six hours. This experiment 
worked with a positive reinforcement that was immediately consumed, although juice for 
sustenance-deprived subjects differs in type and accessibility to the video games of the 
previous study. As in the previous two studies, a significant number of subjects displayed 
choices consistent with preferring LL to SS rewards where delays were short, and in trial 
where delays for both options were extended by the same amount, coming to prefer SS to LL 
rewards. 
All of these studies either appeal to agents who are not capable of exposing their 
choices to a rigorous cognitive screening process, or to choices amongst rewards that are not 
amenable to such cognitive oversight such as those that are consumed on delivery, or those 
that confound easy quantification. The relevance of such characteristics of the experimental 
condition is that they all have the effect of interfering with the subject’s ability to reflect upon 
the comparative goodness of the outcomes. All of the experiments in which hyperbolic 
                                                 
142  Forzano & Logue, 1992/8. 
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discounting appears to be prevalent create situations in which the ability of the agent to reflect 
is compromised in some way. In cases where these conditions which compromise reflection do 
not exist, such as gambles using money, most people appear to discount the future 
exponentially. What the condition of proximity does to us is to introduce various salience and 
focalizing effects that tend to compromise our ability to reflect by emphasizing the good in the 
desired alternative, and minimizing the bad. It is these effects that block what I have been 
calling ‘clear-headed reflection’ about what our considered preferences are in the condition of 
proximity.143  
The structure of amount vs. delay experiments reveal an agent’s ‘unreflective’ 
preferences better than experiments which employ easily quantifiable rewards such as money. 
Moreover, these ‘unreflective’ preferences are precisely the type of felt emotional components 
of desires that are generated by the conative system. The amount vs. delay experiments are a 
fruitful ground for such behaviors because it is evident that although we care about the delay 
before our reward, we are just not terribly good at quantifying and comparing amounts and 
delays. In essence, such experiments reveal our felt emotional components of desires before 
they are modified by reflection. It is no surprise, then, that the kinds of desire responses which 
are subject to hyperbolic discounting and tend to constitute temptations, are directed toward 
objects or outcomes that are not easily quantifiable, and have a tendency to elicit emotional 
responses of desiring, that is, desire responses.  
One reason that hyperbolic discounting may be counter-intuitive, which is a fairly 
common response, is because we tend to learn to discount exponentially. This in turn implies 
that we recognize the value of exponential discounting, and tend to take exponential 
discounting as a norm for measuring choices. Note that this is entirely consistent with it being 
                                                 
143 Note that my claim is not that we do not have any access to our considered preferences in cases of 
temptation, but rather that our access is blocked in such a way that we have an imperfect grasp of the 
stable motivational strength of our considered preferences. 
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the case that our default rate of discounting the future is hyperbolic, however it highlights the 
question of why such a default rate might evolve. 
I am not particularly committed to a specific account of the origin of hyperbolic 
discounting, as I am more concerned with the fact of its existence. It is plausible that an 
evolutionary story could be told about its origin, although this, like many other evolutionary 
tales, is a ‘just so’ story with all of the attendant difficulties. We can readily imagine a time in 
the past where hyperbolic discounting might confer significant evolutionary advantage, and it 
is only relatively recently that the disadvantages of hyperbolic discounting have become 
relevant. In a society of hunter gatherers whose time is spent in the service of merely 
surviving against a background of scarce resources, it is plausible that ‘over-valuing’ proximal 
resources by systematically magnifying the strength of desire responses to things such as that 
piece of food, that element of shelter, or that sexual partner, would be an excellent survival 
strategy. For a human who is starving, eating what is available now could be a critical 
difference in whether or not she survives. However, as I said earlier, this is simply a sketch of 
an evolutionary story which is merely meant to hint at the origins of hyperbolic discounting, 
without making any firm claims. 
The next question is what evidence is there that the hyperbolic curve is fundamental. I 
suggest that it is demonstrated by its persistence in the face of the clear advantages of 
exponential discounting. Consider: Not only can the person with an exponential curve exploit 
a person with a hyperbolic curve; Ms. Hyperbolic is doubly at a disadvantage as she will 
consistently undermine her long term goals by giving in to short term temptations. So, it 
seems clearly in Ms. Hyperbolic’s interests to discount the future exponentially. Moreover, 
Ms. Hyperbolic seems to recognize this in that most people, in cases of goods that are not 
immediately consumed, or when diabolical psychologists are not confounding their 
computations about outcomes, act as if they discount the future exponentially. Why does the 
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hyperbolic curve persist? Because it seems as if the rate in which we discount the future is not 
in our direct control. If it were, then we would all be manipulating our utilities in order to 
make things worth more to us. If I know that I am receiving a particular present g on my 
birthday, and my discounted valuation of g is six utiles, one consequence of my discount curve 
being in my direct control would be that I could change it so that g is worth 10, 12 or 20 utiles 
to me. We could coin our own rewards, and would, insofar as more reward is better, have a 
significant incentive to do so. Yet we do not do this, which suggests that this control is not 
something that we possess. This is not to deny that we can discount the future 
exponentially—we clearly do in many cases—but to claim that this is not our default rate of 
discounting the future. Our default rate is not a matter of choice, but rather a fact about our 
psychological dispositions to value goods. As Ainslie puts it: “The banker-like curve seems to 
represent an added accomplishment, not a fundamental change.”144 What makes this an added 
accomplishment is that it looks like exponential discount curves are a function of the agent’s 
reflection on, and deliberation about, her desires. Given that hyperbolic discounting is the 
default rate of discounting—that is, that hyperbolic discounting is a feature of the way that we 
are psychologically disposed to value goods—then exponential discounting represents a 
triumph of reason over our natural impulses in evaluation. This accomplishment is 
demonstrated in our considered preferences, which tend to act as if their objects have been 
exponentially discounted, but is lacking from our desire responses, because our desire 
responses are the product of the same conative system that represents our psychological 
dispositions to value goods. Thus it is not that hyperbolic discounting causes the proximity 
effects which undermine the agent’s ability to clearly reflect on her considered preferences. 
Rather, such proximity effects appear to be a precondition for hyperbolic discounting to 
manifest itself. 
                                                 
144  Ainslie, 2001, p. 37. 
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The hypothesis that temptations generated by hyperbolic discounting are connected to 
conditions which interfere with the agent’s ability to clearly reflect on what her considered 
preferences are is supported by the fact that all of the experiments in which hyperbolic 
discounting appear to be prevalent have one thing in common, they are situations in which the 
ability of the agent to reflect is compromised in some way. One of the experiments used 
cognitively impaired adults as subjects; other experiments use goods that do not lend 
themselves to quantification (and thus comparison), and so on. Thus hyperbolic discounting is 
plausibly the result of desire responses similar to the perceptual responses characteristic of 
various visual illusions. However what makes hyperbolic discounting so pernicious is that we 
are not good at correcting for this warp in our conative system in cases where the objects of 
our desires are not easily quantifiable, in the way that we do in the case of visual illusions. In 
cases where these conditions which compromise reflection do not exist, such as gambles using 
money, most people appear to discount the future exponentially. What the condition of 
proximity does to us is to introduce various salience and focal effects that tend to compromise 
our ability to reflect by emphasizing the immediate properties in a desired state, and 
minimizing the distal consequences of that state. These effects undermine the agent’s ability 
to fully reflect on what her considered preferences are in the condition of proximity.145 
                                                 
145 One issue that I should touch on is the relationship between my project and Ainslie’s views. Ainslie’s 
own project is descriptive, rather than normative. He is aiming to reconcile his empirical discovery of 
the prevalence of hyperbolic discounting with the utility model: “Hyperbolic discounting is a shock for 
utility theory. Suddenly the pavement moves beneath our feet, and we have to take the simple concept 
of maximizing expected reward not as a description of basic human nature but just as a norm that we 
try to implement.” (Ainslie, 2001, p. 38.) His goal is to give an account of how it is, on the assumption 
that we discount the future hyperbolically, that utility theory can describe the phenomena of self-
control, impulse, and addiction. Ainslie is aiming to form a hypothesis about the nature of the will that 
makes sense of akrasia and other paradoxes of motivation which “…does not violate the conventions of 
science as we know it.” (Ainslie, 2001, p. 12.) By modeling the mind as a population of temporally 
divergent and competing interests, shaped by hyperbolic discounting, Ainslie finds this theory. Insofar 
as Ainslie’s project is to describe an extension of utility theory, his aims are orthogonal to mine. Thus 
the uses to which he puts hyperbolic discounting are suggestive of, but neither coincident with, nor 
contradictory to the view that I am defending. 
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Thus hyperbolic discounting is an identifiable mistake in the conative system because 
it systematically produces desire responses whose motivational strength does not match the 
strength of the correlated considered preferences. Such desire responses cause difficulties with 
deliberation because the conditions that produce these temptations also interfere with the 
agent’s ability to reflect upon her considered preferences. In such cases it is easy to treat the 
strength of the desire response as the strength of the considered preference, especially as in 
many cases where the conative system is operating normally, the felt intensity of such desire 
responses is correlated with the motivational strength of the considered preference.  
Temptation and deliberation 
Now, this explanation of what it is that is wrong with temptations, and how it is that 
they are produced by the conative system operating under the abnormal conditions of 
proximity, still leaves a final issue to be addressed. This view is not particularly helpful unless 
I can solve the deliberational problem of how it is that we identify such flawed desires in the 
absence of a complete accounting of their origin, which is unlikely to be forthcoming.  The 
analysis that I have given so far about flawed desire responses only allows these responses to 
be identified if the agent has access to the mechanism by which the desire was created. But this 
is not a useful method for identifying such problematic desires in the midst of deliberation, 
and such identification is necessary to answer the challenge of temptation.  
I propose that we can use the comparative stability of our desires as a proxy for 
information about the motivational strength of our considered preferences, and thus as a 
proxy for identifying mistaken desire responses. In short, the concept of stability for desires 
can be used to give an account of why it is that in a case like Kim’s her considered preferences 
should be privileged over her desire response to the cake. Consider: Cases of unstable desires 
that result from hyperbolic discounting are analogous to cases of unstable beliefs generated by 
wishful thinking. In the case of Charlie Brown and the football introduced in the first chapter, 
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the change in his beliefs is caused by an event that has nothing to do with the truth of his 
beliefs. The changes in Charlie Brown’s beliefs, and thus this instability, are caused by 
information which is not evidentially relevant to his opinions. Charlie Brown is simply 
mistaken if he treats his opinions which are generated by wishful thinking on a par with all of 
his other opinions, as they are not sound. Essentially his belief change (and the belief that 
results from this change) is unwarranted, and should be discounted in his deliberations.  
In the case of Kim, the fluctuation of the felt intensity of her desire to eat the cake (her 
desire response) is not a response to changes in the properties in virtue of which she finds the 
cake desirable. Like the case of wishful thinking, this instability in her desire response is not 
moving Kim toward a better grasp of that which the state reflects, the underlying goodness of 
the outcome for her. The change in the strength of Kim’s desire for cake is not warranted 
because, like the change in Charlie Brown’s credence in the case of the football, it is not caused 
in the right way. Thus her desire change (and the desire that results from this change), is 
unwarranted and should not be treated on a par with her other desires in her deliberations.  
In the cases of Charlie Brown and Kim, what makes the unwarranted change in 
attitude clearly problematic is that the attitude which is strengthened comes to dominate some 
other, better grounded, attitude. In Charlie Brown’s case the attitude is his correct belief that 
he will not be able to kick the ball. In Kim’s case it is her considered preferences to maintain 
her diet. Thus paying attention to types of instability gives us an account of what it is that is 
wrong with proximal preferences (desire responses). Specifically, the instability in the felt 
intensity of the hyperbolically discounted desire response is not moving the agent toward a 
better grasp of the underlying goodness of the outcome for her, where that underlying 
goodness is expressed through either the normal desire response that she has to that thing, or 
the motivational strength of her considered preference. Thus, we can understand temptation in 
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terms of this identifiable type of instability that is displayed by temptations, instability which 
is not caused in the right way. 
How, then, does paying attention to the stability of these states solve the 
deliberational problem of how it is that we identify such flawed desires? Consider again the 
case of Kim: her mistake is that she is, in some sense, overestimating the goodness of the 
outcome of eating cake at the moment when the option of eating cake is proximal. The 
strength of her desire response, and thus the strength of her motivation for the cake, is 
abnormally strong for her. The epistemic problem is that her ability to directly evaluate 
precisely how good she really takes the outcome to be is distorted by the proximity effects that 
produce the temptation. Had she, at the time of choosing, had a different perspective to take 
on her desires—a perspective ‘out of the moment’ as it were—she would be able to see that 
the desire response for the cake is not her considered preference for the cake. The felt intensity 
of her desire for cake was weaker 10 minutes ago, and will be weaker 10 minutes from now, 
which is a fact about her desire responses that we have access to from this temporally extended 
perspective. However, Kim herself cannot simply take this third personal perspective in, so it 
is not clear that she is making a cognitive mistake in believing, at that point in time, that 
eating the cake is her considered preference.  What is happening is that there is some subset of 
her conative machinery—that part of the mind dedicated to the processing of the felt intensity 
of desire responses—which ‘takes over’. Kim has better access to her desire responses at the 
point of temptation through the lens of felt intensity, than she has to her considered 
preferences. From the outside, observing this shift in desires, we can see that it is not 
warranted, so the desire response for the cake is not warranted. But this mistake is only clear 
from the third personal perspective.  
As it stands, my view apparently suffers from an epistemic problem. How is it that 
Kim is able to tell that her desire is mistaken? Especially as given the distorting effects of 
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temptation on the agent’s capacity to reflect on her considered preferences, there is no direct 
way for the agent to do this. I have two responses to this issue.  
The first is that there is an application of the view that need not solve the epistemic 
problem. In arguing that inexplicably unstable desire responses are flawed, I am not 
suggesting that it is necessarily the case that the agent must have access to these mistakes. I 
want to appeal here to Nomy Arpaly’s distinction between an ‘account of rationality’ (a third 
personal theory of rationality that gives an account of when it is that an agent is acting 
rationally), and a ‘rational agent’s manual’ (a first personal theory for how you, as an agent, 
should deliberate in order to be rational).146 Interpreted as a third personal evaluation of 
rationality, my argument that temptations are flawed desire responses whose cause also 
interferes with the agent’s ability to reflect on her considered preferences need give no account 
of how the agent herself has access to this information, particularly given the subtle nature of 
the agent’s mistake.  
I do think, however, that a more can be said, using the concept of stability, about how 
this could be understood as a part of a rational agent’s manual. In other words, the agent may 
have access to information about her mistake, through taking the ‘third personal’ perspective 
on her competing motivations outlined earlier. The significance of the stability of beliefs in 
deliberation is that a measure of stability can act as a proxy for the justification of the belief. A 
deliberatively responsible agent can rely on stable beliefs (that is, beliefs that are known to be 
stable), in deliberation, even if they can no longer access the justification for that belief. 
Consider the case of auto-epistemic beliefs. An auto-epistemic belief is a belief that has the 
property that the fact that you have the belief at all, and that this belief is stable, is reason to 
think that it is true. That I have the belief that my mother’s middle name is Brenda is a reason 
to think that my mother’s middle name is Brenda. This is the case even if I have no other 
                                                 
146  Arpaly, 2003. 
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evidence or justification for the belief. In cases of such deeply ingrained information, the 
presence of a particular belief is reason to think that that belief is justified. Moreover, it is not 
just the fact that I have the belief right now which is reason to think it true, but the fact that I 
have had this belief over a period of time. In these circumstances, the fact that the belief is a 
stable one is evidence that the belief is a justified one. Here the stability of the belief acts as a 
proxy for the justification of that belief. The result is that the agent need not revisit, nor even 
know (at this point in time), the justification of such a stable belief in order to utilize the belief 
in deliberation.    
My hypothesis is that the stability of desires may play a role in deliberation similar to 
that of the stability of beliefs. It can act as a proxy for information relevant to deliberation —
information relevant to distinguishing mistaken desire responses from considered preferences. 
Kim’s desire for cake is a desire response, while her desire to maintain her diet is a considered 
preference. One difference between desire responses and considered preferences is the scope of 
the current information which enters into them. In understanding the strength of her 
considered preferences, Kim reflects on all of her reasonably accessible information about the 
world and herself, including her information about her past and future desires. In contrast, the 
strength of her desire response just is the felt intensity of her desire at a time. One thing to 
note about desire responses is that the intensity of such an automatic affective response is 
always tied to the moment of emotional experience, as they are occurrent states. If Kim takes 
these desire responses to be authoritative of the strength of her considered preferences, then 
the evidence that she is relying upon is very restricted. This would not be a problem if the 
information excluded from the calculation is irrelevant to the deliberation at hand, but it 
seems clear that information about the past and future state of the motivational strength of a 
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desire is relevant to this choice.147 It is both possible and coherent for Kim to feel a desire for 
cake more intensely than her desire to maintain her diet at a particular time, while being 
aware that in the past she has preferred maintaining her diet over eating cake. Stability acts as 
a proxy for this information by flagging abrupt and inexplicable changes in desire. 
Considering the relative stability of her motivations with respect to the passage of time will 
demonstrate which is more likely to be due to a desire response, and which due to a considered 
preference, and thus whether one of them should be discounted in deliberation.  
So, there are three pieces of indirect information about her desire responses and 
considered preferences that Kim has access to. The first is the stability of her motivation to 
diet, which is stable, thus indicating that it is likely to be a function of a considered preference. 
The second is the past strength of her desire to eat cake, which has been stably weaker than 
her desire to diet in all cases except those in which cake is proximal. The third is the sudden 
spike in the felt intensity of her desire to eat cake in the presence of the cake, which in its 
instability looks like a flawed desire. I propose that the instability of the sudden increase in the 
motivational strength of her desire, in the absence of any evidence of a warranted change, is 
evidence that this is not due to a considered preferences or normal response, but rather a 
desire response with inappropriate motivational strength. Thus the instability of her desire to 
                                                 
147 Let me make a delicate point here. Many of our deliberations about what to do take place 
automatically. We employ various heuristic devices to limit the scope of our deliberations, and to 
establish what we really care about in any given case, because a full reassessment of our entire corpus of 
beliefs and desires every time we are deciding whether or not to eat the chocolate cake is simply not 
feasible. I propose that felt intensity tends to act as proxy for our considered preferences in deliberation, 
which is just fine so long as our considered preferences and felt motivations do not come apart. The 
resilience of various motivational accounts of desire is evidence that this approach is pretty good. 
However, in cases of temptation, the trick is not to act on temptation, but to resist it. Given the 
prevalence of hyperbolic discounting, and such attendant splits between the agent’s desire responses and 
considered preferences, strict instrumentalism dictates that people should give in to temptation far more 
than they actually do or ought. Thus, as Ainslie might put it, the main challenge to instrumentalism is 
not to explain why we give in to temptation when we do, but to explain how it is that we manage to 
resist temptation so successfully. Moreover, it needs to say why it is that we take giving in to 
temptation to be some sort of failure. If strict instrumentalism were correct, then not only would we be 




eat cake, when compared with the stability of her considered preference to maintain her diet, 
indicates that maintaining her diet is, in this instance, her strongest stable motivation. Thus it 
is the motivation she should act on if she is only considering the strength of her considered 
preferences. Stability, then, can act as a proxy for information relevant to deliberation, 
information about what is, and is not, an appropriate desire response. The instability of desire 
responses that cannot be explained is a symptom of flaws in the proximal emotional responses 
of desiring, thus such inexplicable instability can be used as evidence that a desire has been 
produced by the conative system under abnormal conditions—in other words, inexplicable 
instability can function as a marker of flawed desires, desires that should be discounted in 
rational deliberation.  
Conclusion 
The challenge of temptation is that a plausible theory of desire must be able to 
differentiate temptations from other desires, and in doing so, show why it is that they should 
be treated differently in deliberation. By taking the emotional component of desire—the desire 
response—seriously, I have argued that what differentiates temptations from other desires is 
that they are inappropriately intense desire responses. The mechanism that produces such 
temptations is hyperbolic discounting, which is the default rate at which we discount the 
future. That it is the default rate means that hyperbolic discounting tends to be caused in 
conditions where the agent’s ability to reason about her considered preferences has been 
compromised in the manner discussed earlier. Thus Kim’s desire to eat cake is irrational 
because the change in the strength of her desire is not warranted—it is a change caused by 
hyperbolic discounting and proximity effects—thus it is not stable. My view is not that, as a 
general matter, stability or resilience is evidence of a desire that is going to stand up to rational 
scrutiny. Rather it is that in this very specific case of temptation generated by hyperbolic 
discounting, stability can act as a proxy in deliberation for direct information about what is, 
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and is not, a considered preference. Thus it is evidence about  which motivations should be 
discounted in deliberation. So, although instability is not in itself a problematic characteristic 
of desires, instability of the kind that generates unwarranted changes in desires is a marker of 
the type of conative flaw that generates temptations.  
Appealing to stability in this way also gives us an account of what precisely it is that is 
wrong with Gauthier’s proximal preferences (desire responses), which in turn generates an 
account of why they should not be treated the same as other desires in rational deliberation. 
Hyperbolic discounting shows why it is that the conative system yields felt emotional 
components of desiring which are not fitting under conditions of proximity. But more than 
this, it shows how pervasive mistakes in intensity occur in the conative system in the 
formation of proximal desires that count as temptations. Isolating the mechanism of 
hyperbolic discounting thus explains what causes these proximal shifts in our preferences in 
temptation cases. This is an improvement on Gauthier’s view, as he leaves it a mystery why 
we have these proximal shifts in our preferences, and does not address the question of 
precisely what it is that is wrong with them. 
Recall how the reflective equilibrium between the strength of considered preferences 
and the strength of desire responses works. There is a range of conditions under which I desire 
the cake, and I desire it in virtue of its desirable features. The automatic affective response that 
is the desire response also occurs over a range of conditions. Both considered preferences and 
desire responses are in part produced by a common cause—the properties in virtue of which 
the thing is desirable to you. However, we tend to encounter difficulties when these two 
conditions come apart. If one of these measures of motivation is mistaken, then it should be 
discounted in achieving this equilibrium. I have argued that the flawed desire responses should 
be discounted in achieving reflective equilibrium between the motivational strength of desire 
responses and the motivational strength of considered preferences, on the grounds that it 
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results from the conative system operating under abnormal circumstances. However, I think 
there are also independent reasons for reaching a reflective equilibrium in this way.  
Another, and different, species of argument for favoring considered preferences over 
flawed desire responses in such cases is that hyperbolic discounting opens us up to various 
types of exploitation. One such form of exploitation is extremely common and widely 
successful. Every time that you go to a restaurant, and the server brings you a dessert tray to 
look at after you have eaten your main, your tendency to overestimate the attractiveness of 
dessert when it is right in front of you is being exploited. There are endless articles in 
marketing magazines advising various businesses how to exploit the kinds of temptations that 
are generated by hyperbolic discounting.  
A different face of this same vulnerability is that such proximal preferences, in the 
sense that they short-circuit our considered decisions about what is valuable to us, undermine 
our autonomy in an identifiable way. They interfere with our ability to clearly reflect on what 
our considered preferences are in predictable ways. This is what is being exploited in the desert 
tray case, and it can’t be good. Thus in a very straightforward sense, privileging these flawed 
desire responses over considered preferences makes us worse off. However, this is not to say 
that we can never rationally act on whims, inclinations, or other species of spontaneous desire, 
rather, the claim is that we cannot act on them when they are contrary to those considered 
preferences that we wish to maintain. 
In sum, these automatic affective responses are connected to desires because they 
capture the relationship of desiring between agents and the objects of their desires. They solve 
the gap in Schroeder’s Reward Theory of Desire, because such automatic affective responses 
provide a principled explanation for why it is that some representations are constituted by the 
agent as rewards while others are not. Finally paying attention to this emotional component of 




plays in accurately or inaccurately generating desire responses, and shows that classic cases of 
temptation are generated by the conative system operating under abnormal conditions. Thus 
temptations should not be treated on a par with other desires in rational deliberation, because 
they are irrational states in the sense that they are inappropriately strong desire responses.   
 
C H A P T E R  6  
CONCLUSION 
 
There are three concluding points that I want to make. The first is to acknowledge 
those areas of the dissertation where I have not fully discussed the relevant issues. The second 
is to suggest those areas of future research that arise from the dissertation. The final and most 
important point that I want to make is what I take to be the main contribution of the 
dissertation to be. I will address these in turn. 
There are several issues which I have excluded from the scope of the dissertation that 
should be addressed in a fully realized version of the view put forward here. I note them here 
both as a recognition of these gaps, and because these gaps suggest interesting areas for 
further exploration.  
The first of these issues is that I suggested that Schroeder’s Reward Theory of Desire 
is best understood as a theory of desire change, rather than a theory of desire. However, I did 
not address precisely how this might work. I take it that a full discussion of this possibility 
would be fruitful area of further inquiry. A particularly interesting question here is how this, 
as an account of desire change, would interact with the account of warranted and unwarranted 
changes in desire that I gave in chapter five.  
Another issue is precisely what the connection between full-fledged desires 
(considered preferences), and the automatic affective responses of desiring (desire responses) 
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is. I have treated desire responses as connected to, and a type of evidence about, considered 
preferences. But I am sure that this is not the full story. I suspect that a comprehensive 
analysis of these states will yield a view of desire-like states that exists on some interesting 
continuum between these two extremes, with some unclear line between what should, and 
what should not, be treated as a pure case of desire. This is not only a gap in the argument I 
have given here, but also an area for further research.  
The last of the elements of the dissertation which require greater attention than I have 
given here is the analysis of the temptation cases. I have considered only a restricted, albeit 
common, case of temptation—that of temporal conflicts amongst motivations resulting from 
hyperbolic discounting. A stronger version of the case that I have presented would present 
both a taxonomy of temptation cases, and a discussion of the rationality or otherwise of acting 
on those temptations.  
Not only are these areas for discussion which are highlighted by the gaps in the 
discussion I have given, there are a variety of fertile possibilities for further research generated 
by the positive contribution of the dissertation—the various properties of desires that I have 
defended—the accounts of stability, warranted and unwarranted change in the strength of 
desires, and the existence of the emotional component of desires.  
One possible such extension of the work here is in applying the idea of the stability of 
desires to the question of how to determine the right strategy for choice when we are choosing 
diachronically. Diachronic choice is what happens when we make choices that are implemented 
over time, rather than at a time. It differs from synchronic choice—choice at a time—in that it 
faces the problem of future action, which is the question of how it is that my commitment at 
the present time to some action in the future (in the form of a plan, course of action, or 
future-directed intention), can (or should) affect my actions at the relevant future point. This 
problem is particularly salient in cases of desire change, a subset of which I have been 
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exploring here. By their very nature, intentions are temporally located – they are formed at a 
time, in light of a particular set of desires and beliefs. If we are acting on an intention at the 
approximate point in time at which it is formed, then there is no difficultly with this. As I 
form the intention to sip my coffee and immediately reach out to do so, the beliefs and desires 
that lie behind this intention are, in the vast majority of cases, going to be the same 
throughout the intention-action sequence. But in cases like that of Ulysses and the Sirens, the 
agent desires one thing when he plans what to do on hearing the Sirens, and quite another 
when it comes time to implement his initial plan. In dynamic choice theory such a change in 
desire goes under the name of ‘dynamic inconsistency’.  
What makes dynamic inconsistency so problematic is that when I form an intention 
about actions that will take place in the future; I am forming a plan to act at that future time. 
But this causes a problem for explaining action over time, lucidly explained here by Michael 
Bratman: 
Future directed intentions and plans are, after all, revocable: they do not control one's 
future conduct by way of some mysterious action at a distance; and many times, in the 
face of new and relevant information, we recognize that it would be folly to stick rigidly 
with our prior intention period so in exactly what sense am I now committed to later 
action when I settle now on a plan so to act then?148 
The mysteriousness of the motive force of such resolutions lies in the question of why my 
future self should adhere to some resolution that my past self made. Especially as my past self 
resolved to so act when she was not experiencing the desires that my future self is 
experiencing at the time the choice is to be acted upon.  
There are two modes of choice that are often presented as solutions for this problem, resolute 
choice and sophisticated choice. Resolute choice is the view that we can form an intention at a 
particular time, and then succeed in implementing that intention no matter how our desires 
                                                 
148 Bratman, 1999, p. 2. 
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change, simply by resolving to act on that intention. Sophisticated choice is the view that it is 
rational to act on that desire which is strongest at the moment of choice, so if you want to 
prevent your future self from acting what you know will be her strongest desire—in some 
cases that which she is tempted to do—you must ensure that she is not in a position to have 
that desire. In other words, the strategy of sophisticated choice is to avoid the mere possibility 
of temptation. What motivates this view is that it is always rational to act on your strongest 
desire, whether or not your present self thinks that your future self’s desire is in fact a 
temptation. This view promotes the primacy of the present self. On this view, that which the 
agent is right to do is that which she judges to be right at the moment of acting. Past decisions 
are taken to have no deliberative weight. In essence, the agent is assumed to begin deliberating 
about what to do at each moment of choice with a ‘blank slate’, consulting only the beliefs and 
desires that she has at that point in time. This is in contrast to the approach of resolute choice, 
which holds that the agent’s prior intentions/desires should be taken into account when 
making choices. Now, neither of these accounts of how it is rational to choose in the face of 
dynamic inconsistency is clearly more plausible than the other. Indeed, there are examples in 
which it looks obviously rational to privilege your present choices over your future self’s 
views; and other cases where it seems clearly rational to privilege your future self’s views over 
your present choices. The resolution solution to the problem of dynamic inconsistency is 
controversial because it doesn’t seem to be the intuitively right thing to do in some cases 
(although it clearly is in others). I suspect that a plausible mixed strategy of rational choice in 
some cases and sophisticated choice in others could be defended by paying attention to the 
relative stability of the desires involved in the preference reversals. 
Another area for future research that looks promising is in terms of using the 
properties of desire that I have proposed to generate norms of rational criticism for desires, 
thus challenging the strict Humean view that desires are not the kind of states that are 
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amenable to rational criticism. I think that such norms may be found in both the account of 
warranted and unwarranted desire change, and in the account of how it is that desire may be 
more or less stable with respect to reflection. The existence of norms of rational criticism for 
desires would have many interesting implications in decision theory, rational choice, and 
action theory.       
In conclusion, throughout the dissertation I have been examining the nature of desire 
through the lens of the challenge of temptation. I began by pointing out that the challenge of 
temptation cannot be answered by the currently favored simplistic accounts of desire that treat 
them as states with just the two basic characteristics of motivational strength and object. In the 
intervening four chapters I have discussed accounts of desire that are inadequate in a variety of 
ways, and defended the view that desires have certain attributes, attributes which I appealed to 
in giving an answer to the challenge of temptation. I think that the reason that the challenge 
of temptation should be of general interest is that it tells us something about the inadequacy 
of most common theories of desire. Indeed, the theories which I have canvassed generally 
failed to meet the challenge of temptation for reasons connected to their simplicity. What the 
challenge of temptation does is to illustrate the necessity for a more complex account of 
desires. Thus the underlying aim of this dissertation is to give a more psychologically realistic 
picture of desires than is the norm in philosophical discussions of rationality, action, and 
deliberation.  
Similarly, I take the main contribution of this dissertation not to be the specific 
response that I offer to the challenge of temptation, but rather the various properties of desires 
that I have identified and defended in giving this response. Specifically: the account of how 
desires may be more or less stable with respect to reflection and new information; the role of 
the emotional component of desires, desire responses, in variously forming and undermining 




how it is that we are psychologically disposed to value goods over time (hyperbolically), and 
the way in which it is rational to value goods over time (exponentially); and the account of the 
difference between warranted and unwarranted changes in the strength of desires. However 
this is more of a picaresque exploration of some of the properties of desires other than 
motivational strength and object, than a fully realized theory of desire. I hope that it makes 
the point that desires are far more complex than they are generally accepted to be.
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